It is impossible to understand the relationship between Iran and the Houthis without recognizing the pivotal role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which serves as the main military and political tool for implementing Tehran’s regional policies.

*Ibrahim Ali (South24)

The past weeks witnessed a large-scale military escalation by Israel and the United States targeting the structure of the Iranian regime, as part of an escalating confrontation aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear program and curbing its regional clout.

These strikes, which hit military sites and strategic facilities inside Iran, represent a qualitative shift in the Western military pressure on Tehran, and may lead to weakening of Iran's ability to finance and support its armed proxies in the region, top of who are the Houthis in Yemen. 

The Houthis are considered one of the most prominent regional proxies that rely on Iranian support, whether in terms of training, armaments, or political and media guidance. 

Over the past years, the Houthis have greatly benefited from Iran’s regional backing, which allowed them to enhance their influence in large areas of Yemen and carry out cross-border attacks, including targeting international navigation in the Red Sea and launching attacks against Israel. 

However, this support largely depends on Iran's ability to maintain the supply lines and continue its backing role, which has come into question now in light of the recent strikes which are likely to resume despite the ceasefire.

From this perspective, the current developments stir serious questions about the future of the Houthis: Will they be able to continue with the same strength without effective Iranian backing? Or will they enter a phase of strategic decline due to a potential reduction in external support? Or will they seek alternative sources of alliances and support?

This report attempts to anticipate the contours of the Houthis’ next phase amid the region’s rapidly shifting dynamics. 

The Revolutionary Guards: The Cornerstone 

It is impossible to understand the relationship between Iran and the Houthis without recognizing the pivotal role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which serves as the main military and political tool for implementing Tehran’s regional policies.

Since the rise of the Houthis as an influential force in Yemen, the IRGC has been the primary driver that enabled them to strengthen their military and political influence. This support hasn't been limited to financial aid alone but also included the transfer of advanced military technologies and the training of Houthi members in camps inside Iran or through regional proxies.

The IRGC has supplied the Houthis with ballistic missiles and drones and played a direct role in planning military operations by providing sophisticated targeting strategies and unconventional combat tactics.

Additionally, the IRGC has acted as a communication channel between Iran's top leadership and the Houthis, conveying strategic directives that serve Tehran's regional interests. It also contributed to building the group’s organizational structure and strengthening the loyalty of its leaders toward Iran, making the Houthis an organic extension of Iranian influence in the region.

Over the past years, Iran has sent several senior IRGC commanders to Yemen, including Colonel Reza Basini and Commander Ali Rajabi, to oversee Houthi military operations.

In 2017, Tehran sent a specialized military team, led by Bahram Rahnama, to help manufacture weapons locally inside Yemen in a way that enhanced the Houthis’ combat capabilities. More than 1,100 Houthi members received training in IRGC camps in Iran, while another 250 were trained at a Quds Force base in Hamadan. The Iranian navy has used secret routes to transfer weapons to the Houthis through ports like Bushehr under the guise of anti-piracy operations.

In 2016, Iran also provided the Houthis with financial support estimated at around $90 million, in addition to advanced weaponry, as confirmed by Western intelligence reports.

As part of efforts to apply financial pressure on Tehran, the U.S. Treasury Department recently imposed its widest sanctions package yet on a Houthi–Iranian financing network. The network is accused of using sophisticated financial tools, including cryptocurrencies, fake shipping companies, and exchange offices in China and Malaysia to launder money and purchase advanced military components.

Key figures in this network include Saeed Al-Jamal, a senior financial official backed by the IRGC-Quds Force, along with Hashem Ismail Al-Madani, the Houthi-appointed Governor of the Central Bank in Sanaa, and Ahmed Mohammed Al-Hadi who is tasked with coordinating and distributing funds within Yemen.

The sanctions also included Mohammed Ali of Al-Thour Exchange Company, Khaled Al-Hazmi, and Abdullah Al-Jamal for their roles in financing the group through complex operations linked to the sale of Iranian oil.

On the logistical front, Washington pointed to senior officials such as Wael Al-Wadoud and Omar Al-Hajj who facilitated smuggling operations through the Horn of Africa using shipping companies like Safwan Dubai in China and Tefcas Marine in Malaysia.

Since the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, the IRGC has intensified its military and intelligence support to the Houthis as part of Tehran’s broader strategy to expand its influence through the so-called "Axis of Resistance”.

Sources pointed to the presence of Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah officers in Yemen who directly oversee the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and provide intelligence data to target ships linked to Israel.

The Iranian support has included the supply of advanced weaponry, such as high-precision drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, allowing the Houthis to target commercial vessels since November 2023 under the pretext of "solidarity with Gaza”. The IRGC has also trained Houthi operatives in Iran on how to use these weapons.

In addition, the IRGC established a command center in Sanaa to manage the Red Sea attacks, overseeing target selection and implementation. American and military sources confirmed that Iranian intelligence played a crucial role in the accuracy of the Houthi strikes.

Is Iranian Influence Waning?

At present, Iranian support for the Houthis faces unprecedented challenges, most notably due to the recent Israeli and American strikes that targeted sensitive Iranian nuclear and military facilities, as well as the assassination of senior IRGC commanders. While these strikes have not caused a total collapse of Iran's military infrastructure, they could significantly impair Tehran’s ability to coordinate effectively with its regional proxies, including the Houthi group.

Undoubtedly, targeting the command and planning centers inside Iran, especially those affiliated with the Quds Force, the external arm of the Revolutionary Guard, is certain to hinder the transfer of weapons and intelligence to the Houthis. Disrupting the communication and financing networks will also slow the pace of support, making it harder to maintain operational coordination between Tehran and Sanaa.

If these strikes continue and Iran fails to develop alternative mechanisms, this could lead to a gradual decline in its influence, particularly if Israel and the United States succeed in disrupting the maritime and aerial supply lines on which the Houthis rely.

In addition to military challenges, Iran is facing internal economic and political pressures, amid the escalating financial crises due to international sanctions. This could weaken its capacity to fund the Houthis at previous levels.

If this trajectory continues, the Houthis may be forced to seek alternative sources of support, whether through new regional alliances or by enhancing their own weapons production capabilities.

In addition, any significant decline in Iranian support could subject the Houthis to serious tests, whether militarily -- in confronting the Yemeni government forces backed by the Arab Coalition if war resumes, or politically -- amid growing public discontent due to the deteriorating economic situation in areas under Houthi control.

While Iran still wields considerable influence in Yemen, the accumulation of these challenges could mark a turning point in its relationship with the Houthis, potentially reshaping regional alliances and weakening Iran’s ability to use the Houthis as a pressure card in regional conflicts.

Implications of an Iranian Decline

If Iran’s capabilities are significantly reduced due to successive strikes and international pressure, the Houthis may find themselves in the face of a new and increasingly complex reality. For years, Iran has been the group’s most prominent patron, providing political and military support essential to its survival. Any disruption in this support could deeply impact the group’s performance and existence.

The first possible consequence would be a decline in the Houthis military capabilities, as they rely almost entirely on Iranian logistical and technical support, particularly in the areas of drones and ballistic missiles. With supply lines disrupted or reduced, the group could lose much of its military momentum and become less capable of maneuvering on the battlefronts or in carrying out sophisticated attacks.

In addition, internal organizational instability and power struggles are likely to emerge within the Houthis, especially since Tehran has played a central role in maintaining balance among the group’s factions. The absence of this stabilizing influence could lead to internal clashes and leadership disputes, weakening the group's cohesion and increasing its structural fragility.

Politically, the Houthis are likely to face growing regional and international isolation, and may gradually lose segments of popular support which was partly based on their image as a "resistance movement backed by a strong regional axis”. Amid the worsening economic and living conditions, it will become tougher for the Houthis to justify the continuation of their political project or persuade the public of their legitimacy.

Looking for Alternatives

Amidst the increasing pressure on Iran and its declining ability to support allies, the Houthis may seek to diversify their foreign alliances in search of strategic alternatives to fill the potential gap left by Tehran. One of the main options may be to strengthen ties with major powers such as Russia or China, based on what is believed to be a shared interest in reducing the American influence in the region. This was partially reflected during the Gaza war when Washington accused China of indirectly supporting the Houthis.

Despite this ambition, relying on Moscow or Beijing is not without its challenges. These countries are reluctant in becoming deeply involved in a complex conflict like Yemen, especially given the high political and humanitarian costs. Additionally, geographical distance and the lack of strong historical or logistical ties make any such potential support limited and conditional.

Ultimately, the possibility of aligning with global powers remains constrained by geography and international politics. The Houthis also lack the leverage needed to present themselves as indispensable allies to these countries. This means that the search for realistic and sustainable alternatives to Iranian support may prove to be a difficult—if not impossible—task in the near future.

An Uncertain Future

Although the recent American and Israeli strikes have not immediately cut off Iranian support to the Houthis, they have placed Tehran on the defensive and disrupted the calculations of the IRGC. This may gradually translate into a decline in the scale and impact of the support directed toward its regional proxies, foremost among them the Houthi group. This shift imposes difficult choices on the group --between seeking international alternatives that are fraught with obstacles, or attempting to build self-sufficient capabilities in a complex environment that lacks necessary resources.

Given these circumstances, the future of the Houthis appears clouded with uncertainty, especially if pressure on Iran persists and the group’s internal challenges continue to grow. The coming months will be decisive in determining whether the group can adapt to the new reality or whether it will enter a declining trajectory that could lead to a reduction in its influence, both locally and regionally.