"The Red Sea operations have moved beyond serving as mere instrument of  international pressure: they have become a means for the Houthis to reposition themselves on the regional and global map”

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Ibrahim Ali (South24 Center)

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Following the announcement of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, attention quickly turned to the future of other fronts ignited by the war-foremost among them, the Houthi front in Yemen, which has witnessed ongoing reciprocal operations between Israel and the Iran-backed group. The concern was well-founded the Houthis had explicitly linked  their operations in the Red Sea and the key maritime corridors to the continuation  of the war in Gaza. This linkage was reinforced by Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who declared that his group “will monitor Israel’s commitment to the truce and will resume its support for Gaza if it fails to comply.”

Logically, the Gaza ceasefire deal should lead to a de-escalation of the Houthi front in North Yemen-perhaps even a return to the pre- October 7 status quo. However, Israeli statements and indicators, combined  with the Houthis’ own gains and interests, suggest otherwise. The confrontation appears to be developing a momentum of its own, driven by evolving interests and dynamics increasingly detached from the original Gaza front.

Shift in Houthi Motivations

The first step in understanding current dynamics is to reassess the presumed link between the Gaza conflict and the Houthi front. Even if one takes the Houthis’ stated rationale at face value—support for the Palestinian resistance and pressure to end the war in Gaza—the evolution of events has granted the group an unprecedented degree of strategic autonomy. The first step in understanding current dynamics is to reassess the presumed link between the Gaza conflict and the Houthi front. Even if one takes the Houthis’ stated rationale at face value—support for the Palestinian resistance and pressure to end the war in Gaza—the evolution of events has granted the group an unprecedented degree of strategic autonomy. The Red Sea operations have moved beyond serving as a mere instrument of international pressure; they have become a means for the Houthis to reposition themselves within the regional and global map.

By extending their attacks beyond Yemen’s borders, the Houthis have succeeded in breaking the regional and international isolation imposed on them during years of war in Yemen. They have effectively transformed from a local actor in a forgotten war into a regional actor capable of threatening global trade and energy flow. The propaganda, political, and military gains, especially the narrative  of being the “defender” of Gaza in Arab and Islamic discourse—constitute strategic capital that the group is unlikely to  abandon merely because of a ceasefire agreement.

This raises a critical point: if the Gaza war was merely a pretext rather than a genuine cause, the Houthis  may seek new justifications to continue its hostile operations. potentially under different slogans or ideological framings. Their close, albeit sometimes flexible, alignment with the Islamic Republic of Iran further reinforces this possibility, suggesting that their actions may increasingly reflect broader regional calculations rather than the immediate realities of the Gaza conflict.

Transformation in Israeli Perspective

Conversely, Israel’s perception of the Houthis has undergone a profound transformation—as significant as the shift in the group’s own motivations. The missile and drone attacks from Yemen are no longer viewed as mere “reactions” or “tactical nuisances. “Instead, These operations have exposed strategic vulnerabilities and Demonstrated  the Houthi’s capacity to threaten Israel’s security, economy, and deterrence posture elevating the group to the level of a potential  existential threat.

Statements aired by Israel’s Channel 12 regarding the National Security Council’s decision to separate the Gaza front from the Houthi front are more than merely administrative measures. They reflect a strategic shift in confrontation doctrine. Israel’s declared intent to launch extensive strikes post-Gaza war, “waves of attacks never before executed” following the Gaza ceasefire suggests preparations for preemptive or punitive operations designed to degrade Houthi’s capabilities and reshape  the regional  rules of engagement.

Israel’s growing recognition of the Houthis as a major threat stems from several factors:  the group’s integration into Iran’s regional proxy network, its demonstrated  ability to reach Israeli territory  with increasingly advanced weaponry, and the devastating economic impact on Red Sea shipping routes . Thus, for Israel, therefore, the continuation of the confrontation is no longer a question of retaliation it has become a matter of strategic necessity, aimed at neutralizing an emerging regional threat. 

Balancing Risks and Rewards

With both parties now driven by independent motivations, the continuation of hostilities post-Gaza truce becomes a delicate balance of risks and rewards.

For the Houthis, the war serves their propaganda and media interests,  bolstering their image as “heroes” defending Gaza and carrying the banner of resistance. Yet this advantage depends on the perception that their actions remain tied to the Gaza cause. Sustained engagement after the war’s end risks stripping away that cover—turning them from a “support front” into a primary target. In such a scenario, they could face the full weight of Israel’s military, intelligence, and technological capabilities, along with international pressure and isolation. increased international pressure and isolation.

For Israel, continued confrontation with the Houthis offers the prospect of achieving a long-term strategic objective: degrading the capabilities of a militia that functions as Iran’s arm along a vital maritime corridor. Yet opening a broad front in Yemen without a clear strategic plan carries its own challenges—chief among them, the risk of regional escalation or harsh Houthi retaliation against international shipping. Such dynamics could intensify global trade disruptions and compound the broader economic strain already amplified by the conflict. 

Proxy Wars and Strategic Maneuvering

Beyond this tactical calculus lies a broader geopolitical reality: the Houthi-Israeli confrontation is not an isolated conflict but part of the ongoing struggle between Israel and Iran’s regional proxy network—the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Within this architecture, the Houthis operate as the maritime pressure arm of the axis, while Israel views them as a strategic extension of Iranian power that must be contained and neutralized.

From the Israeli perspective, the Houthis have evolved from a limited nuisance into a rising strategic threat   requiring sustained deterrence. Tel Aviv understands that targeting the Houthis is not just a defensive act against a local militia, but a direct response to the axis’s overarching strategy. Hence, the decision to separate the fronts is a practical acknowledgment that the Red Sea and Yemeni front constitute an independent proxy war—one aimed at draining and curbing the capabilities of Iran’s “maritime arm.”

As one  Iranian official reportedly  remarked,  “a truce in Gaza may mean the start of war elsewhere” encapsulates this equation precisely: a ceasefire does not end the conflict—it merely shifts it to new fronts. The Red Sea has become a prime example, transforming from a symbolic platform of solidarity with Gaza into an independent arena where regional ambitions, international trade interests, and great-power competition converge. 

Risks of Field Escalation

Undoubtedly, the continuation of reciprocal attacks between the Houthis and Israel after the Gaza war carries the potential for conflict expansion. The more Israel strikes Houthi positions, the greater the likelihood of Houthi retaliation possibly at a new level of escalation. Should this occur, other regional actors may find themselves indirectly involved, particularly the United States, which maintains naval forces in the area despite the temporary agreement brokered by Oman between Washington and the Yemeni militia.

Thus, the continuation of war on this front may not be solely a Houthi or Israeli decision, but part of a larger regional game involving multiple powers. This complexity increases the likelihood of prolonged tension, even in the absence of major operations.

The most probable scenario is that the Gaza truce will not extinguish the flames of the Red Sea and Yemeni front. Instead, it may usher in a more dangerous phase of conflict, with each party seeking to achieve its own strategic objectives. This phase will be critical for the Houthis, who will shift from a protected “support front” to a “primary target” exposed to unprecedented Israeli strikes. The fate of this front will not be a mere return to square one, but a transition into a long-term, independent conflict with ramifications stretching from the Middle East to global trade routes.