Overall, Al-Awlaki's speech reveals a desperate attempt to revive an organization that has lost its momentum and legitimacy, even among its sympathizers. The rhetoric does not reflect true solidarity with the tragedy in Gaza but rather exploits it as a tool to polish the violent agenda of a group that is struggling with an identity crisis and shrinking popular support.

Ibrahim Ali (South24)

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In his first media appearance since assuming leadership of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), succeeding Khaled Batarfi in March 2024, Saad Atef Al-Awlaki delivered a video speech, broadcast by the AQAP’s media arm ’Al-Malahem Foundation‘. The 30-minute speech, delivered on June 7, focuses on the developments in Gaza in the aftermath of the bloody war launched by Israel after the October 7 2023 operation.

 

First: Gaza as an Entry point for Jihadist Repositioning

It is apparently clear that the AQAP was not concerned with the events in Gaza since the start of the war. There were no logistical or field activities or even a media stance during the initial months of the war. This can be attributed to the AQAP’s declining regional influence and diminished capabilities following the security crackdowns and geopolitical shifts. Amidst the growing public and official support for Gaza around the world, the delay in the AQAP's stance appears to have become a burden. This pushed it to adopt an aggressive stance in order to get back to the forefront of the global jihadist discourse. This can be understood from the timing and content of Al-Awlaki's speech.

 

It is noteworthy that Al-Awlaki's first speech was entirely dedicated to Gaza, despite the organization's new leaders usually beginning with internal mobilization messages or speeches directed to areas where it is active. The choice of Gaza has a symbolic dimension, as the group is attempting to take advantage of the momentum of the war to regain its media presence and remind followers of its old Jihadist narrative, especially regarding the Palestinian issue. 

 

Al-Awlaki harked back to rhetorical themes dating back to the era of Osama Bin Laden, Abdullah Azam, and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, seeking to resurrect the group’s historical link to the Palestinian issue. He also cited statements by these leaders, to suggest that what is happening today in Gaza validates what these leaders proposed decades ago. Al-Awlaki’s invocation is part of a deliberate process to recycle the justifications for global jihad, and link them with the new scenes of bloodshed. 

 

What sets this speech apart is its use of actual scenes from the Gaza tragedy, especially pictures of the dead children and body remains, as a visual background --in a rare departure from the AQAP's usual visual style. The aim is to create emotional empathy and channel that into an enthusiastic adoption of the organization's narrative. 

 

Second: Escalation, Incitement, and Chaos. A Discourse seeking an Audience

 

The most dangerous aspect of Al-Awlaki's speech is his outright incitement to chaos and rebellion in several Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Gulf states, in a manner unprecedented in the organization. He called on employees of strategic ministries such as oil and banks, to hold strikes. He urged the tribes to arm themselves in preparation for what he called “the promised day”. 

 

Among the key elements of his speech, and probably the most alarming, is his outright call to revive “assassinations”, and target Arab rulers, such as Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi, the Jordanian King, and all Gulf leaders. He also called on the military pilots to use their weapons against their governments - in one of the most extreme directives issued by the AQAP since its foundation. Clearly, this bloodthirsty rhetoric, especially coming from a new leader, suggests that the AQAP is trying to compensate for the decline of its influence on the ground by igniting internal chaos within relatively stable countries. It also represents its pattern of invoking internal chaos after open war against regimes has failed. 

 

This type of incitement goes beyond the traditional jihadi narrative, which is often limited to denouncing regimes or issuing calls for jihad, and shifts toward specific incitement directed at segments within societies. In doing so, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen is attempting to adopt a model closer to that of revolutionary armed movements that sow chaos from within.

 

Al-Awlaki does not hide his attempt to tap into popular anger, particularly among the youth, by placing the blame for what is happening in Gaza on the ruling regimes and portraying the AQAP as a principled organization whose stance on Palestine has remained unchanged, unlike others. When he found that this was not enough, he expanded the circle of blame to include wealthy individuals and religious scholars, accusing them of falling short in supporting "jihad”.

 

However, what is surprising is Al-Awlaki's complete silence on Iran and its proxies in the region, especially Hezbollah and the Houthis. This unusual silence, at a time when he could have attacked the organization's traditional foes, raises questions about its motives. It is difficult to separate this from circulated reports about the presence of Al-Qaeda leaders in Iran, foremost being the Leader of the parent organization, Ahmed Saif Al-Adel, which reinforces the existence of an undeclared tactical rapprochement or undeclared alignment. Additionally, multiple reports refer to coordination and cooperation processes between the Houthis, the AQAP, and the Somali movement ’Al-Shabaab‘. 

 

Third: Recycling anti-US rhetoric under ISIS guise

The US was prominently featured in Al-Awlaki's speech, using extremist language. Al-Awlaki called on Muslims in the United States to carry out attacks without consulting anyone, invoking Osama bin Laden's famous phrase, “Consult no one in killing Americans”. Most alarmingly, he makes no distinction between civilians and military targets, directly inciting the killing of women and children, justifying it as “retribution.” 

 

The video includes incitement against prominent political and economic figures such as US President Donald Trump, businessman Elon Musk, US Vice President JD Vance, as well as the US Secretaries of State and Defense. Moreover, the logos of Tesla and a number of brands associated with American economic powerhouses also appear.

 

This type of direct public incitement against public figures reflects a shift in the organization’s strategy, of mobilizing extremist and unorganized groups by using visual tools and familiar slogans, resembling the ISIS’ style more than Al-Qaeda’s traditional rhetoric.

 

Conclusion: A Desperate cry in the name of Gaza 

 

Overall, Al-Awlaki's speech reveals a desperate attempt to revive an organization that has lost its momentum and legitimacy, even among its sympathizers. The rhetoric does not reflect true solidarity with the tragedy in Gaza but rather exploits it as a tool to polish an agenda of violence of a group that is struggling with an identity crisis and shrinking popular support. Al-Awlaki has attempted to rebrand the AQAP as the bearer of a “liberation” project that goes beyond mere geographical boundaries. However, in doing so, he has resorted to calls for chaos, assassinations, and indiscriminate killings. 

 

In a regional context where power balances have shifted and the Al-Qaeda's presence has waned amid the rise of more violent and organized groups, Al-Awlaki's speech appears as a desperate summoning of a past era -- rather than a declaration of a new phase. In essence, it represents an attempt to manufacture leadership on the ruins of a tragedy, at a time when the world needs discourse to stop destruction, not promote it.