“Riyadh hastened to reach out to the Houthis as soon as the war in Gaza ended, culminating in a direct meeting with them in Muscat at the end of October 2025. And because it is unable to guarantee the reopening of the airport and the port and the lifting of U.S. sanctions, it has offered the Houthis a set of undisclosed economic concessions.”

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By Hussam Radman and Maher Abu al-Majd (South24 Center)

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At the beginning of 2023, Saudi diplomacy took two bold steps: first, concluding a reconciliation agreement with Iran under Chinese mediation; and second, the public landing of the Saudi envoy to Yemen, Mohammed Al-Jaber, at Sanaa airport to negotiate with the Houthis on a peace proposal later known as the “roadmap.”

These moves implicitly acknowledged the need to share regional influence with Iran and also conceded the intractability of a military solution in Yemen. At the same time, however, they represented a strategic maneuver to neutralize security threats posed by the “Axis of resistance” and to create favorable conditions for launching ambitious geopolitical pathways that would enhance Riyadh’s regional role: by way of partnership with Washington (in defense, economy, nuclear), and normalization with Israel within the contours of a two‑state solution [1]. This Saudi approach was in line with President Biden’s desire to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran.

In September 2023, the Saudi approach began to take on a practical dimension, as Washington concluded a ‘Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement’ with Bahrain, as a prelude to another with Saudi Arabia [2]. This move provoked an angry reaction from Iran, which responded with "gray‑zone" measures, while the Houthis targeted a military site on the Saudi border, killing Saudi and Bahraini officers and soldiers [3]. Then came the events of October 7, which froze diplomatic tracks in the region and created a new regional equation.

Riyadh makes a Stronger Return to its Ambitious Course

Two years after the outbreak of the Gaza war, Mohammed bin Salman has decided to resume his previous course with his exceptional visit to Washington, scheduled on 18 November 2025, during which unprecedented defense and economic partnership agreements are expected to be announced, including an explicit commitment to Saudi security similar to what was concluded months earlier with Qatar [4]. Riyadh now appears to be in a stronger negotiating position than two years ago; the “Axis of resistance” has declined, Israel has become a source of greater regional concern and is increasingly isolated on the international stage, while the two‑state option has gained greater political and diplomatic traction.

At the same time, the Houthi movement in Yemen has ceased to be solely a Saudi problem; rather it has become a regional and international headache due to its disruption of shipping lanes, even as the group faces intensified political and economic pressure.

Conversely, Saudi Arabia has managed to bolster its security umbrella through a nuclear partnership with Pakistan, and has regained its geopolitical presence in both Syria and Lebanon. The balance of negotiations with Washington has shifted somewhat in Riyadh’s favor under the current U.S. administration that pursues a transactional, interest‑based approach, unlike the previous administration which tended to reengineer geopolitical balances in the region.

All this has enabled Riyadh to conclude a major bilateral defense deal ($142 billion, in May 2025) with the Trump administration without needing to tie it to broader regional files. While Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman offered economic investment packages with a future commitment to open a normalization track with Israel, Trump, in return, provided security guarantees coupled with a later promise to support a two‑state solution. Ultimately, the returns and obligations of this strategic partnership were no longer organically linked to the normalization track with Israel, or the outcomes of the Iranian nuclear file, or even the political settlement in Yemen.

The close U.S.-Saudi partnership, and later the formal recognition of a Palestinian state by several Western countries in September 2025, provoked two types of angry reactions: first, from Tel Aviv, which sought through the Knesset to declare the annexation of the West Bank, in addition to offensive remarks by figures such as Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich who rejected the idea of a two‑state solution. But Trump applied deterrent pressure on Israeli escalatory behavior, both regarding the West Bank annexation and even in Gaza and Lebanon ([5]).

On the other hand, the Houthis shifted their escalatory rhetoric from the Red Sea to the Saudi interior, threatening possible military strikes and intensifying ground and rocket mobilization on the border fronts. Riyadh dealt with this challenge using the same playbook it used with Tehran two years earlier: neutralizing security threats through diplomacy and offering further incentives to buy time and de-escalate tensions.

Containing Iran and Calming the Houthis

In the recent past, Riyadh has worked to court Tehran through three incentives: first, pushing for resumption of the nuclear negotiation track with the U.S. and the West and exerting pressure to prevent large-scale military escalation in the region ([6]); second, easing political pressure on the Hezbollah to disarm ([7]); and third—and most importantly, resuming diplomatic mediation efforts with the Houthi movement and considering the possibility of easing economic pressure on them.

Riyadh understands that resuming the roadmap track in Yemen is no easy matter: it is constrained by a U.S. veto following the designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), which in turn is linked to the “maximum pressure” policy that Trump pursues against Iran and its allies. The roadmap is also threatened by Israeli disruption, as Israel will seek to deprive the Houthis of economic lifelines, represented by Sanaa airport and Hodeidah port, and may continue to strike these targets without even claiming responsibility-- through a covert “shadow war,” which has already occurred recently ([8]).

Despite these constraints, Riyadh hastened to engage the Houthis as soon as the Gaza war ceased, culminating in a direct meeting with them in Muscat at the end of October 2025. Since it cannot guarantee the reopening of the airport and port or the lifting of U.S. sanctions, it offered the Houthis a set of undisclosed economic concessions, including reportedly allowing them to obtain legal licenses from the legitimate government in Aden to establish an airline, with the Houthis bearing responsibility for its operation ([9]).

The Houthis also discussed with Riyadh opportunities to ease the restrictions of the ‘National Committee for the Regulation and Financing of Imports (NCRFI) ‘, a committee formed by the Yemeni government and the Central Bank (in July 2025) to oversee imports and prevent any Houthi companies from benefiting from commercial flows. Riyadh may press this committee to allow Houthi companies to participate in importing goods to Hodeidah ([10]).

Instead of resuming salary payments to state employees in Houthi‑held areas, Saudi Arabia has reinstated lists of financial grants for tribal sheikhs and some Houthi leaders, thereby helping to reduce the Houthis’ expenditure on their patronage networks amid the group’s financial strain ([11]).

In sum, Riyadh recognizes that it is just a matter of time before Saudi Arabia, the regional frontrunner, may emerge even stronger following Crown Prince Salman’s visit to Washington. With strengthening of the U.S.-Saudi defense partnership, any threat posed by Iran and its allies to Saudi security will prove costly, and Saudi Arabia’s strategic leverage in Yemen will grow, whether through peace or war. Thus, Iran will likely be forced to race against time to improve its strategic standing toward Riyadh, facing two options:

Either apply pressure and threaten the use of force to extract the maximum Saudi guarantees and concessions while accepting that Riyadh’s deal with Washington has become a fait accompli, and concede that the costs of abandoning a policy of good‑neighborliness are far greater than the gains, especially since the scenario of confrontation with Israel and the U.S. remains possible, and the best way to reduce the risks of that scenario is to preserve the Arab stance rejecting regional escalation.

Or draw Riyadh back into a full scale war in Yemen and collapse the fragile truce in place since 2022, through a major battle inside Yemen or by targeting Saudi vital interests deep within its territory to lure Riyadh into a direct military response. This could help Tehran poison the political climate and provide Trump’s opponents with an ideal pretext for sabotage, thereby limiting the commitments of any defense partnership with a country embroiled in a civil war.

Limits of Houthi Escalation

It is true that the Houthis’ own calculations align with their escalatory approach toward Saudi Arabia, but calibrating that escalation -- politically or militarily -- will be tied to Iran’s regional calculations. It is noteworthy how the diplomatic activity in Muscat between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia coincided with a parallel diplomatic movement in Tehran led by the Omani interior minister (October 27, 2025), who met with President Masoud Pezeshkian and extended a special invitation to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, to visit Muscat.

So far, Iranian policy appears closer to signaling escalation without becoming entangled in the actual use of force. Tehran thus seeks to remind everyone of the importance of taking its interests into account, especially during the Crown Prince’s upcoming pivotal visit to Washington, in the hope that the Saudi leadership will succeed in persuading Trump to resume the nuclear negotiation track under more flexible terms. At the same time, Iran is holding on to the Red Sea card while awaiting the outcome of mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington and preparing for any potential military confrontation with Israel.

On the other hand, Iran is leveraging the Houthis’ political escalation to play the role of the “good cop” who remains open to a settlement and will work to persuade its hardline local ally accordingly. Tactically, Iran also seeks to trade off a détente in Yemen for a halt to escalation in Iraq, which Iranian assessments view as the likely arena for any forthcoming Israeli strike.

In light of this equation, the Houthis are temporarily committed to refraining from cross‑border escalation and are focusing on activating negotiation tracks to achieve two tactical objectives: first, breaking international political isolation—hence their official invitation to the U.N. envoy to Yemen and to Western ambassadors to visit them in Sanaa; and second, easing economic pressure, albeit in a limited and gradual manner.

Most likely, the Houthis understand the difficulty of an immediate return to the original roadmap, but they will continue to work to energize this track through three cards: first, diplomatic flexibility with the international community, including willingness to discuss detainees and to reaffirm their commitment not to threaten navigation; second, the threat of renewed border escalation with Saudi Arabia; and third, and most importantly, the possibility of conducting military or security operations inside Yemen to unsettle the legitimacy camp and exert pressure on the Arab coalition and the international community.