"The Southern Transitional Council faces a decisive political test amid mounting public anger and a sharp decline in its influence within the internationally recognized authority. Between a paralyzed partnership and a deteriorating economic reality, the legitimacy it was founded on as a representative of the Southern cause is steadily eroding."

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South24 Center Editorial

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In light of the rapid transformations sweeping the political scene in South Yemen, an important question arises regarding the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) position and role within the internationally recognized “legitimate authority”, and whether it still retains the political legitimacy originally rooted in its representation of the Southern cause.

Although the STC was successful in establishing its formal presence as an active party in the government following the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, and later solidified its role as a genuine partner within the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) after the Riyadh consultations in 2022, recent political and economic indicators pose serious challenges to its standing—both in terms of popular support and its influence within the PLC.

In the capital Aden, long considered the STC’s power base, the local authority—jointly administered by the Southern Transitional Council—faces a deepening economic crisis and a sharp decline in basic services, including electricity. This has sparked widespread public anger and raised questions about the STC’s ability to stand for and defend citizens’ interests. This decline coincides with attempts by the Transitional Council's rival factions to expand their influence within the PLC, most notably Rashad al-Alimi, the PLC president, who has consolidated control over key sovereign decisions and appointments—particularly in relation to Aden’s economic matters, which directly affect the STC’s popular support base.

In light of this context, this editorial seeks to examine whether the STC still retains its legitimacy as an effective partner in power, or whether it has been pushed to the margins by emerging realities. This requires the STC to redefine its position in the current political equation and safeguard its popularity in the face of the severe economic and services deterioration, as well as its ability to take more decisive steps regarding its political project related to the future of the South. 

Loss of Influence Within the Presidential Council

The STC formally joined the recognized government as a political and military actor under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, representing the Southern cause and the project for restoring a Southern state—based on the public mandate granted by the historic Aden Declaration of May 2017. Its political presence was further consolidated in April 2022 with the formation of the PLC, with STC President Aidrous al-Zubaidi being appointed as Vice President of the PLC. This representation was strengthened later with the inclusion of PLC members Abdulrahman al-Mahrami and Major General Faraj al-Bahsani in the STC’s senior leadership. This resulted in the STC getting three seats at the highest echelons of the current power structure, giving the Council a recognized role within the Yemeni presidency and a ministerial bloc within the Riyadh Agreement government.

However, a crucial question emerges now: Does the STC’s political presence within the current authority still carry any real weight? Despite its formal representation within the PLC, the current reality indicates a decline in its influence, especially in light of decisions and appointments made by the highest levels of authority -- without the STC’s knowledge or participation, in a scenario that perpetuates a pattern of unilateral decision-making led by Presidential Council President Rashad al-Alimi, who continues to act with the authority of a “President of the Republic” rather than as chair of a collective leadership body. His approach disregards the political architecture that was formed after the transfer of power in 2022, which clearly stipulates the transfer of power to a “presidential leadership council” that would take decisions collectively. This insistence on governing the state with a unilateral mindset undermines the consensus-based framework on which the transitional phase was built, breaches the principle of partnership among PLC components, and evokes parallels with Ali Abdullah Saleh’s conduct following the creation of the unified presidential council in 1990.

For instance, two members were recently appointed to the Central Bank’s Board of Directors unilaterally—without consultation with or notification to other PLC members, and without any formal announcement. Such appointments lack legal validity unless officially published, at least via the state-run Saba News Agency, especially given the absence of an official journal issued by the Ministry of Legal Affairs. This was in addition to a series of other decisions that have been passed unilaterally, without consensus or discussion within the Council.

The STC’s silence in the face of such practices cannot be interpreted merely as political flexibility, but may instead be perceived by the public as a surrender of its key partnership principle. The STC, from the outset when it entered the temporary “unified” governance structures, had asserted its non-negotiable principles—chief among them the parity between North and South as the foundation of any transitional partnership. Therefore, by relinquishing the need for balance in decision-making and its core principles exposes the STC to growing public scrutiny and threatens its representational status within the power equation it has strived to maintain.

It must be emphasized that it is no longer politically acceptable for northern factions to monopolize authority and disregard the fundamentals of the PLC partnership, particularly the principle of parity in appointments and decision-making. These are not merely administrative arrangements -- they are the backbone of the political equilibrium that allowed the STC to join the formal power structure. Notably, northern factions do not possess the geographical or economic parity to justify such equal partnership, especially with most northern regions under Houthi control. Therefore, any complacency or silence by the STC regarding attempts by Al-Alimi or other northern actors to bypass these foundations does not constitute a tactical retreat but rather a perilous slide that erodes the Council’s raison d’être as a voice for Southern aspirations. It risks reducing it to just any other standard political entity stripped of its original unique Southern mandate.

A Government Under Al-Alimi’s Guardianship

If the PLC is considered the highest executive authority, rather than a government of equal representation, this effectively means that the government is now under the control of a single faction -- the same one that holds the reins of power within the Presidential Council. As such, this renders the Southern Transitional Council's participation in the government through a number of ministers meaningless, as long as the final executive decision revolves around the Chairman of the Leadership Council, and overrides the partnership that is supposed to regulate the relationship between the components of power. 

For example, the relationship between former Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak and President Rashad al-Alimi exemplified institutional tension due to constant interference from the Presidential Office in government affairs, including non-consultation in appointments and suspension of financial allocations. This is not an anomaly in the Yemeni context. Despite presidential powers being transferred to a collective council, which was intended to ease the executive constraints on the government, the council president (Al-Alimi) has reclaimed the role of president of the republic —monopolizing power and nullifying the very rationale behind the PLC’s formation.

To break this cycle of unilateralism and the absence of real partnership, it is recommended that the government be completely reconstituted—headed by a prime minister with genuine authority and executive ability to manage the current phase. Moreover, the public services portfolio must be decoupled from political entanglements, allowing the government to function as an independent administrative and executive body, while the PLC attends to sovereign issues, such as war, peace, and steering the transitional process. The STC bears the unique responsibility to push for change or recalibrate the power arrangement, especially given its de facto military and security control over Aden, which is also a reason many political rivals hold it largely accountable for the current situation. The rivals are exploiting the situation through coordinated media campaigns aimed at undermining the STC’s popular standing and distorting its role. This calls for a clear political response to reset the relations between the government institutions and hold each party accountable.

Special Exceptions for the Capital, Aden 

Given the severe deterioration of basic services in Aden, it is essential to grant the local authority exceptional and comprehensive powers to manage service delivery as an urgent rescue measure, particularly if the central government is not granted administrative powers. Rather than continuing to assign blame to the ministries such as electricity or water for the recurring crises—amidst the administrative weakness—responsibility must be directly transferred to the local authority and empowered to manage these vital sectors independently and effectively.

The past years have demonstrated the Yemeni government’s failure in managing service provision, which necessitates a different approach based on transferring full executive responsibility for services to Aden’s local authority. This will ensure faster response time, clearer accountability, and also shield the city from further politicization and crisis.

In general, the STC must now move to correct the course of the partnership by adopting a comprehensive strategy that addresses two interlinked priorities: First, fixing the deteriorating internal situation for which the Council bears part of the responsibility—especially in Aden; and Second, reevaluating its political partnership within the current power structure.

Simultaneously, PLC President Rashad al-Alimi is duty-bound to foster consensus within recognized institutions —not undermine it. His task is not to govern unilaterally, but to coordinate among all sides and uphold the Council’s consensus-based framework as stipulated in the power transfer declaration. However, his current conduct, rooted in unilateralism, contradicts that mission and transforms him from guardian of the partnership into part of the problem. If this persists, decisive measures must be taken to redraw the political map, including exploring options that safeguard Southern entitlements from being eroded and preserve the cohesion of its popular support base.

Ultimately, continued acceptance of a lopsided arrangement where select actors dominate decision-making will gradually strip the STC of its representational legitimacy, weaken its popular appeal, and even threaten to erode its influence in Aden itself, the core of its political, security, and social weight. If “partners” continue to sideline the STC, the only viable political recourse may be withdrawal from both the presidential and governmental frameworks, while maintaining its military and security commitments within the Arab coalition. Remaining in an unbalanced and weak arrangement serves neither the South nor the STC, but risks losing what remains of its public standing and its ability to meaningfully represent the Southern cause.