For years, Al-Mahra remained largely insulated from direct confrontations in the country's war. However, this geographic exception turned out to be merely a cover, behind which growing Houthi movements and armed groups operated, taking advantage of the state’s weakness.

Abdullah Al-Shadhli (South24 Center)

On the morning of July 8, an unusual security incident occurred at the Sarfait border crossing between South Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman in Al-Mahra Governorate, when border security forces stopped Mohammed Ahmed Al-Zaidi, a tribal leader affiliated with the Houthis, as he attempted to exit the country illegally, using a diplomatic passport issued by the unrecognized authorities in Sanaa.

The suspicion sparked by this sudden arrest deepened when an armed vehicle was spotted stationed near the crossing, prompting heightened alertness and the dispatch of reinforcements from the Al-Ghaydah military axis. Yet, what followed was shocking: the security force sent to reinforce al-Zaidi's arrest was ambushed in the mountainous area of Damgut, leading to the death of the force's commander, Colonel Abdullah Zayed, and injuries to two of his companions.

This was not merely a spontaneous clash, but rather, according to many observers, evidence of the presence of organized interconnected armed networks operating within Al-Mahra Governorate, coordinating in advance to serve the Houthis — a theory that has circulated over the past few years.

Suspicions surrounding the ambush were linked to Sheikh Ali Salem Al-Hurayzi, the influential tribal leader who heads the ‘Peaceful Sit-In Committee’ in the governorate, known for his opposition to the Saudi-led Arab Coalition and his ties with the Houthis. While the Sit-In Committee denied any connection to the incident, describing it as a separate security matter, the Houthis quickly issued a statement condemning Al-Zaidi’s arrest, claiming he had no political affiliation.

Yet the Houthis’ narrative has found little traction, given the scale of the armed movements surrounding the incident, and previously aired footage by the group’s Al-Masirah TV showing Al-Zaidi mobilizing fighters for the Houthis and clearly pledging allegiance to the group’s leader, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi.

In light of all this, debate has resurfaced over the extent of Houthi infiltration into Al-Mahra Governorate. It is a legitimate concern, given the repeated indicators of quiet encroachment into the southern territories— especially in areas suffering from fragile security and the absence of southern armed forces. Moreover, Al-Mahra stands out as a primary land smuggling corridor used to transport weapons to the Houthis, as revealed by a series of smuggling incidents over the past years.

Threats Surrounding Al-Mahra

For years, Al-Mahra remained largely untouched by direct confrontations in the country’s war. However, this geographic exception turned out to be merely a cover behind which increased Houthi movements and armed groups took advantage of the state’s fragility and the overlap of authorities. The recent incident served as a revealing moment, prompting the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the governorate to issue a strongly worded statement on July 11, warning of “suspicious alliances” between local groups and the Houthi militia, and describing the event at the border crossing as a “dangerous breach threatening the security of the governorate”.

The statement did not stop at condemnation, but called for an urgent and transparent investigation, a restructuring of security arrangements at border crossings, and tighter control over international roads. It also demanded that the Yemeni government and local authority take a clear stance against armed groups cooperating with the Houthis. In contrast, the STC expressed its gratitude to the Sultanate of Oman, acknowledging its constructive role in helping resolve issues at the crossing, and praising its efforts to preserve stability in the border region.

However, this commendation of Oman’s role did not obscure the growing questions about Al-Mahra’s ability, under its current security situation, to resist the Houthi infiltration. In a press statement to ‘South24 Center’, Abdul Rahim Al-Sadiq, head of the local leadership of the Southern Transitional Council in Al-Mahra, said that “the governorate is facing mounting security challenges due to the infiltration of Houthi elements”, accusing both northern and local forces of collusion and enabling their entry.

Al-Sadiq pointed out that the arrest of Al-Zaidi would not have been possible had the Sarfait border force not been composed of Al-Mahra natives, with its leadership aligned with the Southern Armed Forces under the Al-Ghaydah military axis.

He added, “If the security force had been assigned by authorities loyal to the central government in Marib or Sayun, it is likely, in my view, that Al-Zaidi would have been smuggled out easily.” This assessment highlights a real security divide within the governorate, where factions have differing loyalties — some leaning to the Houthi project, others orbiting northern political currents, while certain formations aim to establish an independent southern security model.

In this context, Al-Sadiq spoke of sleeper cells that facilitate Houthi movements through known desert routes, noting the presence of “collaboration from complicit forces in Marib and Sayun”, enabling the transfer of these elements from the North to Al-Mahra. He also pointed to “local forces organizing protest activities”, such as the Sit-In Committee led by Ali Al-Hurayzi, describing it as “a political and military front for the Islah Party, supported by northern forces”, and accused it of cooperating with the Houthis.

This accusation is not new, but within the current context, it gains heightened significance — especially amid ongoing events on the ground and the declining ability of local authorities to assert control over all of Al-Mahra’s territory. According to Al-Sadiq, this makes Al-Mahra “the weakest link in South,” warning that if it were to fall into Houthi hands, it would give them access to “a seaport and open supply lines”.

The Sultanate of Oman: Mediation and the Limits of Responsibility

In the wake of the armed clashes at the Sarfait border crossing, following the arrest of Houthi leader Mohammed Ali Al-Zaidi, the pivotal role of the Sultanate of Oman could not be ignored. Despite its traditional rhetoric of neutrality and mediation, Oman found itself at the heart of the escalating security tensions in the governorate.

The incident led to the temporary closure of the international road between Yemen and Oman for several hours — a development described as unprecedented, potentially sparking a broader debate about the boundaries of Oman’s role in the Yemeni issue. This is especially relevant in Al-Mahra Governorate, which shares a long and complex geographical border with the Sultanate and maintains strong tribal and societal ties with Oman’s Dhofar region.

The Sultanate faces accusations of supporting the Houthis, given its hosting of their political delegation and its close ties with Iran.

In this context, Abdulsalam Mohammed, head of Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies (DSS), told ‘South24 Center’: “Oman’s continued support for the Houthis harms Yemenis,” and called on the Sultanate to avoid getting drawn into conflicts beyond its borders.

The Yemeni expert offered an assessment of the Houthi infiltration methods in Al-Mahra, noting that the group relies on two primary patterns:

1. Camps affiliated with their local ally, Ali Al-Hurayzi, whom he described as “a shared ally of the Houthis and Oman” — referring to a dual network, of tribal influence and regional support.

2. Covert cells operating under various fronts, engaging in criminal activities or clandestine movements aimed at destabilizing the governorate.

Abdulsalam Mohammed presented two hypotheses regarding how Al-Zaidi reached the border crossing:

• First, that he left Sanaa using a fake identity and was exposed at the border crossing.

• Second, and more plausible given his movements, that he used known desert smuggling routes stretching from northern Yemen to Al-Mahra and then onward to Oman.

Tribe and State: A Test of Sovereignty

Abdulsalam Mohammed believes that the arrest of Al-Zaidi presents a valuable opportunity for the state to test its ability to restore its authority. In his view, the real option for the authorities is not to negotiate or release Al-Zaidi, but to refer him to the judiciary and take a firm stance that would restore public trust in the state and shake the image of the Houthis as powerful tribal allies.

He emphasized that continuing to detain Al-Zaidi would grant the state credibility among tribal communities and send a message that legal and institutional authority remains viable, and capable of enforcing discipline, even in regions traditionally governed by tribal custom.

These questions grow more pressing amid fast-moving developments following the confrontation with the Houthi group, the latest being the arrest of their former Foreign Minister, Hisham Sharaf Abdullah, at Aden International Airport on July 9, as he attempted to travel to Ethiopia.

A New Arena

The Sarfait border crossing incident exposed the security vulnerabilities in Al-Mahra, demonstrating that the governorate is no longer an exception to Yemen’s political and military conflicts, and could even become a new open arena for such disputes.

As part of the fallout from these events, the President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and member of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Major General Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, held a meeting with the Governor of Al-Mahra on July 10, in which he expressed support for the local authority and called for empowering Al-Mahra’s residents to manage their own affairs.

This statement was not a formality, but carries with it a clear desire to reformulate the power equation within the governorate, especially after it has become clear that the current security and administrative structure is unable to protect the border crossing or control smuggling routes and Influence Lines

On July 13, the city of Mukalla witnessed a military meeting between the commander of the Second Military District, Major General Talib Saeed Barjash, and the commander of the First Military District, Major General Saleh Mohammed al-Jaemlani, to discuss the evolving security situation in Al-Mahrah following the arrest of Houthi leader Mohammed al-Zaidi and the ambush that followed.

The meeting resulted in the announcement of the formation of a joint military force from the First and Second Military Regions to secure the roads and border crossings between Hadramout and Al-Mahrah, and to reinforce the al-Ghaydah axis and vital sites within the governorate.

This meeting and the measures that emerged from it are seen as a notable paradox, as the First Military District, which is mostly composed of northern soldiers, has long been the subject of widespread criticism from Hadramout residents, who have repeatedly called for its removal from the governorate.

It should also be noted that there are military forces in Al-Mahra as part of the so-called ‘Nation Shield Forces’ that Saudi Arabia established in South Yemen in 2023. These forces did not move during the recent events, nor have they taken any stance so far.