“Iran’s renewed involvement in supporting the Houthis, and the Israeli pressure to resume American strikes against the Yemeni militia, are all factors that suggest a possible shift in the United States’ military position. However, other factors do not favor such a change.”

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Mohamed Fawzy (South24)

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In recent weeks the Red Sea region has witnessed remarkable patterns of escalation, as the Houthi militia resumed targeting maritime navigation in the vital waterway, as part of its approach known as the “Support and Endorsement Front”. The return of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea has prompted Israel to act on two levels: first, by intensifying attacks against the group’s positions in Yemen, and second, by pushing Washington to resume its strikes against the Yemeni militia. These developments raise questions regarding the possibility of renewed American strikes on the Houthis, as well as the repercussions of this escalation in the Red Sea region.

First – Recent Escalation Trends

The main developments on the Red Sea front, and the successive events unfolding there, are associated with a set of key indicators, mostly characterized by elements of “escalation.” These can be highlighted as follows:

1 – Houthis Resume Targeting Maritime Navigation:

The escalation trajectory of the Houthis has taken a qualitative turn, with the Yemeni militia resuming attacks on maritime navigation in the Red Sea. These attacks are considered the most dangerous in recent months, such as the one that occurred on July 8. The European Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea reported that a Houthi attack on the Eternity C vessel resulted in the death of three sailors and injuries to several others—just hours after an attack on the Magic Seas vessel. Both ships were Liberian-flagged and Greek-operated. The ships sustained damage from gunfire, missiles, sea drones, and remotely controlled explosive-laden boats. The attacks caused the sinking of both vessels in the Red Sea waters.

In a speech on July 10, 2025, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, leader of the Yemeni militia, stated that “the maritime operations, which resulted in the sinking of two ships belonging to non-compliant companies, confirm the firm position of banning navigation for the Israeli enemy, as long as the aggression and blockade on Gaza persists,” as he put it. He emphasized that “what happened in the Red Sea carries a clear lesson for every shipping company operating on behalf of the Israeli enemy—that they will be treated firmly, and that no company transporting Israeli goods through the declared operational zone will be permitted,” according to the Houthi leader’s statement.

It is important here to note critical developments: the first relates to the Houthis’ resumption of targeting maritime navigation in the Red Sea, following a pause since November 2024. The second is the U.S. Embassy in Yemen's announcement that the Houthis kidnapped several surviving crew members from the Eternity C vessel after the attack. The Houthis have recently released a video showing the 10 crew members of the Eternity C they had captured after sinking the vessel, and have threatened to escalate their attacks, These incidents cannot be separated from Iran, given the possibility that this escalation was encouraged by Tehran as a form of retaliatory action and an attempt to reaffirm its continued control of regional proxies.

2 – Continued Houthi Operations Against Israel:

The Houthis’ renewed maritime attacks in the Red Sea are not isolated from their ongoing strikes inside Israeli territory. After the ceasefire between Iran and Israel on June 24, 2025, following their 12-day war, the Houthis began intensifying the pace of their attacks against Israel, targeting what they described as “a vital Israeli site” in Beersheba on June 28, 2025. Since then, the militia has launched multiple attacks into Israeli territory, reflecting a diversity in the nature of their attacks: sustained targeting of Israel’s interior and the resumption of maritime attacks in the Red Sea.

3 – Israeli Pressure on Washington to Target the Houthis:

Hebrew media outlets reported on July 11, 2025, that the government of Benjamin Netanyahu has asked U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to resume its strikes against the Houthi militia in Yemen. Israel’s public broadcaster stated that “Tel Aviv informed Washington that Houthi attacks on maritime navigation are not solely an Israeli issue, but a global one.” Israel called on the United States to “carry out intensified joint attacks against Houthi regime targets—not only through Israeli fighter jets, but also by renewing U.S. strikes and forming a coalition that includes additional countries.” The broadcaster quoted an Israeli official as saying, “There is a need for a broader coalition to signal to the Houthi regime that it is in danger.” This indicates Israel’s attempt to leverage the recent Houthi escalation to draw Washington back into a military confrontation with the Yemeni militia.

Read more at: https: Why Does Israel Fail in Yemen Despite Its Success in Iran and Lebanon?

4 – Intensified Israeli Strikes Against the Houthis:

In response to the Houthis’ continued escalation in recent weeks, Israel has begun to intensify the pace of its attacks against the Yemeni militia. On July 6, 2025, Israeli forces launched strikes on what they described as Houthi targets in the ports of Hodeidah, Ras Issa, and Salif, as well as the Ras Kathib power station. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz confirmed the targeting of the vessel Galaxy Leader, which had been seized by the Houthis in November 2023, stating that it was being used for “terrorist activities” in the Red Sea. On July 21, 2025, the Israeli army announced it had attacked and destroyed military infrastructure belonging to the Houthi militia in Hodeidah port—including engineering equipment used to rebuild the port, fuel barrels, marine components used for military activities, vessels in the nearby maritime zone, and other infrastructure utilized by the Houthi militia.

In this context it is notable that Israel continues to focus on targeting the Houthi militia’s infrastructure in Yemen, reflecting its inability, thus far, to achieve an intelligence penetration into the group that would ensure the effectiveness of its strikes, similar to what occurred in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon. These Israeli attacks appear aimed to curb the Houthis’ ability to launch future operations and to rebuild their capabilities.

5 – Seizure of a Large Iranian Weapons Shipment to the Houthis:

A major development related to the escalation was the announcement by the ‘National Resistance’ forces on the western coast that, on June 16, 2025, they had intercepted “the largest strategic weapons shipment from Iran to the Houthis.” The shipment reportedly weighed 750 tons. The size of the cargo reflects Iran’s increasing military and financial investment in the Houthis and signals a new phase in Tehran’s support for the militia. The development also reinforces the previous assumption that the recent Houthi escalation received a green light from Iran.

Second – Implications for the United States' Position

In light of the aforementioned developments, it appears that the trajectory of Houthi operations in the Red Sea will escalate further, alongside continued Israeli operations. Iran’s renewed support for the Houthis, and Israeli pressure to resume U.S. strikes against the Yemeni militia, are factors that suggest that a shift could occur in how the United States responds to the Houthi threat. In this context, it can be said that a number of factors may encourage Washington to reengage militarily:

• One of the main factors that may motivate Washington to engage in a new escalation against the Houthis is the likelihood of the undermining of the U.S.’ interests in a truce with the Yemeni militia. This is due to several reasons. First, the Houthis’ recent attacks in the Red Sea threaten one of the red lines set by Washington in the ceasefire agreement brokered by Oman, including the principle of freedom of navigation in the waterway. Second, the situation is complicated by the dynamics surrounding the Gaza ceasefire and the nuclear negotiations with Iran, which increases the likelihood of a return to regional escalation. Third, there is a growing conviction within some American circles that the absence of effective deterrence against the Houthi militia is causing greater economic and security damage than any political considerations favoring de-escalation.

• The possibility of renewed American strikes against the Houthis is also related to recent regional and international developments. President Trump has managed to reach an arrangement with European partners that eases Washington’s burden of arming and funding the operations in Ukraine. Moreover, the decline in Iranian influence in the region may help reduce the risks associated with any potential escalation against the Houthis, especially regarding the targeting of U.S. interests and presence.

• The third factor relates to Trump's personal ambitions and his desire to project himself as a stronger leader than previous US administrations, and his efforts to overturn their strategies and approaches to certain issues. In this context, the U.S. president may see the need to move beyond the previous administration’s approach that emphasized “containment and defensive deterrence”, and instead opt for preemptive operations and what may be called “offensive deterrence”, which would force the Houthis to “separate the fronts” and halt the escalation.

• It is also impossible to separate the scenario of renewed American strikes against the Houthis from the Israeli factor in the equation. The growing threat posed by the Yemeni militia to Israeli territory—not just in terms of direct casualties caused by its attacks but also in terms of fueling further unrest inside Israel—adds urgency. In addition, pressures from pro-Israel lobbying groups and Israel’s strategic calculations regarding the need to eliminate Iran’s axis in the region, are all factors potentially pushing Washington toward re-engaging in escalation against the Houthis.

However, despite all the aforementioned considerations and indicators, Washington may adopt an approach based on temporarily postponing involvement in any new escalation tracks in the region, including against the Houthis. This is due to several factors: First, the lack of an intelligence breakthrough concerning the Houthis thus far, that would ensure the effectiveness of strikes and inflict losses that compel the group to de-escalate.

Second, current indicators suggest that, given local Yemeni conditions and considerations related to certain regional parties, it would be difficult to carry out a full-scale ground operation against the Yemeni militia, especially since airstrikes alone are insufficient to uproot the group. Third, domestic pressures in the United States currently do not favor direct involvement in escalation tracks in the Middle East. Fourth, Donald Trump's ambition to secure a Nobel Peace Prize, in addition to his desire to conclude a comprehensive deal in the Middle East that includes expanding the umbrella of the Abraham Accords-- are all factors that may prompt the American administration to refrain from responding to Israeli pressure to re-engage in escalation against the Houthi militia.