“The defectors’ move appears to be a pivotal moment within the scene of extremist jihadist groups in Yemen, not because they represent a large force now, but because they may be the first nucleus of an emerging movement, or the spark of a deeper internal split that threatens the collapse of AQAP.”

*Ibrahim Ali (South24 Center)

In recent days, the jihadist scene in Yemen has witnessed a notable development, with a group of defectors from Al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) issuing a statement calling on the organization to submit to a “Sharia court.” Although this call is not new in Jihadist rhetoric, its source this time makes it worthy of attention and analysis. The defectors who issued the statement had left the organization many years ago, and each pursued his own path without any notable coordination or clear political or military activity during the intervening period. Therefore, their sudden coming together and the issuance of a collective position carries undeniable implications at both the organizational and political levels.

The first striking point is that this move signals a clear desire among the defectors to play a new role in the coming phase. A statement that uses sharp religious‑based legal language and is directed at an organization undergoing decline and instability, is not issued lightly nor intended merely to register a passing stance. Rather it appears to be closer to an attempt to reintroduce themselves as potential actors in Yemen’s jihadist scene, especially amid internal disagreements within AQAP and the increasing operational and security pressures the group faces in Southern areas.

Nature of the Defectors and Their Potential Impact

Despite the organization’s attempts to downplay the defectors as “old names,” private sources [1] indicate that the number of such individuals is in the dozens and, more importantly, that they possess a qualitative status and influence. Sources explain that most of them once held active leadership positions within the organization, which gives their move greater organizational weight than a mere media statement. The coordination or communication among them suggests that they are operating as a unified front, which increases the statement’s significance as a potential nucleus of a new entity or an internal opposition front.

It is likely that the defectors are seeking to build an entity or framework that need not declare itself at this stage, but is moving toward creating a political and organizational space capable of attracting disgruntled members of AQAP’s leadership or those who have disagreed with its choices in recent years.

It is worth noting that AQAP in Yemen has gone through a series of acute crises in recent years: from defections in favor of ISIS nearly a decade ago, to battlefield losses, internal competition for leadership, and a decline in tribal influence. All these factors have weakened the organization intellectually and structurally, opening the door to secessionist initiatives of this kind.

Interestingly, the defectors appear to understand that any counter‑AQAP movement may attract international and regional attention, directly or indirectly. The Syrian experience with Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham provides a prime example: a faction that split from Al-Qaeda ultimately received political and media support as a jihadist force perceived as “less harmful” and therefore manageable in certain dossiers. The defectors in Yemen may not aspire to an identical model, but they clearly grasp the new rules of the game: Any faction that breaks away from designated terrorist organizations and presents a more moderate or at least less escalatory discourse, may find an opportunity for support, or at least for tolerance.

“External Conspiracy” and the core of a New Entity

For AQAP in Yemen, the defectors’ recent move can only be interpreted as a direct threat. It is natural for the organization to view the statement as an “external conspiracy” aimed at undermining its internal cohesion. This is precisely what some media outlets quoted “jihadist sources” as saying, suggesting that the defectors may be backed by Arab or international actors seeking to weaken AQAP.

The organization’s reaction, based on sources close to its media center, indicates that AQAP’s leadership in Yemen views the defectors’ statement as an organized, externally-funded campaign rather than a spontaneous internal defection. This view links the names mentioned in the statement to a former leader, Riyadh al‑Nahdi (Abu Omar al‑Nahdi), the head of the “Change and Freedom Current,” announced in the Al Abr area of Wadi Hadramout in April 2025. Sources within the organization accuse the movement of being “supported by a Gulf state” and of aiming to confront AQAP. To undermine the statement’s credibility, the organization insists that these names are not “new defectors” but a “recycling of old names” who left its ranks between 2016 and 2021, noting that some reside in areas outside AQAP control such as Taiz and Sanaa or within Houthi‑influenced zones. From this perspective, the leadership views the tactic as intended to create media and political confusion and to promote “fake defections” as part of an externally directed strategy against the organization.

This narrative is not new; AQAP has always attributed any internal disagreement to “infiltration” or “external interference,” because admitting an internal flaw would mean acknowledging leadership failure, which it strives to avoid.

Despite this sensitivity, the most important point is that such a coordinated defection has not occurred in recent years. Since the major defection in favor of ISIS in 2014–2015, no organized secessionist entity has emerged that could stand as an alternative or even as an independent grouping. All defections that occurred were individual or limited and did not evolve into a standalone front. Therefore, the current gathering of these defectors and their issuance of a statement with a unified discourse gives the impression that they may be attempting to establish something more cohesive than a mere media initiative. According to one of AQAP’s defected leaders, “the future belongs to the defectors, not the organization”.

This step explains AQAP’s evident unease about the statement, as reflected in the quoted jihadist sources. The organization understands that the move is no longer limited to rhetoric and may be a prelude to forming an organizational nucleus, possibly a rising political or military project. If the defectors succeed in attracting a number of dissenters within the organization or even groups of elements dissatisfied with the current course, AQAP is expected to confront a profound crisis of internal contraction.

Legitimacy Struggle within the Organization

The organization fundamentally suffers from erosion of human and financial resources, loss of areas of influence, and declining presence among tribes. Nevertheless, it still retains some weight in certain areas, but any new defection that helps form an independent entity will further weaken its structure and may open the door to successive defections similar to those faced by other jihadist groups in the region. This scenario appears to resemble a state of “internal fragmentation,” which is more dangerous than security strikes because it attacks the organization’s spirit rather than its body.

Moreover, the call to submit to a “Sharia court” is not merely a legal phrase but a pressure tool. It implicitly accuses AQAP’s leadership of failing to implement Sharia properly or of deviating from its original course. In jihadist discourse, such accusations are a heavy weapon capable of attracting ideologically sensitive elements. The defectors know well that challenging the religious legitimacy of leadership can open the door to internal rebellion, especially in an organization that bases its legitimacy entirely on doctrinal compliance rather than political victory.

The post written by Riyadh al‑Asiri, one of the main defectors, reveals the core of the crisis facing the organization, which goes beyond mere disagreement over the application of Sharia. The message, titled “AQAP in Yemen... Is It Following the Methodology of the Mother Al‑Qaeda?,” is essentially an indictment of the organization’s leadership in Yemen using the statements and principles of Osama bin Laden. The main headings of the post accuse the Yemen branch of extremism, deviation from the jurisprudence of consequences and balances, and poor assessment of the reality and the prerequisites necessary for jihad, which led to ill‑considered confrontations that produced harm without achieving any significant benefits, according to al‑Asiri.

Conclusion

Although the statement did not explicitly announce the establishment of a new entity, its wording, source, and context give the impression that the defectors may be gauging reactions, both within and outside the organization. Such tests are common in Jihadist milieu: A statement or position is issued, the level of response is measured, and subsequent steps are built upon that. The current situation in Yemen also provides fertile ground for these initiatives. The country is undergoing wide transformations manifested in escalating internal conflicts, proliferation of active actors, large security gaps, and continuous shifts in the influence of armed groups here and there. This unstable environment gives the defecting group a real opportunity to emerge.

The defectors’ move appears to be a pivotal moment within the landscape of extremist jihadist groups in Yemen, not because they represent a large force now, but because they may be the first nucleus of an emerging movement, or the spark of a deeper internal split that threatens the collapse of AQAP.