The Houthis benefit from AQAP operations to destabilize areas outside their control without bearing the cost of direct confrontation, while AQAP benefits from the chaotic environment created by the Houthis.

Ibrahim Ali* (South24 Center)

Amid the escalating public discontent in Hadramout, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has entered the crisis with a striking statement, through which it sought to reposition itself and exploit the turmoil to obstruct any path toward stability in southern Yemen. The statement, which combined jihadist slogans with economic demands, linked the Hadramout protests to the war in Gaza, presenting itself as the bearer of the banner of “resistance” against what it called “American hegemony” and “local corruption”.

Behind this statement, infused with religious and political rhetoric, lies a deeper strategy: to keep the South in a state of perpetual instability. The group seeks to capitalize on social unrest and convert it into a mobilization tool that serves its jihadist agenda, thereby obstructing any reforms that might pave the way for resolving the terrorism file in Yemen. This is especially relevant given that recent days have witnessed an improvement in the value of the local currency in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government, along with a noticeable drop in the prices of certain food and consumer goods.

The statement adopted a dual approach: it legitimized the public anger as a “revolt against injustice and tyranny”, while simultaneously reframing it within its jihadist project, linking it to slogans such as “removing tyrants”, “establishing Sharia”, and “expelling Americans and Zionists”. The objective was clear: to delegitimize the government by portraying it as an “American tool”, and to politicize the livelihood protests, turning them into calls for regime change and linking the local arena to the global struggle against Washington and Tel Aviv, while tapping into emotional sentiment surrounding the Palestinian cause.

The statement also conveyed multiple messages: to the public, affirming that their movements are religiously legitimate and transcend mere economic grievances; to scholars and preachers, urging them to play a mobilizing role; and to Washington and its allies, asserting that any attempt to stabilize the region will be met with calculated disruptions.

Special Focus on Hadramout

The choice of Hadramout as a priority was no coincidence. The governorate’s vast expanse and diverse terrain—especially in Wadi Hadramout, offer a relative security vacuum that facilitates hiding and repositioning operations. Moreover, tensions among certain local factions—particularly following the escalation led by Amr bin Habrish against the authorities—provide AQAP with an opportunity to appear as a supporter of the protests. In addition, the governorate hosts oil fields and export ports, making it a strategic pressure card.

The statement was careful to link the local and regional contexts, portraying the events in Hadramout as part of the “nation’s battle” by directly connecting them to the Gaza issue. This imparts a sacred dimension to the local conflict and taps into the anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment. What is also new is the prominent presence of the economic file, as the group called for control over oil and gas resources and preventing the government from benefiting from them, in an attempt to weaken it financially and attract tribes or groups with similar demands—even if they do not share its ideology.

Convergence of Interests with the Houthis

Despite the apparent sharp ideological and doctrinal contradictions between the Houthi movement and Al-Qaeda, field data and security indicators reveal a pattern of direct mutual service between the two parties that goes beyond mere “convergence of interests”. AQAP’s latest statement, in its content and targets, aligns conspicuously with the Houthi agenda—particularly in striking at the economic interests of the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Foremost among these is obstructing oil exports from southern ports, through direct attacks or by inciting the population to do so. These attacks—whether carried out by Al-Qaeda or the Houthis—serve a single goal: to keep the South in a state of economic and security paralysis.

The Houthis have been blockading southern Yemeni ports since October 2022, following drone strikes targeting the ports of Al-Shihr and Al-Dhabbah in Hadramout, and Nashimah in Shabwa governorate. The Yemeni government recently announced that it had incurred losses of approximately $7.5 billion due to the halt in oil exports.

Moreover, this mutual utility is not based on a declared alliance, but rather on an informal division of roles, where each party finds in the other a useful and suitable tool for achieving its goals. The Houthis benefit from AQAP’s operations to destabilize areas outside their control without bearing the cost of direct confrontation, while the Al-Qaeda benefits from the chaotic environment created by the Houthis, which allows it to reposition, recruit, and operate with greater freedom. In this way, the common enemy, the internationally recognized government and its allies—becomes a practical point of convergence between two doctrinal adversaries, united by a mutual interest in obstructing any stability that might reinforce state legitimacy and prompt the international community to act more decisively against them both.

At the end of July, the Houthis issued a statement preceding AQAP’s, in which they endorsed the popular protests that broke out in Hadramout and incited an “uprising” against the local authorities. The statement also used terminology similar to that of AQAP, such as “mercenaries”, “Saudi-Emirati occupation”, and the word “intifada”.

It is worth noting that Al-Qaeda’s statement came just days after security authorities in Hadramout governorate announced “confirmed and detailed information indicating the presence of infiltrating elements affiliated with terrorist organizations such as AQAP, and Houthi operatives seeking to stir chaos in coastal Hadramout”, according to a statement issued by them.

Indicators of Upcoming Moves

The language and content of the statement reveal four main directions in Al-Qaeda’s upcoming plan:

• Repositioning in Hadramout: by sheltering under the social umbrella of the protests to gain implicit legitimacy, protection from security operations, and to restore the local support networks lost in recent years.

• Escalating propaganda warfare: by merging local issues (corruption, services) with global ones (Palestine, conflict with the West) to attract supporters beyond the traditional jihadist framework.

• Targeting economic infrastructure: placing it at the core of the upcoming agenda through attacks or tribal incitement, aiming to cripple the government’s financial resources and amplify public discontent.

• Expanding temporary alliances: by attracting tribes or groups that share its rejection of the government—even if ideologically divergent—to provide local cover and prevent operational isolation. The statement was accompanied by a video in which the group showcased what it described as its “achievements” during its control of coastal Hadramout (2015–2016).

Conclusion

AQAP seeks to exploit popular anger in Hadramout as a tool to prolong turmoil in the South, combining jihadist rhetoric with livelihood demands. The focus on Hadramout reflects its awareness of the governorate’s strategic value: a security vacuum, political tensions, and economic weight. It also reveals implicit alignment with Houthi objectives in striking the South’s economy, reinforcing the hypothesis of undeclared mutual utility between the two. Ultimately, the group understands that relative stability would bring the war on terror agenda back to the forefront—and that the best way to delay this is to keep the South in a state of perpetual unrest, through systematic investment in protests and linking them to a cross-border agenda.