“The renewed Houthi attacks on commercial vessels came just ahead of the Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia and amid high-level U.S.–Israeli meetings—underscoring a deliberate timing ..”

Abdullah Al-Shadli (South24)

In the current month of July, the Houthi group in Yemen launched violent attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea, using explosive-laden boats, guided missiles, and drones. These attacks led to the sinking of the MV ‘Magic Seas’ on July 6, followed by the MV ‘Eternity C’ on July 8, resulting in the deaths of four crew members, injuries to some crew, and the disappearance of more than 15 individuals, according to the United Nations.

According to official statements issued by the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, Washington accused the Houthis of kidnapping several surviving crew members from the Eternity C after the attack, marking a serious escalation in the nature of their operations.

This sudden resurgence, following a months-long halt since November 2024, raised fundamental questions regarding the true motives behind the Houthis’ resumption of their maritime campaign that originally began in November 2023. While the group insists on linking its operations to what it calls “support for Gaza”, observers argue that the timing, regional context, and its abrupt return suggest other explanations.

Experts and analysts interviewed for this report stated that the recent escalation is not merely a reaction to the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza, but likely part of a deliberate strategy directed by Tehran. This is seen as a coordinated regional retaliation following the unprecedented military escalation between Israel and Iran between June 13 and 24, which led to the killing of multiple Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists, and air strikes on its nuclear facilities involving U.S. support.

Amid this escalation, fears are rising that Yemen could once again become a proxy battlefield, with maritime pressure tools being used to influence potential nuclear negotiations between Iran on one side, and Israel and the United States on the other.

Or, the maritime attacks could also serve as instruments of retaliation, in a scenario that threatens to derail the remaining prospects for peace in the decade-long Yemeni crisis and opens the door to renewed instability.

Attacks Stopped

Since the November 19, 2024, attack by the Houthis on the Turkish-flagged vessel Anadolu S in the Red Sea, the territorial waters of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have witnessed an unusual period of calm. The Houthis ceased their maritime operations, in spite of the ongoing war in Gaza and the continued U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Hodeidah ports and other key Houthi-linked sites.

In December 2024 and thereafter, the Houthi operations were limited to striking American military targets in the Red Sea, including the aircraft carrier USS Truman, and launching missile attacks on Israeli positions. On January 19, 2025, following the announcement of a Gaza ceasefire agreement, the Houthis declared the next day that they would target only Israel-linked ships—signaling a narrowing of their target portfolio, which had previously included any vessel heading to Israeli ports.

However, no attacks on ships occurred as promised. On March 11, a week before the breakdown of the ceasefire and Israel’s resumption of military operations, the Houthis issued a four-day ultimatum to Tel Aviv to allow food aid into Gaza or face renewed maritime strikes. Again, nothing happened in the days that followed.

By mid-March, the American-led “Operation Rough Rider” against the Houthis had begun, involving sustained strikes around the clock on targets in Houthi-controlled areas. In early May, President Trump announced an agreement with the Houthis that involved halting U.S. airstrikes in exchange for a commitment from the group not to target ships.

In remarks to the ‘South24 Center’, Fernando Carvajal, a former member of the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen, described the halt in Houthi attacks as “still unclear”. He noted that the Iranian-backed group suspended its operations “a month after the U.S. elections,” suggesting a potential link to the shifting political dynamics in Washington.

This coincidence led to speculation about whether the change in leadership in Washington had influenced the group’s recalculations. However, Carvajal also suggested alternative possibilities, saying: “It is interesting that the Houthis stopped attacking commercial vessels… but it is unclear whether this was due to their stockpile of drones running out or the departure of the Iranian spy/ghost ships from the Bab al-Mandab area.”

Yemeni journalist and political analyst Mahmoud Al-Taher offered a political explanation tied to informal understandings, telling ‘South24’ that “this halt was linked to an unannounced agreement between Washington and Tehran”, adding that the U.S. was keen to portray stability in the Red Sea as a political achievement for newly-elected President Donald Trump.

Al-Taher added: “There was clear American interest in projecting control over maritime corridors,” meaning that stopping aerial strikes was conditional on temporary Houthi restraint, within arrangements that were not publicly disclosed at the time.

On the other hand, Dr. Omar Bajardaneh, President of the Knowledge Center for Strategy Research and Studies, argued that the halt in attacks cannot be divorced from the dynamics of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear file. Speaking to ‘South24’, he said: “The suspension conveyed an implicit message from Tehran to Washington”—a signal that Iran can rein in its proxies if it perceives serious engagement from the American side.

Renewed attacks

At the beginning of July 2025, the Houthi group broke the maritime calm. This sudden return to escalation, after more than seven months of halt, prompted sharp questions about the true motives behind the timing of this comeback.

One interpretation is that the renewed Houthi attacks are directly linked to the outbreak of open confrontation between Iran and Israel in June, which saw unprecedented Israeli strikes on nuclear sites inside Iran and targeted senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guard—triggering widespread regional tension.

In this context, Mahmoud Al-Taher stated that “the Houthis refrained from any involvement in the early days of the war,” but “soon returned to the maritime stage,” which he viewed as an indication that they “were seeking to exploit developments and reposition themselves as a regional pressure tool capable of influencing outcomes.”

According to this analysis, the group interpreted the new regional context as an opportunity to reaffirm its role as Tehran’s field proxy—capable of indirect retaliation against Israeli strikes and disrupting U.S. interests in the Red Sea without engaging in direct confrontation.

Dr. Omar Bajardaneh suggested that the resumption of attacks came after Iran reached the conclusion that “strategic gains cannot be achieved without escalation.”

He added: “The moment Tehran realized there were no strategic benefits without escalation, it likely gave the green light to its proxies, particularly the Houthis, to resume attacks on international shipping.” He continued: “Targeting ships is not an act of solidarity with Gaza as claimed—but a covert retaliation to the strikes against Iranian scientists and nuclear facilities.”

Fernando Carvajal also confirmed this strategic rationale, noting that the attacks occurred before the Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia, and amid high-level U.S.–Israeli meetings, describing the timing as “intentional.” He stated that the attacks carry “a dual retaliatory message: against the strikes on Iran and against the failure of nuclear negotiations.”

Nature of the Escalation

The Houthis’ return to Red Sea operations did not merely mark a resumption of attacks—it featured an unprecedented escalation in tactics, weaponry, and outcomes. The group employed a complex mix of explosive boats, drones, and short-range ballistic missiles, as well as explosives to sink the MV Magic Seas.

In this context, Mahmoud Al-Taher argued that the simultaneous use of multiple weapons systems reflects a clear intent to demonstrate operational readiness and enhanced technical capabilities. He added: “Through escalation, the group aims to rebrand itself as a decisive actor at the negotiating table, capable of reshaping dynamics if ignored by regional or international powers.”

Dr. Omar Bajardaneh linked the qualitative escalation in the group’s attacks to an effort to assert its strength after recent political and military setbacks in Sanaa and Hodeidah, caused by Israeli and American airstrikes.

Implications and Consequences

Prior to the latest Houthi attacks on ships, renewed diplomatic activity had given rise to cautious hope that Yemen’s prolonged political paralysis—ongoing for nearly two years—might finally be broken. The political scene saw active developments, including UN envoy Hans Grundberg’s visit to Aden on July 1–2, where he emphasized the need for a unified negotiating delegation and proposed urgent economic measures. Meanwhile, the Southern Transitional Council and Presidential Leadership Council intensified international outreach from Riyadh, amid regional and international support for these efforts in a relatively calm post-Gaza escalation.

However, these hopes suffered a major setback with the Houthis’ sudden return to maritime escalation, reopening debate about possible scenarios moving forward.

U.S. expert Fernando Carvajal warned that the recent escalation could mark the beginning of a new wave of tensions in South Yemen, highlighting the possibility of “clashes erupting in Al-Mahrah and Hadramout,” as well as Houthi attempts to advance toward “Shabwa, Marib, and Taiz.”

Dr. Omar Bajardaneh emphasized that the escalation threatens not only the political and military scene but also threatens accelerated economic and humanitarian disasters.

He added: “Continued escalation will push Yemen further into international isolation, deteriorating living conditions and increasing famine—especially with the disappearance of basic goods tied to maritime supply chains.” This means that Houthi naval operations are not merely symbolic threats, but in actuality cause partial shutdowns or actual disruption of one of the key commercial and supply lifelines on which Yemen depends.

Political analyst and journalist Mahmoud Al-Taher summed up these dangers by stating: “If international powers do not act decisively, the Red Sea could become an open arena for confrontation, and Yemen will be the primary victim of its fallout.”

According to a report published by Arabi21 on July 14, Washington sent indirect messages to the Houthis via regional intermediaries. Some of these messages included explicit threats that continued attacks on vessels could lead to “a fate similar to Hezbollah and Iran.” The U.S. offer also reportedly contained a new political roadmap for the situation in Yemen, according to the outlet.

No official confirmation has been issued by American or Houthi sources regarding the accuracy of this information, but since July 8, the Houthis have not attacked any commercial vessel.

In a development reflecting the international community’s mounting concern over the escalation of Houthi maritime attacks, the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday, July 15, adopted a resolution to extend the reporting period for the Secretary-General’s assessments of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea until January 15, 2026.

This resolution was passed during a session dedicated to the agenda item “Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” based on a draft submitted jointly by the United States and Greece as penholders for the Red Sea file. It faced no major objections from other Council members, aside from repeated reservations from Russia, China, and Algeria regarding the earlier wording in Resolution 2722.

In a session on the day prior, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2786, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) until January 28, 2026, based on a draft presented by the United Kingdom. This came despite American pressure to end the mission, arguing that recent field developments had rendered its mandate obsolete.