“The Houthi security structure is decentralized, highly secretive, and reliant on separate cells that only communicate through primitive methods that are difficult to spy on”

*Ibrahim Ali (South24)

During 2024 and in 2025, Israel appeared to have reached the peak of its intelligence and operational capabilities. It succeeded in carrying out a series of precise and focused assassinations against Lebanese Hezbollah leaders, including Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, in one of the most audacious intelligence operations in decades. These operations extended beyond Lebanon, reaching high-ranking commanders within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), both in Tehran and across their regional spheres of influence.

However, this operational success did not extend to Yemen. Despite the repeated operations launched by the Houthis against Israeli interests, whether by targeting ships in the Red Sea or firing missiles and drones toward southern Israel, Israel has so far been unable to eliminate any senior Houthi leaders. Even the strike it announced targeting a military meeting in Sanaa, which was intended to assassinate Chief of Staff Mohammed al-Ghamari, turned out to be a miss. Why is Israel failing in Yemen while succeeding in Lebanon and Iran? 

Topographical Constraints

When considering the differences between the trajectory of Israeli operations in Lebanon and Iran on the one hand and Yemen on the other, geography emerges as a decisive factor separating success from failure. Intelligence and military action do not occur in a vacuum but are shaped by the ground on which they operate. In this sense, geographical topography is a key differentiating factor, and can sometimes be the first and last line of defense.

In Lebanon and Syria, Israel operates in familiar terrain where it has conducted intelligence activities for decades. Southern Lebanon, for instance, shares a direct border with Israel, facilitating the infiltration of operatives and the execution of precision airstrikes.

The region’s infrastructure—both digital and physical—is modern and interconnected, enabling real-time surveillance, signal interception, and satellite-based target acquisition. Moreover, long-standing social penetration has rendered certain communities susceptible to informational and human intelligence exploitation.

In contrast, northern Yemen—where the Houthi movement is concentrated—presents a rugged and fortified landscape that poses formidable challenges to intelligence collection. The mountainous terrain not only offers natural cover but also impedes aerial reconnaissance and electronic surveillance, even with advanced technologies.

Furthermore, the Houthi leadership does not operate from exposed compounds (mansions) or centralized command centers. Instead, they are constantly on the move, using caves or scattered houses as temporary shelters.

Decades of Infiltration in Lebanon

Israel’s intelligence superiority is exemplified by its ability to construct complex and effective espionage networks inside a number of hostile countries, particularly Lebanon and Iran. Through decades of cumulative effort, Israeli intelligence has been able to penetrate deeply into the security and political ecosystems of these states and carry out decisive qualitative operations. Yemen, by contrast, remains resistant to such infiltration due to the nature of the security system prevailing in the Houthi-controlled areas, and the absence of any local structures that can be exploited for penetration or recruitment.

In Lebanon, Israeli intelligence operations have demonstrated their deep penetration—not only into civil society but also the Hezbollah’s internal command structure. In 2009, Lebanese authorities dismantled over 11 active Israeli spy networks, involving over 70 agents, and arrested more than 40 operatives as part of a campaign. These infiltration networks reached even the level of senior officers, like Brigadier General Adeeb al-Alam of General Security and Colonel Shahid Toumieh, who provided their operators/handlers with coordinates of Lebanese military sites that were later targeted during the July 2006 offensive.

Additional networks also facilitated targeted assassinations, such as the 2004 elimination of Hezbollah commander Ghaleb Awali. Several operatives, including Ziad al-Homsi, admitted to meeting their handlers abroad and working with a detailed “target bank” that included Hezbollah targets, including civilian and military installations in Lebanon and Syria.

This level of deep infiltration peaked in 2024–2025, when Israel conducted a series of highly complex operations that neutralized most of Hezbollah’s senior leadership—including Nasrallah himself. This unprecedented blow shook the Hezbollah structure and raised serious questions about the extent of intelligence penetration within its senior leadership and the secret of the failure of the security system to protect the leadership ranks, even though the Israeli operations were not a surprise. 

Among the most notable operations was the ‘Pager Campaign’, a coordinated effort in which Israel deployed miniature electronic alert devices—resembling pagers or buzzers—that had been covertly planted or delivered to Hezbollah members. Hundreds of these devices exploded simultaneously during a specific moment, in what appeared to be a meticulous intelligence cleansing operation, targeting the second and third level ranks of the party structure, in addition to some prominent field commanders.

In Iran, Israeli operations reached unprecedented levels of sophistication, transitioning from intelligence collection to direct action within the core of state institutions. The 2020 assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh—executed via a satellite-controlled remote weapon with no human presence on site—marked a paradigm shift in Israeli operational capabilities.

This was preceded by a series of assassinations targeting nuclear scientists and cyberattacks, most notably the 2010 Stuxnet virus, which disabled thousands of centrifuges at the Natanz facility.

Reports indicate that Mossad successfully recruited over 20 agents inside Iran, including personnel within the security and nuclear institutions. These operatives facilitated sabotage, smuggled out classified documents, and provided actionable intelligence that enabled precision strikes on strategic infrastructure. Entire nuclear archives were reportedly exfiltrated and publicly disclosed by Israel, underscoring the depth of Israeli penetration and its superiority.

The Israeli operations escalated further in 2024–2025, targeting senior IRGC commanders—including Major General Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, and Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of the General Staff—alongside top nuclear scientists, in the recent Israeli attacks.

These operations were carried out in a surprise manner, in the heart of Tehran and other fortified areas, in what was widely interpreted as the culmination of a deep penetration within the Iranian military and security establishment, and perhaps even the collapse of part of its security structure in the face of Mossad's highly skilled apparatus.

In contrast, the Yemeni theater, especially in Houthi-controlled areas, appears to be a complex environment that is difficult to penetrate. Israel does not have logistical bases in Yemen, not are there any entities linked to Israel that could be used as a starting point or provide cover for any intelligence activity, as has happened in other countries. 

The Houthi security model is decentralized, highly secretive, and reliant on separate cells that only communicate through primitive methods that are difficult to spy on. Leaders avoid fixed locations and smartphones, adopting unpredictable movement patterns that defy conventional tracking methodologies, which makes monitoring them or penetrating their networks difficult, but not impossible.

To date, no successful Israeli intelligence operation has been recorded within Yemen’s interior—neither in terms of information penetration nor leadership targeting—reinforcing the assessment that Yemen remains more fortified and self-sufficient in terms of security, despite its limited technological infrastructure.

An Enemy Under Surveillance, but Beyond Reach

Israel identifies Hezbollah as its primary strategic threat due to its geographic proximity, its growing precision-guided missile capabilities, and potential to open a northern front. The Houthis, by contrast, are viewed as a secondary, indirect threat: they possess long-range strike capabilities but with limited accuracy. Furthermore, their presence in Yemen does not constitute an existential threat to Israel, compared to the Hezbollah, for example.

Nonetheless, the recent escalation in Houthi operations and their expanded targeting of Israeli and allied interests has redefined the calculations within the Israeli security establishment. The Houthis, despite their complexity and geographic remoteness, have emerged as a priority on Israel’s intelligence radar. This explains Israel’s approach toward expanding its covert activity in Yemen and efforts to construct a more precise “target bank” based on localized intelligence information.

Still, Israel continues to treat Yemen as a high-risk theater, as it lacks robust intelligence infrastructure or reliable local partners. Any military or intelligence operation would require intricate regional coordination. Consequently, Yemen remains an unfavorable arena for direct intervention—at least in the short term—with intelligence gathering serving as the primary instrument for threat monitoring and strategic assessment.

Is Mossad Beginning to Penetrate Yemen Intelligence-wise?

To date, no successful Israeli intelligence operation has been recorded deep inside Yemen, nor has any senior leader of the Houthis been targeted in a high-profile strike, despite rising tensions. This failure is not necessarily due to an intelligence deficiency, but rather the absence of a prior strategic decision to engage in the Yemeni theater, which—until recently—lay outside the scope of direct threats to Israeli national security.

However, the scene has shifted. With the expansion of Houthi attacks on international shipping and the group’s growing role within the so-called Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”, Israel has begun to view Yemen as an emerging strategic front that warrants the establishment of a long-term intelligence presence. While this option is now firmly on the table, its implementation is fraught with structural and environmental complexities.

The first obstacle lies in the closed tribal nature of Yemeni society, where social structures are built on familial and historical loyalties, making external infiltration a difficult task without local intermediaries. Moreover, the Houthis maintain strict control over their territories through a decentralized and highly secretive security system. Their leaders do not operate from fixed locations, nor do they use traceable smart communication devices—as previously noted—but instead rely on primitive, traditional methods that are difficult to penetrate.

The harsh punishments imposed by the group on anyone suspected of collaborating with the enemy, which include public executions, serve as a powerful deterrent to any local recruitment efforts, rendering even limited infiltration attempts extremely costly in both human and security terms.

Nevertheless, several vulnerabilities could offer Israel a future foothold in the intelligence operations. The deteriorating economic conditions, widespread poverty, and unemployment in Houthi-controlled areas may tempt some individuals to cooperate under financial pressure or in exchange for money. Additionally, the presence of local adversaries to the Houthis—be they tribal factions, political forces, or opposing sectarian groups—could provide fertile ground for building espionage assets through indirect tactical alliances.

Furthermore, despite their rigidity, the Houthis lack a cross-border security infrastructure similar to that of Hezbollah or the IRGC, which means that their intelligence operations remain limited within Yemen and may not pose an effective counter-threat to Israeli activities.

In sum, Israel’s move to establish an intelligence network in Yemen has become a matter of time, driven by the rapidly evolving geopolitical dynamics. However, the success of this endeavor will depend on Israel’s ability to overcome tribal barriers and penetrate the Houthis’ tightly closed security apparatus, with the understanding that any meaningful breakthrough may require years of positioning and covert work before translating to tangible results on the ground.

Sanaa may seem too distant for Mossad operations to reach effectively today, but it is not beyond Israel’s sights. Just as Israeli infiltration in Tehran began with a narrow margin, and gradually over time evolved into a seismic shock that rattled the core of Iran’s military and security institutions, the Yemeni theater is likewise poised—albeit slowly—to follow a similar path.

In the world of intelligence, achievements are not built with swift strikes, but cultivated over years of concealment, surveillance, and silent recruitment. As long as the Houthis continue their transformation from being a local actor into a regional player threatening the Red Sea security and openly aligning with an axis hostile to Israel, the building of an intelligence penetration network within its core is no longer a deferred option—but a rising priority for Israel.