The February 2011 events have metamorphosed from an opportunity for democratic change into a gateway to a long-term conflict which has benefitted the local, regional, and international forces, while the Yemeni people have so far paid the highest price.

Ali Sallam (South24 Center)

Since the incidents of February 2011, Yemen has experienced deep transformations impacting its political, social, and economic scene. Although these events began with a mass revolution against the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime, calling for political reforms and social justice, it quickly transformed into a conflict between the traditional and emergent forces. These incidents lasted for three years before turning into a real war in 2015. This has moulded the shape of the Yemeni state, including its military institutions, leading to a period of instability in which gross human rights violations have been committed, including what amounted to the level of war crimes, across the country. By the end of 2019, estimates said that more than 233,000 Yemenis were killed due to the conflict and the humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented more than 200,000 deaths and injuries among civilians as a result of the fighting since March 2015. More than 17 million Yemenis of a total population of 35 million suffer from food insecurity. 

So, who are the winners and losers of the 2011 events? 

First: The Traditional Political Forces

The Islah Party (The Muslim Brotherhood): It initially made use of the popular movement against the regime of former president Ali Abdulllah Saleh by enhancing its political and military influence. However, the subsequent changes, especially after the 2015 war, weakened the Islah's influence in North Yemen while expanding its clout in the Central and Southern areas, including parts of Taiz, Marib, Wadi Hadramout, and Shabwa. Its influence in Shabwa faded away in 2021 after forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) established control over the governorate. Despite the dismissal of former Yemeni Vice President Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar - the Islah’s strategic ally - from power (in April 2022), the party has kept its presence in the state institutions, including the parity government which was established according to the Riyadh Agreement of 2019 and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) that was formed in April 2022.

We shouldn't ignore the fact that the Islah leaders involved in the February revolution left the country after the fall of Sanaa (in September 2014) and currently reside in states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. 

The Houthis: The February 11 incidents were a turning point in the Houthi’s significant rise in the political and military scene of Yemen. The group had previously fought six wars against Ali Abdullah Saleh regime, between 2004 and 2010, known as the Saada wars. The justification for the six wars launched by Saleh on Saada proved useless as the Houthis were ultimately able to expand militarily, and took control of Sanaa in September 2014 and most governorates of North Yemen despite the intervention of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition. 

Post the October 7, 2023, Al-Aqsa storm, the Houthi military interventions have grown, seen in the launching of missile attacks against Israeli ports and regions. On the 19th of that month, the Houthis launched a large attack using ballistic missiles and drones against the Israeli port city of Eilat under the pretext of “supporting the Palestinian people”. These attacks were followed by the hijacking of a commercial ship ‘Galaxy Leader’ and targeting more than 200 military and trade vessels in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, which led to the killing of several sailors and the sinking of two commercial ships in the Red Sea, besides the disruption of international maritime trade traffic.

The General People's Congress: This party, which held control over the entire country for 21 years, faced major repercussions due to the February 2011 events. It lost power after the overthrow of Saleh and his subsequent assassination by the Houthis in 2017. However, one faction is in alliance with the Houthis in Sanaa, while another faction (Tariq Saleh-Ahmed Saleh) has made use of the political transformations to reposition itself with regional support from the UAE. Nonetheless, some Congress leaders have installed themselves in top positions in recognized state institutions such as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the outgoing House of Representatives, and the Shura Council.

Secondly: Regional and International Actors

The Iranian role: Since the 2011 so-called ‘Arab Spring’ protests rocked Yemen leading to the overthrow of the Saleh regime, Iran has played an increasing role in the Yemeni crisis. Tehran has found a space in Yemen to enhance its regional clout by supporting the Houthis politically and militarily, giving it a pressure card in the region. The Iranian role in Yemen has been part of its regional strategy in the Middle East to bolster its influence in the neighbouring states. Iran has contributed to enhancing the Houthi power in North Yemen, especially in Saada governorate. It supplied the Houthis with weapons, training, and funds, facilitating the Houthis in ousting the Yemeni government in Sanaa, by taking advantage of the lethargic stance of the main parties to face the Houthis who also held control over the traditional military capabilities of the Yemeni army, including the Scud missiles. Later, Iran provided the Houthis with advanced technology to make missiles and drones which they turned into a crossـborder threat against countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is in addition to attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab AlـMandab.

Thirdly: The Gulf Role

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): In the aftermath of the 2011 massive protests that rocked the country against President Saleh, the GCC states played an important role in an attempt to resolve the political crisis in Yemen. This led to the Gulf Initiative proposed in November 2011 to end the conflict and promote stability in the country. 

The GCC initiative laid the foundation for formation of a transitional government and stipulated that President Saleh step down in exchange for judicial immunity for him and members of his government. The Gulf Initiative aimed to avoid violence and secure a peaceful political transition in Yemen. This was confirmed through the diplomatic and financial support from the Gulf states. In November 2011, President Saleh signed the Gulf Initiative agreement, transferring power to his deputy Abdrabu Mansur Hadi. Accordingly, a transitional government was formed, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Basindawa.

The most prominent features of the Gulf role of 2011 include the financial and political support provided by the Gulf states to the Hadi government. This is in addition to organizing the National Dialogue Conference in 2013 and 2014 with an aim to rebuild the political system in Yemen.

In 2015, after the Houthi militia held control over the capital, Sanaa, and other Northern areas, and were heading toward South Yemen, the Saudi-led Arab Coalition, which comprised of nine countries from the Middle East and North Africa, intervened to support the Yemeni government. Subsequently, the war in Yemen developed into a comprehensive military conflict between the Iranـbacked Houthis and the Hadi government supported by the Arab Coalition. Despite the deـfacto truce sponsored by the UN which officially expired in October 2022, fighting among Yemeni parties, even at a lower pace, continues on several border fronts.

Fourth: Extremist Groups

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: AQAP elements held control over the city of Jaar and several other nearby areas in the Southern governorate of Abyan, during the time of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ protests in Yemen. The opposition accused President Saleh of handing over the city to the AQAP to attract global attention toward the threat posed by the terrorist organization in order to receive help. The AQAP exploited the security chaos and the state’s weakness to increase its activities in some Yemeni areas, giving it more space for recruitment and to implement its operations.

Later, the AQAP militants took control over the city of Mukalla, the center of Hadramout governorate, on April 2, 2015 by an ambiguous operation raising many questions. However, the local forces, known later as the ‘Hadrami Elite’, with UAE support, drove out the AQAP in 2016 and liberated the cities of Hadramout.

In 2015 and 2016, the AQAP was able to control some areas in Abyan and Shabwa. However, the Southern forces (the Security Belt, the Shabwani Elite [later known as the Shabwa Defence forces], Storm Brigades, and Abyan Security) backed by the Arab Coalition carried out several large military and security operations between 2017 and 2022 against the AQAP in these areas. The latest of them was the ‘Arrows of the East’ operation which cleared a number of the AQAP’s long-held strongholds for the first time since 1994. The ‘Arrows of the East’ is part of the ongoing counterterrorism efforts against extremist groups such as the AQAP and ISIS. According to military officials, the operation aims to eliminate extremist organizations as well as restore security and stability through securing South Yemen’s areas. 

The Reality of South Yemen after 2011

The popular movement in South Yemen began nearly four years prior to the February 2011 incidents. In 2007, military retirees established what was later known as the peaceful ’Southern Movement (Hirak)’ which began with demands for improving services and reforming the unity path. However, the demands escalated to include restoring the state of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, due to the accumulation of the injustices and the marginalization of the Southerners following the Yemeni unity. The first months of the ‘Arab Spring’ incidents witnessed an agreement between some factions of Hirak and other forces in the North to engage in the struggle against the Saleh regime. However, the Gulf Initiative of November 2011 completely ruled out any consideration of South Yemen in any stage. It only accommodated the ‘Joint Meeting Parties’ in addition to the ruling party and its aides at this time. This rejection of the South issue led to organizing the first Southern conference by Hirak in late September 2011. The decisions of the conference included not to participate in the National Dialogue without obtaining guarantee of parity between the North and the South, and between the two states. They also sought acceptance of their right to self-determination as demanded by the different components of Hirak. The war between the Internationally-Recognized Government and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels has had much impact on South Yemen. These developments led to the eruption of fierce local opposition to the Houthi invasion of Aden backed by forces affiliated with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2015. The Southern influence expanded remarkably after the liberation of Aden from the Houthis, backed by the Arab Coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Since then, Aden has become an epicenter of South Yemen under the control of the STC-affiliate Southern forces.

The Biggest Loser

Despite multiple parties benefiting from the 2011 events, the Yemeni people ended up becoming the biggest loser due to its ramifications. Now 14 years down the line, the implications of the events have led to major political conflicts, economic collapse, increasing poverty, and the exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis. This is in addition to the political fragmentation of Yemen which adds more ambiguity to the future of the country. Most of the traditional forces in the Yemeni regime (The Congress and Islah) still control the state's decision-making. 

It can be said that the February 2011 events metamorphosed from an opportunity for democratic change into a gateway to a long-term conflict which has benefitted the local, regional, and international forces, but the Yemeni people have so far paid the highest price.