Andrew Korybko (South24 Center)

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The rapidly escalating Iranian-Israeli conflict began after Israel’s large-scale aerial sneak attack against Iran late last week. Israel claimed it was a preemptive operation to stop Iran’s supposedly imminent obtainment of nuclear weapons, while Iran said it was unprovoked. Both sides have since exchanged several rounds of attacks, and the international community is very worried that the conflict might spread. The most widely discussed possibility is that the US could directly intervene on Israel’s side.

This could occur in response to Iran striking regional US bases under the pretext of American involvement in Israel’s sneak attack and subsequent strikes. It could also result from a speculative false flag operation by Israel blamed on Iran, or from Trump proactively authorizing direct intervention without any such trigger. In any case, it is a credible concern that must be taken seriously by all stakeholders, including Russia. Its policy towards the conflict will now be described in order to better predict how it might respond to such a scenario.

Iran joined the Russian co-founded Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2023. This group was initially created to resolve border disputes between Russia and other former Soviet Republics with China. Its members are united in their opposition to terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Over time, the SCO began to prioritize economic, financial, and other forms of connectivity cooperation. Some have described it as a “non-Western NATO,” but this is inaccurate since there is no Article 5 equivalent.

Iran also joined the Russian co-founded BRICS in 2024 after being invited during the prior year’s summit. Unlike the SCO, BRICS has no security component. However, Iran’s membership in both organizations led some observers to believe that Iran is Russia’s ally. This perception was reinforced by reports over the past three years that Russia bought Iranian drones for use against Ukraine. It was further strengthened in the eyes of some after the two countries' leaders signed an updated strategic partnership pact in January 2025.

Regarding that pact, Article 3.3 states: “In the event that either Contracting Party is subject to aggression, the other Contracting Party shall not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor which would contribute to the continued aggression, and shall help to ensure that the differences that have arisen are settled on the basis of the United Nations Charter and other applicable rules of international law.” There is no mention of mutual defense guarantees, similar to NATO’s Article 5, just like with the SCO.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Russia’s relations with Iran are more important and strategic than those with Israel. Russia has repeatedly criticized Israel throughout the course of its regional military campaigns that began after Hamas’ sneak attack on October 7th, 2023. Relations with Israel remain cordial, however, as evidenced by Putin inviting Netanyahu to this year’s Victory Day parade on Red Square in early May. Netanyahu did not attend, but they still held a phone call to “exchange warm greetings,” according to the Kremlin readout.

Russia has also not designated Israel as an “unfriendly country,” unlike several dozen others. Meanwhile, Israel does not officially comply with the West’s unilateral sanctions against Russia. A major reason why relations remain manageable despite disagreements over Israel’s regional military campaigns and the Ukrainian conflict is the large Russian-speaking diaspora in Israel. These people serve as a bridge between the two nations and help maintain stability under these difficult conditions.

Putin even famously declared in September 2019 that “Russians and Israelis have ties of family and friendship. This is a true common family; I can say this without exaggeration. Almost 2 million Russian speakers live in Israel. We consider Israel a Russian-speaking country.” Even so, the Russian Foreign Ministry “strongly condemned” Israel’s sneak attack against Iran, while also calling for mutual restraint—implicitly suggesting that Iran should not escalate by targeting regional US bases.

Later that same day, Putin spoke with Pezeshkian and Netanyahu. During these conversations, he condemned what Israel did and proposed mediating between the two sides if both agreed. Nothing materialized, of course, but the gesture was still in line with Russia’s policy of balancing between Iran and Israel to the best of its ability, given the complicated circumstances after October 7th. What matters is that Russia politically condemned Israel but did not offer tangible aid to Iran.

Putin then called Trump that weekend and “emphasised the importance of preventing the conflict from escalating and the readiness of the Russian side to engage in possible mediation efforts,” according to his top aide, Yuri Ushakov, who briefed the press about their conversation. Trump said he was “open to” the idea. That stance is sensible, considering the Kremlin had earlier offered to receive excess Iranian nuclear fuel as part of an agreement between Iran and the US in the context of their nuclear negotiations.

This would essentially replicate Russia’s role in the now-defunct JCPOA if agreed upon. It is also important to mention that Russia built Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant and agreed to build several more facilities thereafter. Russia is therefore partially involved in the nuclear issue that served as the pretext for Israel’s sneak attack and remains central to Iran’s negotiations with the US. Russia has reaffirmed that the conflict must be resolved through diplomacy, not military force, and this is one possible solution.

However, this possibility could be offset if the US directly intervenes in the conflict on Israel’s side, which could escalate hostilities to the point where diplomacy becomes impossible as Washington and Tel Aviv work to achieve a decisive military victory over Iran. Iran could also lose even without US intervention. In either scenario, Russia could still dispose of Iran’s nuclear fuel and possibly help dismantle its ballistic missile and other programs—just as it helped dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons after the 2013 agreement.

A US intervention would almost certainly lead to Iran’s defeat—even if Tehran manages to inflict serious collateral damage on regional US bases or possibly even the American homeland, should its sleeper cells be capable of such action. Russia is not expected to intervene militarily in support of Iran. As previously explained, shared membership in the SCO and BRICS does not entail mutual defense commitments, nor does the newly updated strategic partnership.

Russia does not want Iran to be decisively defeated because the resulting destruction could disrupt transit across the North-South Transport Corridor with India. The Kremlin considers this corridor one of the most promising geo-economic routes of the emerging multipolar world order. Iran is also a promising emerging market for Russian real-sector exports, and both countries could jointly manage aspects of the global energy industry if Russian companies help bring more of Iran’s oil and gas to market one day.

A regime change following Iran’s potential defeat would adversely affect Russia’s long-term strategic interests. Even so, Russia will not risk sparking World War III with the US over Iran—just as it would not risk it over Ukraine, despite more than three years of intense proxy war there. Russia’s priorities would then shift to preventing a large-scale refugee influx, ensuring that prior contracts are respected, and preventing the deployment of Western arms in Iran that could threaten Russian territory.

Of these, the first imperative is the most realistic since Iran does not directly border Russia, although some refugees could hypothetically arrive via the Caspian Sea. The second would be more difficult and resemble Russia’s struggles in post-Assad Syria. The third is the least achievable due to limited means. “Balkanization” could also follow regime change in Iran if militant Arabs, Azeris, Baloch, and/or Kurds exploit the chaos. Some, like the Azeris, might even enjoy foreign state backing.

The possibility of direct military involvement by neighboring states in a post-Ayatollah Iran could lead to a fierce scramble for influence. Russia is poorly positioned to participate in such a contest due to the ongoing Ukrainian conflict and its lack of influence among separatist groups—unlike its position immediately after World War II. To be clear, this sequence of events, including the deployment of Western arms in Iran that could strike Russia, is unlikely—but it cannot be ruled out if the situation continues to spiral out of control.

Those in Iran and among its international sympathizers who are placing their hopes on Russia decisively intervening in support of Iran if the US intervenes in support of Israel will therefore be sorely disappointed. The best-case scenario is that Putin convinces Trump to pressure Israel into halting its campaign in exchange for a Syrian-style demilitarization deal, which in this case could involve denuclearization. However, that may not happen—or Netanyahu could blatantly defy Trump’s demands.

The absolute maximum Russia might do to help Iran—and this is admittedly highly speculative, as it would contradict Russia’s careful balancing act between Iran-Israel and Iran-US—is to provide emergency military aid and possibly intelligence support. Aside from being extremely unlikely, such actions would not alter the military-strategic dynamics of the conflict. The diplomatic costs would far outweigh the benefits, making it almost impossible to imagine Putin, the pragmatist, authorizing anything of the sort.

Simply put, Iran is militarily on its own against Israel and possibly soon the US. This conclusion should not surprise those with a clear understanding of Russian policy towards the current conflict. Iran is one of Russia’s strategic partners and important for fulfilling some of its long-term strategic objectives in regional connectivity and the global energy sector. Still, Iran is not worth risking World War III with the United States—something both the US and Israel are keenly aware of and may be emboldened by.