The Houthis’ experience with the US system of terrorist designation has been a complex one to date.

Dr. Marta Furlan (South24)

In January 2021, the Trump administration designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Despite the concerns voiced by numerous aid organizations that had warned against the harmful effects that the designations would have on Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, the decision was taken as part of the administration’s attempt to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran and its proxies.

However, the Houthis remained for less than a month on those lists. In February 2021, President Biden formally delisted Yemen’s Houthis as both an FTO and an SDGT. The rationale was manifold: the terrorist designations did not seem to have any tangible and significant effect on the Houthis, the classification of the Houthis as FTO and SDGT was to have detrimental impact on Yemen’s civilian population, and delisting the group was meant to facilitate the peace negotiation efforts.

In January 2024, the Biden administration re-designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity. The announcement came after months of Houthi attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea aimed at disrupting international shipping and expressing support with the people of Gaza. In that context, the Biden administration justified its designation as an effort “to impede terrorist funding to the Houthis, further restrict their access to financial markets, and hold them accountable for their actions.”

As President Trump prepares to return to office on January 20, the new administration may want to reinstate the FTO designation against the Houthis. In fact, Trump’s choice for National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, has been a vocal advocate of redesignating the Houthis since the first weeks of the war in Gaza. Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, Sen. Marco Rubio, has also been a proponent of redesignation. 

Meaning of, and Difference between, SDGT and FTO

There are some key legal differences between the FTO designation and the SDGT designation. Organizations designated as a SDGT organization are those which are considered to threaten the security of the US. FTOs are also foreign organisations that have been identified as a threat to US national security, but sanctions against them are stricter.

First, individuals affiliated with an FTO are automatically barred from entering the US, whereas this does not apply to individuals on the SDGTs list. Second, US citizens providing funding to an FTO can be convicted of a crime if it is proven that they knew they were providing funds to a terrorist organisation. Meanwhile, for SDGT organizations, the standard of proof is higher, meaning that for a US person to be convicted of a crime, proof is required that they “wilfully” funded a terrorist organization.

Third, the US can prosecute anyone in any country in the case of FTOs. Meanwhile, individuals or entities can only be prosecuted for violating sanctions against SDGT organizations deliberately or inadvertently if the conduct occurs in the United States or was committed by a US citizen. Finally, the criminal penalty for providing material support to an FTO can be as high as life in prison. In the case of SDGT organizations, the penalty is up to 20 years in prison.

Possible Consequences of the Houthis’ (re-)designation

As noted above, the FTO and SDGT designations are used to sanction organizations engaged in terrorist activities and believed to pose a security threat to the US. However, when applied against a group such as the Houthis, the impact of these counter-terrorism tools seems questionable. Unlike other groups, in fact, the Houthis’ leadership doesn’t typically travel abroad and doesn’t have international assets to freeze. 

Conversely, the designation promises to have a catastrophic impact on Yemen’s dire humanitarian situation, which sees 80% of the population relying on humanitarian aid for survival. The designation and its associated sanctions, in fact, will have a catastrophic impact on the ability of humanitarian aid providers and commercial importers of foodgrains and aid material to reach the suffering civilians. Delivering aid into territories controlled by an organization subjected to international sanctions would pose immense challenges and obstacles to humanitarian organizations. In other words, the listing of the Houthis as FTO would impact ordinary families living in Yemen by making it harder for humanitarian aid to reach them. The Houthis know this quite well, but have been brazenly continuing their attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. This highlights how the Houthis are bent on ignoring the humanitarian plight of the millions of Yemenis in the North, just for the sake of making their presence felt as a menacing power. Their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have majorly affected the supply of essentials, like food and humanitarian aid, from reaching the Yemeni ports, and providing much-needed relief to Yemen’s needy millions. 

 As the Houthi-controlled territory is home to 70-80% of Yemen’s population, the extent of the impact that the Houthis’ FTO listing would have can hardly be overstated.

Houthis’ Expected Reaction

Being well-positioned to resist the legal and financial consequences that typically accompany an FTO designation, the Houthis are unlikely to be deterred from their military activities – just as the SDGT designation failed to deter them from their naval attacks in the Red Sea. Following that classification, in fact, the Houthis have continued the launch of missiles against US and US-allied ships transiting through the Gulf of Aden.

Should the Trump administration decide to relist the Houthis as FTO, the Houthis would use it to their full advantage. The classification would further embolden the group and fuel its leadership’s rhetoric of resistance against the Zionist-American alliance. The classification would be seen by the Houthis as a prime opportunity to further consolidate their position within the regional landscape and Iran’s Axis of Resistance, obtain more material support from Iran (advanced weaponry including long-range drones and missiles), and acquire increasing visibility on the international and regional stage. This would come at a heavy expense not just to the Yemeni legitimate government in the South, but also to regional peace and stability, compound the suffering of the Yemeni people and lead to the stalling of economic growth, and peace efforts. Finally, for the vast multitudes of Yemeni youth who see no opportunities for enhancing their skills and learning or getting gainful employment, the classification as “terrorist organization” could inadvertently drive more Yemenis towards the tentacles of the Houthi’s recruitment machine.

That the Houthis are unfazed at the possibility of re-entering the FTO list was evident last November, when following the news of Trump’s electoral victory, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, from the group’s Supreme Political Council, emphasized that neither Trump nor anyone else intimidates the group and noted that “American interests in the region remain at the mercy of our firepower and missiles.” Previously, the top Houthi leader, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, had also said that Donald Trump's victory in the election would not stop the Houthis’ naval military operations to target ships.

Conclusion

Since the Houthis are sure to take full advantage of their re-designation as FTO to the detriment of regional and international peace and security and the Yemenis’ humanitarian condition, the incoming US administration should aim to adopt a more comprehensive strategy towards Yemen.

First, it should remember that the Houthis have sought to link their Red Sea attacks to the Gaza war. The US should invest its efforts in ensuring that the Hamas ceasefire is respected by all parties, that the agreement is duly implemented, and that a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Hamas conflict can be achieved, which would deprive the Houthis of their excuse to attack shipping vessels.

Second, the US should back the establishment of a politically unified and military effective government in those parts of Yemen outside Houthi control. As the anti-Houthi camp has suffered from several and deep internal divisions, investing in a unified government is key to strengthen the latter’s capacity to counter the Houthi threat and influence. At the same time, the defensive capabilities of the government must be addressed, through provision of training and latest weaponry, to fix the imbalance in military power that is currently observed on the ground between the Houthis and the government. Until the internationally recognized government becomes a credible counterweight to the Houthis, any negotiation attempt will see the Houthis having the upper hand.

Third, the Houthi threat is inextricably linked to the threat posed by Iran and its Axis of Resistance – and indeed well-informed personalities in Washington already said that Trump will most likely reinstate his previous “maximum pressure” approach on Iran and its regional allies. However, before (re-)taking this road, the incoming administration should first define the role of sanctions within its wider policy towards Iran and the region.