“Amid this gradual collapse in the structure of the Yemeni state, there is need for a rational and courageous step to restore the initiative to the Arabs themselves, and pull the Yemeni file out of the whirlpool of ambiguity and internationalization”

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Hany Mashour (South24)

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More than a decade has passed since the launch of ’Operation Decisive Storm‘, but the Yemeni scene continues to be enveloped in the fog of regional and international politics, witnessing one war after another, and moving from failure to collapse. The Saudi-led Arab Coalition, which engaged in the war under the slogan of “restoring legitimacy”, today faces a moral and strategic question: Have we lost Yemen… and is it possible to rescue what remains of the state?

A decisive victory over the Houthis was not achieved and nor has the Internationally-Recognized Government so far regained its sovereignty. The war has turned into a draining conflict in which the local, regional, and international dimensions are intertwined. Even more dangerous is that Yemen has today become an arena for the recycling of ideological groups with vague international deals, similar to what happened in Afghanistan with the Taliban or in Syria with Al-Julani. Today, the Houthis are being normalized in North Yemen as a de facto authority, while channels have opened again to empower the Muslim Brotherhood in South Yemen, amid a regional silence tinged with hesitation and confusion.

This path was not inevitable but is rather the result of an accumulation of multiple mistakes, most notably the absence of a unified Arab strategy for what victory in Yemen means. Is it merely for the defeat of the Houthis, or to rebuild a civil state, or curtail Iran’s influence? The ambiguity of the objectives has led to the scattering of resources and a loss of direction. While Saudi Arabia and UAE were busy in the field battles, Oman managed the dialogue from behind the scenes with firm neutrality. Meanwhile, Qatar has been accused of supporting Islamic groups in South Yemen, deepening the Gulf divide over the Yemeni vision. This fragmentation has allowed the Houthis to exploit these contradictions, and even play the Omani mediation card when the crises intensify.

Amid this decline, the US administration, during Donald Trump’s second Presidential term, announced the suspension of its airstrikes against the Houthis in exchange for the cessation of the group’s attacks against US vessels in the Red Sea. In this regard, US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, said that the United States doesn’t want to repeat what it did in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting that the Houthis have “surrendered”. Meanwhile, the Houthis announced the besieging of the Israeli Port of Haifa, reflecting a stark contradiction between the American and Houthi narratives. This contradiction at its core conceals an unannounced deal in which the US accepts the Houthis’ presence as long as they stop threatening its direct interests.

The irony here is that the price for this “silent collusion” is being paid by Yemen itself along with the Arab Coalition states, which now appear to be operating from behind the scenes, rather than from the heart of events. South Yemen, which fights the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Ansar al-Sharia, ISIS, the Houthis, and the Muslim Brotherhood, in defense of a civil state project, today finds itself marginalized at the negotiation table, and is being subjected to arrangements that don't reflect South Yemen’s sacrifices and political vision. As for North Yemen, it is being redrawn according to a map that serves regional power balances rather than the building of a nation state.

Amid this gradual collapse in the structure of the Yemeni state, there is need for a rational and courageous step to restore the initiative to the Arabs themselves, and pull the Yemeni file out of the whirlpool of ambiguity and internationalization. This initiative should be launched by the UAE, which has over the past years demonstrated clarity of stance and has consistently supported stability due to its experience in understanding the complexities of the field. Therefore, Abu Dhabi should call for an Arab conference on Yemen, in partnership with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and include Oman and Qatar to ensure a comprehensive Gulf position. Muscat, thanks to its unique relationship with the Houthis, can help break the deadlock in negotiations, while Doha, if it is committed to controlling its interventions, can contribute to gaining the trust of the Southern parties. This conference can only succeed with a unified Arab stance, which rejects taking “special peculiarities” as a pretext to float armed groups.

This conference should mark a turning point in the path of the Yemeni crisis, not just be a repetition of formal conferences. What is needed is a clear political platform to establish new rules for dealing with the crisis. The first rule is: rejecting any political normalization of the Houthis without completely disarming them. There should be no political partnership with Islamist political groups which have undermined the notion of the state in more than one country. The second rule is: South Yemen’s right to self-determination should be recognized as part of a fair settlement which guarantees rights and does not create new centers of hegemony. The third rule is: support the building of institutions of a modern Yemeni state based on non-exclusionary foundations, based on citizenship and not quotas. 

In this critical juncture, Cairo and Riyadh will become the main partners in drafting the required initiative. Egypt, with its Arab and historical weight, has the capability for framing a solution as part of the concept of Arab national security, especially since the security of the Red Sea is organically tied to its direct interests. In fact, the concept of ’the Arab national security‘ was actually founded as defined by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser in the wake of the Tripartite Aggression of 1956. This was later reflected in Egypt’s support for Aden’s independence in 1967. The Strait of Bab Al-Mandab and the Suez Canal form a strategic artery that cannot be separated. As regards Saudi Arabia, which has revised many of its regional policies over the past years, it should now leverage this shift to reposition itself in the Yemeni file, not by withdrawing but by correcting the course and achieving a delicate balance between the necessities of security and stability and respecting the will of Yemenis. 

A notable paradox emerges in the positions of some of the regional players. While Oman has kept dealing with the Yemeni crisis using quiet diplomatic tools, Qatar has been accused of prolonging the war by supporting groups linked with the Muslim Brotherhood, contributing to complicating the paths to a solution. In light of the developments in the region, the path to a solution in Yemen can no longer be separated from the stability of the entire Gulf. Just as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi pay the price of the continuation of the conflict, Oman finds itself facing security challenges due to any possible regional flare-up. As for Qatar, it has to revise its policy toward Yemen if it wants to move from being a source of trouble to being part of the resolution. 

The above proposal is based on the fact that relying on the Americans or the international community has proven to be a failure. Major powers deal with issues — including the crisis in Yemen — from the perspective of interests, not principles, and they rehabilitate ideologically driven groups whenever needed. What happened with the Taliban, Hezbollah, and Al-Julani can very well be repeated with the Houthis. Therefore, saving Yemen is no longer merely a moral or historical responsibility, but has become a strategic necessity for the security of the entire region. Arab hesitation in confronting this situation will lead to catastrophic consequences, not only in Yemen but also in the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea. If Yemen falls completely into the hands of armed religious groups, it will become an ungovernable arena for exporting chaos that cannot be contained. The time has come for a rational step -- that starts in Abu Dhabi, is adopted by Riyadh and Cairo, and with Oman and Qatar involved in a sustainable solution, which will lay the foundation for a new Arab partnership.

Although the factor of time has given the regional and international parties the opportunity to impose their own visions for Yemen’s future, the Arab role can still regain the initiative, provided their actions are bold and clear. Merely opposing the normalization of armed groups isn't enough, but an alternative should be proposed. It is not sufficient to just warn about the dangers of militias’ weapons but it is necessary to support the state-building project. It is also unacceptable to keep the South Issue hostage to tactical calculations, especially after the great sacrifices made by its people in pursuit of an independent national project. 

The world is redrawing the map again, and the major powers operate according to their cold logic of interests, not ethics or history. If there is no real Arab will to chart a path to prevent the fall of Yemen into the grip of non-state actors, the next explosion will not be limited to Sanaa or Aden but will extend further. Therefore, the biggest danger today is not just the Houthi aggression but the Arabs' complacent approach and their surrender to the idea that Yemen is beyond influence. But the truth is that Yemen can still be rescued, provided action is taken immediately and based on a comprehensive vision, not a fragmented one, with sincere Arab partnership that includes all active actors, from the Gulf to the Atlantic. From this moment on, the test of will begins.