Previously, the incessant delay of the South Issue could be justified by the lack of sufficient resources to exert pressure on the relevant actors. However, the political landscape has changed significantly today. Southerners now possess enough hard power and are represented at the highest levels of the executive body that governs the country. They no longer have to beg for their rights. With sufficient political will and independence from regional backers, the STC is in a position to take concrete steps to ensure that the South Issue receives the prioritization it deserves.

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Ala Mohsen (South24 Center)

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Among the various issues that are plaguing Yemen, the Southern question takes precedence as Yemen’s most central issue, given its deep roots in the country's political history and its ongoing impact on national stability. The roots of the Southern question go back to the 1994 war that turned the unity partnership into a de facto occupation, depriving the majority of South Yemenis of economic opportunity and the excellent access to state services previously enjoyed under the PDRY (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) regime. The 2007 Hirak street mobilization added renewed vigor to the Southern cause. However, despite its recognized centrality, little effort has been made by the authorities to address its root cause. This was not the case only with Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, which downplayed and de-legitimized the street mobilizations in the South, calling Hirak leaders “thugs” who did not represent the Southern people. Saleh’s opposition parties, while paying lip service to the Southern cause, also did little to ameliorate the situation even when they had more political power in the context of the post-2011 transition regime. Despite the significant changes in the Yemeni political landscape since 2015, the Southern question continues to be postponed and sidelined today, with recurrent insistence by subsequent administrations that it is not the right moment to address it.

The Hirak Movement: The Rise of Southern Discontent 

For many Southerners, the 2006 presidential elections under Saleh were the last hope for political reform in Yemen. However, when Saleh used state resources and intimidation tactics to rig the elections and secure victory against the widely respected presidential candidate Faisal Bin Shamlan, they became convinced of the futility of pursuing change through institutions and elections. As a result, the Southern Hirak took to the streets just a few months after Saleh was declared the winner. Initially, the movement called for reforms and redressal of the marginalization of Southerners and for the forcibly retired Southern military officers. However, Saleh’s provocative measures and violent repression only fueled the Southern movement further. By late 2007, these demands escalated into explicit calls for reinstating the Southern Yemeni state that existed before the 1990 unity agreement. 

The opposition parties under the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), while initially threatening to replicate Al-Hirak’s mobilization in the North to paralyze Saleh’s regime, never followed through on their promises. This led Hirak leaders to question the intentions of the Yemeni opposition regarding meaningful steps to support mobilization in the South. For example, in 2009 Southern leader Salah Al-Shanfarah criticized the JMP opposition parties for not taking the demands of the Southern movement seriously. At the time, the JMP’s main focus was political and electoral reform, thus deprioritizing the South Issue. Had they built on the momentum that Al-Hirak had created in the South, there might have been sufficient pressure on Saleh’s regime to push for genuine reforms. This could have initiated a process to address the Southern question while simultaneously tackling governance deficiencies and other grievances in the North. Instead, the opposition parties chose to remain passive, merely observing the events in the South without taking action or joining forces. 

The 2011 Youth Revolution and Hadi-led Transition 

When mass protests erupted in Yemen in February 2011 as part of the broader Arab Spring movement, the Southern Movement had mixed reactions. On one hand, the Hirak movement shared with the new protest movement a deep opposition to Saleh and his regime, making his ouster a welcome development. On the other, they recognized that some anti-Saleh opposition figures such as Ali Mohsen had longstanding ties to his regime, leading to skepticism about the prospects for meaningful change in Sanaa. Compounding these concerns was the attempt by opposition leaders, particularly from the Islah Party, to portray Hirak as a monolithic movement under the leadership of Abdullah Al-Nakhebi, who has drawn closer to them since the protest movements. Al-Nakhebi, Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Southern Movement, was quoted as saying that Hirak had set aside its demands for independence to join the broader protests against Saleh’s regime. However, in reality, Hirak organized its own demonstrations with distinct demands and objectives. For this reason, some Hirak leaders, such as Nasser Al-Khubaji, now an official in the Southern Transitional Council (STC), publicly stated that opposition leaders used the “topple the regime” slogan to undermine the Southern cause.

As expected, the fall of Saleh and the start of the Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi-led transition opened the political space for broader demands. However, Southern demands were once again sidelined. During the National Dialogue Conference (NDC- from March 18, 2013 to January 24, 2014), the Southern question was recognized as Yemen’s most critical issue, yet representation remained superficial, particularly after the withdrawal of the faction of Mohammed Ali Ahmed (head of the National Southern Conference). Proposed solutions, such as dividing Yemen into six regions, faced strong opposition from Hirak and even the Yemeni Socialist Party, as they were seen as an attempt to fracture the historical unity of South Yemen. Despite this, the Hadi-led transitional regime pushed forward with its plans, arguing that the timing was not right to address the Southern cause and the focus should be on the overall transition. However, as a result of this continued marginalization and ignoring local demands, the entire transition collapsed in September 2014 when the Houthis forcibly entered Sanaa, seizing de facto control over Yemen’s central institutions, thus marking another missed opportunity to address the South Issue. 

The Civil War Phase:

Unlike previous periods of crisis, the current civil war has shifted the domestic balance of power in favor of the Southern Movement, particularly following the military victory of the Arab Coalition-backed Southern resistance against the Houthis and Saleh’s forces in 2015. However, despite the empowerment of Southerners in security and defense and the later inclusion at the executive level (the Presidential Leadership Council), the resolution of the Southern question has been effectively postponed until the Houthis are pushed away from Sanaa and other Northern territories the group currently controls. While this approach may have been justified in the war’s early phase, the prolonged military stalemate—now lasting nearly a decade—with little prospect of reversing Houthi territorial control, has not only delayed a political settlement but also obstructed efforts to stabilize and improve governance in the Southern regions.

In February 2023, PLC chief Rashad Al-Alimi described the South Issue as "a just cause, but discussing it at this moment or addressing its resolution at this time may not be appropriate”. This statement drew significant criticism among Southern circles, with STC spokesperson Ali Al-Kathiri criticizing Al-Alimi, emphasizing that the discussion of the South Issue cannot be postponed or delayed. However, a year and a half later, STC President Aidrous Al-Zubaidi himself stated during an interview at the Davos conference that restoring the South Yemeni state first requires eliminating the Houthis. This surprising statement from Al-Zubaidi reflects a successful pressure from Saudi Arabia to normalize the delay of the Southern question, given its potential to complicate the war against the Houthis. Nonetheless, this position directly contradicts with an established tradition within the broader Southern Movement, which seeks to “disengage” from Sanaa affairs and prioritize the Southern cause over other issues and considerations.

The South Issue as a War Hostage: Risks and Consequences

Coupling the resolution of the South Issue with the status of the Houthis is problematic for several reasons. First, since the war against the Houthis began in 2015, a significant amount of time has passed without meaningful progress against Houthi territorial control. The major defeats the Houthis have suffered so far have primarily come at the hands of Southern fighters, whether in 2015 or during the Hodeidah offensive in 2017 led by the Southern Giants Brigades. Many officials within the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) have also publicly acknowledged that a military defeat of the Houthis is unlikely, reinforcing the expectation that Houthi territorial control will likely continue in the near future. Second, making the resolution of the South Issue conditional on the removal of the Houthis creates incentives for North Yemeni elites to maintain the military stalemate, as it reduces their motivation to actively fight the Houthis. Under this logic, as long as the Houthis control Sanaa, the South remains constrained within the broader Yemeni crisis framework, preventing any moves toward independence. This is particularly advantageous for Northern elites who still hold significant influence within the IRG, which shares power with the STC in the South despite wielding meager territorial control in the North.

The third and most important reason is that some political actors within the Yemeni government understand they can exploit the partnership with the STC to undermine the latter’s goal of achieving independence and sovereignty for the Southern people. By blaming the STC for much of the economic deterioration and decline in public services in the Southern governorates, it becomes easier to erode its legitimacy among the Southern public. This strategy has been somewhat effective, as public opinion has increasingly embraced the view that the STC has failed to protect Southern interests or apply enough pressure on the government to improve services, stabilize the economy, and strengthen the currency. As elaborated in the Aden Historical Declaration of May 2017, the STC’s primary mandate is to represent and defend Southern rights against manipulation by the Yemeni government. The longer the STC remains silent about the suffering of its people, the more isolated it becomes from its constituency. Aden has already witnessed limited protests against the deteriorating situation, with some anti-STC slogans chanted by the angry crowds. However, there is a high potential for these protests to escalate in the coming months, especially as summer approaches and the local currency inflates further. A total loss of trust in the political elites, including the STC, could also mean that the transition from peaceful protests to violence is only a matter of time.

Moving forward: What to do? 

It is evident that the postponement of the Southern question cannot continue indefinitely. Southerners cannot wait another 10 years to fix the situation in Sanaa before they can attend to their own business. While the final resolution of the Southern question can be negotiated later, the process should begin today with an immediate focus on stabilization efforts and addressing the economic issues affecting daily needs. It makes little sense that the South Issue continues to be used as a war hostage during the ongoing civil war when Southern fighters are the ones to have brought the greatest amount of victory against the Houthis since 2015. Also, in the long fight against the Houthis, it is in everybody’s interest to make the Southern governorates a model for good governance. Otherwise, how can you speak in the interest of the common (Northern) people, that they should seek to overthrow Houthi rule, when other “liberated” regions suffer more in terms of electricity cuts, hyperinflation, and chaotic governance? While freedom of speech and civic liberties are far better under the PLC authority, these are not the sole issues that matter for most people who struggle every day to provide food and shelter for their families.

Having said that, this is not a call to underestimate the threat the Houthis pose for all Yemenis and their neighbors. However, one cannot fix others' houses before putting their own home in order. South Yemenis, to a large extent, have failed to translate their military victories into tangible benefits in public services and living conditions. Even though good progress has been made in building security and defense capabilities since 2015, little priority has been given to building civil state institutions. While the Houthis are actively reshaping state institutions in North Yemen, the traditional Yemeni institutions continue to operate in Southern areas despite their inefficiencies and corruption, resulting in widespread mismanagement and the pilfering of public resources into private pockets. Because institutions are sticky, these dysfunctional structures are likely to continue to prevent any positive change in governance unless serious reforms are immediately implemented, including anti-corruption measures and accountability systems .These steps are crucial not only for laying the foundation of a future South Yemeni state but also for demonstrating responsible governance, which in turn strengthens international trust and credibility in South Yemen’s leadership and its ability to govern effectively.

Previously, the incessant delay of the South Issue could be justified by the lack of sufficient resources to exert pressure on the relevant actors. However, the political landscape has changed significantly today. Southerners now possess enough hard power and are represented at the highest levels of the executive body that governs the country. They no longer have to beg for their rights. With sufficient political will and independence from regional backers, the STC is in a position to take concrete steps to ensure that the South Issue receives the prioritization it deserves. To begin with, there should be sufficient advocacy, not for superficial power-sharing but for actual representation and empowerment. Also, the STC should take a realistic approach in its fight against the Houthis, recognizing that its forces are best positioned in a supporting role while leaving the bulk of the fighting to local (Northern) forces with a stronger stake in the battle and deeper knowledge of their terrain. Lastly, instead of reinforcing the status quo, the STC leadership should set clear timeframes for achieving specific military objectives in the war against the Houthis in the North. If these deadlines are not met, the STC can then move forward with its self-government plans, having given the other parties sufficient time to fulfill their responsibilities.