REPORTS

Marib Under Military Pressure Again: What Do the Houthis Want?

Pro-Yemeni government forces in Marib on April 16, 2021 (AFP)

آخر تحديث في: 26-02-2025 الساعة 2 مساءً بتوقيت عدن

The Yemeni forces face several challenges in finding a local solution to tackle the situation in a way that makes it necessary to reconsider the regional calculations toward the Yemen file, which is no longer a local issue, but a regional one.


Abdullah Al-Shadli (South24)


Over the past weeks, the Houthi militia have significantly increased their military presence around the city of Marib in central Yemen. They have deployed reinforcements, including heavy artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles. According to the Ministry of Defense affiliated with the Internationally-Recognized Government, the Houthis have also established new military positions, besides digging trenches which denotes their preparation for a possible wide-scale attack.


The Houthis also launched attacks on several fronts in Marib on February 16. The Yemeni Defense Ministry announced repelling of the Houthi infiltration attempts on the fronts of Raghwan and Medghal, leading to deaths and injuries among the militia. A soldier affiliated with the government forces was killed while four others were wounded.


The government forces on the same day announced targeting of Houthi elements while they were attempting to plant mines and explosive devices in the northwest of Marib. In south Marib, the government forces thwarted a Houthi infiltration attempt in Al-Faliha and AlـBalaq.


On February 20, the Yemeni Defense Ministry announced that clashes had erupted with the Houthis and had lasted for hours following the Iran-backed militia’s attempt to carry out an offensive operation in south Marib. A military source said that the Houthi militia tried to infiltrate military sites simultaneously with intensified bombings by using artillery, mortars, RPGs, and machine guns from several locations.


The Houthi escalation hasn’t been limited to Marib, as the Yemeni Defense Ministry announced on February 18 the thwarting of an infiltration attempt carried out by the group in the “Qanaw” front, east of “Bir AlـMaraziq” in AlـJawf governorate. On February 23, the Yemeni Defense Ministry announced field developments in the battle fronts with the Houthis in Marib, AlـJawf, and Taiz.


In a statement, the Defense Ministry announced confronting the Houthi attacks in which they used drones and artillery on different fronts in Marib. The statement added that several Houthi elements were killed. The eastern front of Al Jawf, Al-Alam, Al-Jadafer, and Shahla witnessed similar clashes.


According to the statement, the government forces in Taiz targeted equipment that the Houthis were using to put up fortifications at the Al-Kadhah and Al-Dabab fronts and were able to neutralize them. This is in addition to responding to hostile fire sources in the old airport area in the governorate’s western front.


The Escalation Theater


In 2021, the Houthis took full or partial control over 12 of a total 14 districts in Marib governorate. However, its capital city, Marib, as well as Al-Wadi district which includes gas fields and the Safer oil storage facility remained out of their control.


The Houthis faced fierce resistance from the tribes and forces affiliated with the Yemeni government. Over the subsequent months, the battles stopped near the city of Marib. The current skirmishes against the Houthis are focused on the same zones where fighting had previously stopped, an informed military source told ’South24 Center’.


Besides the tribes, the Third Military District forces affiliated with the Yemeni government are mainly deployed in Marib. Moreover, the Southern Giants Brigades affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) are deployed in the Harib district over which they hold full control and Al-Abdiyah district where they wield partial control, as well as Al-Jafrah.


These areas are located on the borders between Marib and Shabwa governorates. The latter witnessed fierce battles in January 2022 when the Southern Giants Brigades launched the ’South Tornado‘ operation to retake the districts of Ain, Beihan, and Usaylan from the Houthi grip. The operation was successful in achieving this goal as it ended the Houthi’s choking siege on the city of Marib.


The Goals behind the Houthi Escalation


Political analyst Mahmoud Al-Taher drew a link between the Houthi escalation and the US’ FTO (Foreign Terrorist Organization) designation of the group along with the UN’s decision to suspend its activities and movement in the Houthi-held areas. Al-Taher told ’South24 Center’:“The Houthis are well aware that Marib is an important economic lifeline for the Yemeni government.”


He added: “Controlling Marib and its resources will paralyze the government’s ability to maintain its operations, allowing the Houthis to access the vital oil and gas resources which are necessary for their financial independence. Following the international sanctions, including those imposed by the US, the Houthis are actively searching for alternative sources of income and therefore making Marib’s resources a main target.”


According to Al-Taher,“the Houthis have made use of previous truces to regain their power. This denotes their intention to reignite the war under proper circumstances. The Houthis don’t commit to any peace agreements unless they are in their favor. When they feel that they have military supremacy, they don’t hesitate in launching more attacks.”


This view is endorsed by Yemeni politician Khaled Baqlan, who told ’South24 Center‘ that “the Houthis look at Marib as a strategic goal of great importance. It serves as a pressure card to compensate for possible losses in other areas”.


He believes that the Houthi moves “aim to confront the implications of the US’ FTO designation of the group and prevent any moves to liberate the governorate of Hodeidah on the western coast over which the Houthis fear losing control”.


However, Baqlan pointed to regional dimensions related to the Houthi escalation in Marib. He explains this by saying: "While the Houthis are seeking to boost their negotiation position, there is likelihood of Iran aiming to impose maximum pressure to revive negotiations with the new US administration and avoid any possible strikes against Tehran’s nuclear facilities.”


Baqlan noted that the “Houthis realize the importance of Marib to the international community, particularly in view of the humanitarian aspect due to more than two million displaced persons living there, in addition to its vital oil and gas facilities”.


Head of the Media Department of the Third Military District, Major Amr Al-Zein, believes that the Houthi escalation in Marib is an attempt to escape their exacerbating internal crises. He told ’South24 Center’:“They are increasingly losing their popular support due to the deterioration of livinghood conditions, the failure to pay salaries, and restrictions on people.”


Al-Zein added: “This escalation comes as a hysterical response to their FTO designation. This has increased their internal and international isolation. Consequently, resorting to war and mobilizing forces toward Marib is the Houthis usual method of exporting their internal crises”.


He pointed out that “the Houthis depend on camouflage and deception tactics. They open skirmishes on several fronts for distraction while attempting to carry out real attacks in other axes. They also use media propaganda and psychological warfare as a main part of their strategy”.


Readiness of the Yemeni Government


Major Amr Al-Zein stressed the readiness of the government forces to confront any Houthi escalation. He said that these forces are ready to shift from defensive to attacking mode and take initiatives if decisions are issued by the political leadership to that effect.


However, political analyst Mahmoud Al-Taher warned of divisions within the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and its impact on the military equation in Marib. He added that “any divisions within the PLC and government may facilitate the fall of Marib”.


He pointed to the importance of enhancing alliances with the local tribes which, he said, is “necessary as the tribal men in Marib have proven to be an influential fighting force against the Houthis”. “Over the past days, the Marib tribes have organized demonstrations to express their readiness for fighting the Houthis,” he added.


Al-Taher emphasized the need for “continuation of the aerial support from the Arab Coalition which previously played a decisive role in thwarting the Houthi attacks. Therefore, this support should continue,” according to him.


Nonetheless, Khaled Baqlan believes that “the military situation of the government forces and those affiliated with the government is fragile, especially in light of the neutralized approach by the Arab Coalition’s air forces and the Houthi siege imposed on Marib from three sides”.


Since April 2022, the mutual attacks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have stopped, facilitated by Omani mediation, leading to a direct contact between the two parties and progress on the political path.


On January 21, the PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi held a phone call with the Yemeni Defense Minister Mohsen Al-Daeri and Chief of General Staff, Commander of Joint Operations Sagheer Bin Aziz. According to the Yemeni Ministry of Defense, “the call aimed to review military developments and fighting preparedness in light of the PLC’s decision about the unity of fronts in the theater of joint operations at various levels”.


Possible Scenarios


Al-Taher believes that “there are several scenarios that can happen in case the conflict intensifies in Marib”. He said: “First, the Houthis may attempt to advance through several axes. However, the resistance put up by government forces and tribal men may lead to a longـterm battle of attrition like what happened over the past years.”


He explained that based on this scenario, Marib may stand unscathed. However, “this depends on the continuation of military supplies and logistics support”.


According to Al-Taher, the worst scenario will happen “if the Houthis achieve a strategic penetration in the Marib fronts. This will lead to a quick downfall of the city which will have a disastrous impact on the Yemeni government, allowing the group to advance toward Shabwa and Hadramout”.


He underscored the importance of Marib in regional affairs since “any wide-scale Houthi attack may push the Arab Coalition states, especially Saudi Arabia, to intensify their airstrikes to prevent the downfall of the city. We also may witness American or international intervention to pressure the Houthis”.


Baqlan agrees with this vision. However, he believes that talking about “the status quo is based on two dimensions, the first of which is that the Yemeni file has become regional and international and is no longer a local issue. The second is related to the nature of the relationship of the Yemeni local forces with the region”.


Baqlan explains that “the expected scenarios suggest clashes that may lead to inroads, allowing the Houthis to enhance Iran's position in the negotiations with the US administration regarding the Iranian nuclear file”. He added: “Tehran is seeking to use the Houthis as a tool to return to the negotiation table. Saudi Arabia may play a mediation role in this operation if the Houthis succeed in achieving Iran’s interests.”


Baqlan concluded that the Yemeni forces face several challenges in finding a local solution to tackle the situation in a way that makes it necessary to reconsider the regional calculations toward the Yemen file, which is no longer a local issue, but a regional one.”


Journalist at South24 Center for News and Studies

Note: This is a translated version of the original text published in Arabic on February 24,2025.

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