This geographic shift reflects the Al-Qaeda’s attempt to reposition itself in conflict zones that are less subjected to international oversight and more porous in terms of borders and central authority, offering it an opportunity to rebuild its networks and strengthen its regional influence. 

Ibrahim Ali (South24)

Two decades after the peak of its influence in the Middle East and South Asia, it appears that Al-Qaeda is preparing to write a new chapter in its history, shifting its operational center from the mountains of Afghanistan and Yemen to the plains of Somalia and the deserts of the African Sahel. This transformation reflects not just a tactical repositioning but also reveals a profound change in the structure of the global Jihadist landscape. 

In Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda has receded to the margins of the Jihadist scene, especially after the Taliban's return to power in 2021. Despite their historical ties, the new political dynamics have forced the Taliban to keep a measured distance from the Al-Qaeda in light of its international obligations. On the other hand, the Daesh-Khorasan has emerged as a more violent and bold competitor. In Yemen, despite the brutal blows dealt to the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) between 2015-2025, which reduced its influence and drove it out from its strategic strongholds, the organization has in recent months tried to recover by taking advantage of a complex landscape of shifting alliances and multiple conflicts.

This gradual resurgence is attributed to several factors, most notably to the change in relationship between the AQAP and the Houthis. Field and intelligence reports indicate that direct confrontation between the two has diminished or stopped completely since 2022, opening the door for a form of tacit coordination that enables each to focus on its main adversaries. Local and international reports have repeatedly confirmed that the AQAP receives drone military technology from the Houthis to counter the Southern Forces. Moreover, the near-total elimination of the ISIS from Yemen and its loss of organizational and operational base has removed a tough competitor that was draining the Al-Qaeda’s ability and threatening its influence in several areas.

However, the Al-Qaeda in Yemen continues to suffer from accumulated crises hitting it over the past years. These include internal splits, airstrikes targeting its top leaders, Southern Forces-led field operations as part of ‘Arrows of the East‘ and the loss of grassroot popular support in many areas due to its extremism and ties to external agendas. 

Somalia: A Renewed Stronghold for Al-Shabaab

In contrast, all eyes are now turning to the new front of global jihad. In Somalia, the Al-Shabaab movement, the Somali branch of Al-Qaeda, has been able to wrest control over vast areas by exploiting the state fragility and tribal divisions. Scarcely a week passes without the Al-Shabaab carrying out armed operations, including bombings, assassinations, and attacks against military bases.

Some of its most prominent recent operations include large-scale attacks in central and southern Somalia, targeting military bases, government institutions, and civilian gatherings. Their activities have increased near the capital, Mogadishu, where they target the army's locations and carry out armed patrols around cities and villages. 

On February 20, Al-Shabaab launched a coordinated attack in Middle Shabelle region, seizing several villages temporarily, before being driven out by the Somali forces which said it had killed 130 of its elements, according to government statements. Meanwhile, media reports pointed to the seizure of military vehicles and weapons as well as 93 fatalities during the attack. On February 27, the extremist group attacked the city of Balad and engaged in a fierce clash with government forces before being forced to withdraw. On March 11, the Al-Shabaab targeted a hotel in Beledweyne in central Somalia, killing 10 people, including civilians and military figures, after a 24-hour siege. 

On March 18, they carried out an assassination attempt on Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, using a bomb to target his convoy, resulting in four deaths and inviting international condemnation, including from the UN. The very next day, on March 19, the terror group bombed the fortified Halani Compound near Mogadishu’s Aden Adde Airport, which houses UN and African missions and foreign embassies. On March 20, they launched double attacks in Lower Shabelle, targeting the town of Sabiid and carried out an ambush on a reinforcement convoy, killing a senior military officer. 

On April 24, fierce clashes erupted between Al-Shabaab fighters and the Somali government forces over a strategic military base in Middle Shabelle. The group claimed control of the base but the government said it had regained control with the help of air raids. On May 18, a suicide bomber targeted a military recruitment gathering at the Damanyo military base in Mogadishu, killing 10 and injuring 30 others.

It's worth mentioning that the aforementioned incidents cover only the most prominent operations and is not a complete tally. Data indicates that Al-Shabaab carried out 644 attacks in Somalia between January 2025 and May, leading to 1,376 deaths and injuries among civilians and security personnel. In the African Sahel, the Al-Qaeda’s branch, Jama'at Nasr Al-Islam wal-Muslimin, has expanded its presence amid near-total absence of the state. Following a series of coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, the group has exploited the political vacuum as a fertile ground to grow, sometimes outpacing the ISIS-West Africa in winning local support. 

Clearly, this shift from Asia to Africa is not a coincidence but the result of several overlapping factors. On the security level, the military pressure in Africa is lower compared to the concentrated strikes in Yemen and Afghanistan; politically, the weak governments and the collapse of central authority have created an ideal environment for armed groups; Socially, poverty, marginalization, and ethnic divisions facilitate the recruitment of youth; Geographically, the rugged terrain and open borders hamper counterterrorism operations. According to the ‘Global Terrorism Index 2025’ report, the African Sahel has become a new terrorism hotspot, accounting for more than half of global terrorism-related deaths in 2024, with 17 of the 20 deadliest attacks worldwide occurring there.

As a result, the challenge facing policymakers there is doubled, especially with the Western powers gradually withdrawing from the continent, the weak regional responses, and the multiplicity of jihadist actors. Despite its limited resources, the Al-Qaeda branches in Africa have managed to build strong local networks and carry out "low-cost jihad" with high impact.

Yemen: A Strategic Arena

From the above, it can be stated that this geographic shift reflects the Al-Qaeda’s attempt to reposition itself in conflict zones that are less subjected to international oversight and more porous in terms of borders and central authority, offering it an opportunity to rebuild its networks and strengthen its regional influence. Although the group’s new focus appears geographically distant from Yemen, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains one of the most likely beneficiaries of these developments. This is due to its strong historical and logistical ties with the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, which is Al-Qaeda’s most prominent arm in East Africa. Intelligence reports indicate the existence of active smuggling networks and operational cooperation between the two groups over the years, including the trafficking of weapons and fighters, and the financing of operations. This relationship also intersects with the complex regional dynamics represented by the Houthis in Yemen. Despite the ideological differences between the Houthis and Al-Qaeda, both parties maintain close links with the Al-Shabaab, whether through shared smuggling routes or overlapping logistical interests, particularly in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

In February 2025, the President of the UN Security Council described the relationship between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab as “transactional or opportunistic.” The United States has also warned that the Houthis have supplied weapons to the Al-Shabaab, revealing meetings between the two parties. A March 2025 report by UN experts stated that Al-Shabaab received weapons, ammunition, and various explosives from Yemen via the ports of Marka and Barawa in the Lower Shabelle region. Reports suggest the Houthis are providing increasing logistical and military support, which may include advanced weaponry and training in drone and missile use, heightening the likelihood of attacks on critical shipping routes in the region. This dangerous development reflects the subversive role played by the group in undermining regional and international security. Undoubtedly, this geographic and maritime connection facilitates smuggling between Yemen and Somalia and enhances the opportunities for coordination between both branches of Al-Qaeda, alongside the Houthis.

Against this backdrop, the AQAP is likely to reinforce its status within Al-Qaeda’s international structure, taking advantage of geography, informal alliances, and the security vacuum across the Sahel and Somalia. If this shift is not countered with effective regional and international security coordination, the smuggling and financing channels between Yemen and East Africa could turn into vital arteries of support, reviving the fragmented organization.

Addressing this transformation cannot be limited to security approaches alone. It requires a comprehensive strategy that incorporates developmental aspects, strengthens local governance capacity, and enhances regional intelligence coordination. In areas such as Somalia and the Sahel, there is an urgent need for in-depth field studies that are based on actual understanding of the ground realities, that reveal the shifts in jihadist geography, and go beyond stereotypes and superficial media coverage.