In light of these new Iranian calculations, which completely dismantles the myth that the Houthi escalation is linked to Gaza, the question arises: What will be the form of the potential international response to the threats in the Red Sea? 

Hossam Radman (South24 Center)

In March 2025, as soon as the Houthis signaled their intent to resume escalation in the Red Sea, the entire world was taken by surprise at U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to launch a punishing air campaign against the group in Yemen. At the time, the White House had no concerns about freedom of navigation, nor was it interested in the balance of power on the Yemeni stage. Rather, Trump viewed the demonstration of hard power in Yemen as the most effective way to soften Iran’s position and reinforce his “maximum pressure” strategy.

Trump achieved what he wanted. In April, Iranian officials sat at the negotiating table. In May, Tehran granted the American president a symbolic media victory by reaching an understanding under which the Houthis would cease targeting maritime navigation, in return for halting the airstrikes. In other words, Trump used Yemen as a tool of intimidation, while Tehran leveraged the Red Sea as a tool of goodwill. This arrangement remained in place until this July when the Houthis escalated their maritime attacks, causing two commercial vessels to sink.

Through this maritime escalation, Tehran is once again using the Houthis to serve three strategic objectives: First, to demonstrate its ability to block access to regional straits whenever it faces renewed aggression. This message is intended not only for Washington and Tel Aviv, but also for European and Arab nations as well as China that have been most affected by the disruptions to maritime trade. Second, to deprive Trump of his symbolic victory in securing navigation and defeating the Houthis. This appears to be in response to Trump's recent insult directed at Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei which prompted Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to object and demand that it not be repeated as a condition for further negotiations. Third, and most important, Tehran appears to have decided to shift the Red Sea card from a goodwill gesture aimed at courting Trump into a bargaining chip to pressure the U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff at the nuclear negotiation table.

While Iran’s calculations may appear precise and smart, its rush regarding the Yemeni theater could backfire. For instance, Tehran is stoking regional tensions in ways that serve Benjamin Netanyahu’s agenda of sustained escalation. It also increases the likelihood of its proxy in Yemen being subjected to a painful military operation. Today, Iran’s foreign policy decision-making appears to have become increasingly reckless and opaque. While on the one hand, Foreign Minister Araghchi adheres to a strategy of strategic patience and keeps the door ajar for negotiations, on the other, the Revolutionary Guard adopts a high-risk brinkmanship strategy aimed at achieving a “geopolitical remontada” (1), in a comeback that would dispel the image of Iran’s defeat and restore deterrence.

It is notable that Tehran’s approach to Yemen has witnessed a kind of change. Prior to June, the prospect of a military operation against the Houthis posed a real threat to its geopolitical investment, prompting Tehran to accept de-escalation. However, following the 12-day war with Israel, the option of Yemen as a conflict arena has become an opportunity to exhaust Washington, and even Tel Aviv, for as long as possible - until Tehran can rebuild its defensive capabilities. In cases of existential threat, it is deemed acceptable to sacrifice the fetus so that the mother can live. 

In light of these new Iranian calculations, which completely dismantles the myth that the Houthi escalation is linked to Gaza, the question arises: What will be the form of the potential international response to the threats in the Red Sea? Looking back at events during the final quarter of 2023 reveals that the pattern of international response toward the Houthi threats typically begins with a buildup of political and legal condemnation in the first month, followed by the diplomatic and security measures in the second and third months. (The Houthis began targeting navigation in November 2023, while the reactions surfaced in December 2023 and January 2024.)

Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that this July will serve as a test for the limits of Houthi escalation, and whether it is a calculated and temporary Iranian maneuver, akin to the Revolutionary Guard’s occasional provocations in the Gulf waters, or whether these attacks will evolve into a sustained hostile pattern that seriously threaten global interests, as seen in the past two years.

Moreover, this month’s international response will be shaped by three regional variables: First, the future of the Gaza ceasefire which the Houthis cite as a pretext for their actions. Second, Trump’s seriousness in pursuing negotiations with Iran; and third, Netanyahu’s ability to obstruct diplomatic progress and resume escalation against Tehran. Trump is likely to approach Yemen with a deal-making logic, so he may not rush to deter the Houthis as long as he can exploit their “rogue behavior” and vice versa. It may be useful for Trump to ignore the Houthi piracy and remain silent about its escalation in order to blackmail the Arab and European sides. Everyone still remembers the infamous ’Signal‘ chat leaks in which Trump's men say that Egypt and Europe should be asked to pay for securing navigation.

However, if the Iranian escalation crosses Washington's red lines by directly targeting US assets or vital interests, which the Houthis have so far avoided, this may contribute to convincing Trump to strike the “head of the octopus” and launch a second military campaign against Tehran. It is worth recalling here that the Houthis’ persistent targeting of Ben Gurion Airport throughout May 2025 did not weaken Israel but rather helped it accumulate the justifications that paved the way for the 12-day war. 

Finally, a third scenario for the international response may emerge—theoretically the most ideal but practically the most difficult, in which Trump adopts a strategy of “cutting off arms” starting with Yemen, while applying more extreme pressure on Iraq and Lebanon. This option could achieve a number of goals for the US president: Punishing Iran without engaging in a direct war with it, enhancing the security of America's allies in the Gulf, restoring lasting security for international navigation, and finally, making peace in Yemen through force.

If Trump succeeds in ending the Gaza war, he may encounter a more favorable Arab stance toward a military resolution in Yemen, especially following the arrival of the THAAD missile system in Saudi Arabia. If Cairo is freed from the fear of forced displacement to Sinai, it may become less reluctant to liberate (Houthi-held) Hodeidah, whereas the UAE is ready for decisiveness in any case.