"Africa is no longer a peripheral arena, but rather the heart of Al-Qaeda’s new jihadist strategy—a fertile environment for its “empowerment” project (grassroots expansion), which relies on quiet expansion and societal infiltration rather than direct confrontation."

Ibrahim Ali (South24 Center)

In an unusual move, Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) issued a statement [1] praising the surge in operations by its branches in Somalia, lauding what it described as “jihadist conquests” achieved there. At the same time, the group expressed frustration over the media blackout surrounding these operations, accusing international and regional media outlets of deliberately obscuring what it considers as “achievements” of its African wing.

The group’s public appeal to media outlets to highlight its activities is unprecedented and appears to reflect a growing crisis in its ability to market itself as an influential force within the landscape of armed groups.

Why Is Al-Qaeda Returning to the Media Scene?

Since the Islamic State (ISIS) declared its “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria in 2014, it has overshadowed Al-Qaeda in the media scene, marginalizing it even in areas that were once considered its historical strongholds. Many of its affiliated factions faced sharp divisions, either shifting toward ISIS or disintegrating due to internal splits and local conflicts. Al-Qaeda’s call for media attention seems to be an attempt to regain initiative at a time when ISIS is experiencing notable territorial and manpower decline. If media played a role in amplifying ISIS’ image during its rise, Al-Qaeda now seems to be recycling the same strategy—but through the lens of media victimhood.

Although the statement does not explicitly mention ISIS, the rivalry between the two groups is evident. ISIS stole the spotlight with its violent rhetoric and flamboyant image, attracting a new generation of jihadists. Today, with ISIS in retreat, Al-Qaeda is trying to prove itself as more stable and organized—not through direct confrontation, but via a quiet strategy rooted in local realities.

Africa: A Peripheral Arena or the New Frontline?

It is no longer a secret that Al-Qaeda’s activities in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria and the Sahel) have become limited and contained, while its newer branches in West and Central Africa are gaining momentum and operational effectiveness. Networks such as Al-Shabaab, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, and other factions loyal to Al-Qaeda are expanding and accumulating gains on the ground, capitalizing on weak state authority, lack of development, and ethnic or tribal marginalization. These factions do not carry the ISIS’ banner but follow the Al-Qaeda’s approach of forging local alliances and avoiding direct clashes with tribal communities—a strategy that reflects a gradual shift in the group’s doctrine.

In this context, the Al-Qaeda’s call for media coverage of its activities in Africa is not merely an attempt to improve its image, but also a declaration that the African arena is now its future wager for leading the jihadist scene. The group understands that the lack of media coverage leaves its operations isolated from the broader jihadist consciousness, reducing its chances of attracting recruits and expanding its organizational footprint—especially amid fierce competition with ISIS, which continues to capitalize on media publicity for even minor attacks.

This media appeal also reflects an effort to redefine the global jihadist center of gravity, away from traditional strongholds like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria. Africa—with its fragmented security landscape, fragile regimes, and growing militant groups—offers Al-Qaeda an ideal environment to craft a new phase of its project, one that relies not only on military operations but also on creating a new symbolic narrative to restore its media luster and secure a prominent place in contemporary jihadist memory.

From Retrenchment to Rivalry: Al-Qaeda vs ISIS

Although Al-Qaeda has not been definitively defeated in any of its traditional arenas—whether in Afghanistan, Yemen, or North Africa—its trajectory since 2011 has taken a sharp downward turn. The group suffered two strategic setbacks that deeply impacted its structure and symbolic cohesion. The first was the assassination of its founder and historic leader, Osama bin Laden—an event that dealt a psychological and organizational blow that disrupted its leadership and stripped away much of the aura surrounding his persona. The second setback was the meteoric rise of ISIS after 2014, which managed to dominate the global jihadist scene in record time and steal the spotlight.

Following these two blows, Al-Qaeda suddenly found itself facing a new jihadist audience—one more inclined toward brutal violence and bloody spectacle, favoring swift outcomes and loud symbolism over calculated, phased rhetoric. These shifts did not play to Al-Qaeda’s strengths, which has long been known for its relative restraint, long-term strategies, and complex local alliances that often-required tactical retreats or compromises. In this new landscape, the group seemed to lose its appeal among the younger Jihadist generation, who viewed the ISIS as a more dynamic and radical model.

Over time, a sense may have grown within Al-Qaeda’s ranks that the group was being unfairly sidelined in the media, to the benefit of its rivals—especially ISIS, which was often amplified even in its failures. Thus, Al-Qaeda’s recent call for media coverage of its rising activity in Africa cannot be read solely as an effort to reclaim visibility in the jihadist scene, it also reflects a deep desire to correct what it views as a severe media bias toward other actors. The group wants the world to see that it has not disappeared, and that it remains a powerful presence in new theaters—even if these fall outside the usual zones of attention. This is clearly evident in the recent statement from Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

In this context, Africa gains dual significance: it is not merely an alternative battlefield, but a strategic platform through which the group hopes to reconstruct its image and assert itself as a central player on the global jihadist map.

What is striking about the statement is that it went beyond lamenting media neglect—it presented Africa as the most critical arena today in the confrontation with “arrogant powers.” The group described developments in parts of the continent as a rising jihad that was poised to shift the balance of power, signaling a clear departure from viewing Africa as a peripheral battleground, but rather as the “spearhead” of its future project.

Observers of the evolving situation in the African Sahel and Central Africa recognize that this shift is no coincidence. In recent years, Al-Qaeda-affiliated factions have gained ground, most prominently Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali and Ansar al-Islam in Burkina Faso, alongside sprawling networks active in Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Somalia. These groups have expanded their influence markedly, achieving both military and societal inroads in areas that previously lay beyond the reach of jihadist movements.

A New Afghanistan Under Different Conditions

When the statement claims that developments in Africa “will shift the balance of power”, it is not merely announcing a presence, but rather outlining a new map of geographic and political influence. Through this lens, it becomes clear that Al-Qaeda views Africa as the opportunity it missed in other countries like Yemen and Afghanistan—a theater that could restore its central role in the jihadist world after a decade of decline.

However, the comparison with Afghanistan does not necessarily imply a replication of its scenario. Africa—with its ethnic and religious diversity, fragile political borders, and protracted conflicts—represents a more complex environment than Afghanistan. At the same time, it is more conducive to becoming a permanent hub for militant groups, given the weakness of state institutions, widespread corruption, and deteriorating economic conditions.

In this context, Al-Qaeda appears to have succeeded—at least partially—in transforming itself from a centralized organization into a local network adapted to African societal conditions. Its rhetoric now focuses on fighting what it calls “apostate regimes”, not just the distant enemy, and presents itself as a defender of the oppressed and marginalized—a narrative that resonates, to some extent, with local sentiment.

Notably, in its statement the Al-Qaeda in Yemen described the growing operations of its African branches as “conquests”, directly linking them to the concept of “dismantling the global order”. This use of the term “conquests” is intended to evoke powerful religious and historical symbolism reminiscent of the Islamic expansion eras.

Undoubtedly, this choice is deliberate—a bid to boost the morale of the group’s supporters and convince them that what is happening in Africa is not merely scattered acts of violence, but the “beginning of a historic victory”. This narrative aims to attract more recruits, especially enthusiastic youth, by portraying them as part of a civilizational transformation project that transcends local battles.

What Does Al-Qaeda’s Rise in Africa Mean?

After years of focus on Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, the real flashpoints now seem to be shifting toward the African Sahel. Conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have become matters of international concern, where Western economic interests, Russian and Chinese geopolitical projects, and militant group activities, all intersect.

What African governments fear most today is that Al-Qaeda might succeed in presenting itself as an alternative to the state. This has already occurred in parts of northern Mali, where militant groups provide security in their own way, manage local disputes, and impose taxes.

If Al-Qaeda views Africa as the arena of “the great jihadist opportunity”, then we are witnessing a new phase in the group’s evolution. It no longer bets on high-profile operations in the West, or on targeting strong centralized regimes, but rather focuses on draining fragile states, building local support bases, and creating long-term political influence.

Strategic Summary

The statement by the Al-Qaeda in Yemen was not merely an endorsement or a media grievance—it was a declaration of strategic transformation in the group’s identity and geographic priorities. Africa is no longer a peripheral arena, but the heart of the new jihadist wager—a fertile environment for the “empowerment” project, which relies on silent expansion and societal infiltration rather than direct confrontation. This shift carries profound implications, indicating that Al-Qaeda is attempting to overcome its “retreat syndrome” through a more realistic local gateway, betting on media not just as a façade, but as a symbolic weapon to reposition itself in the global jihadist memory.

Here, the role of media and decision-makers becomes critical: recognizing that what is unfolding in Africa is not a local matter, but a transformation with transcontinental dimensions. Ignoring it may mean leaving the space to a group well-trained in exploiting vacuums.