"The Houthis are no longer just a local militia. They have transformed into a regional player with strategic ties to the AQAP, Al-Shabaab, and other extremist organizations..."

*Ibrahim Ali (South24)

A recent report by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has unveiled a pivotal transformation in the operational scope of the Houthi movement. Once perceived as a local militia confined within Yemen’s borders, the group has now emerged as a dynamic regional actor, forging strategic ties with violent extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and ISIS affiliates.

Released on October 17, the report does more than compile intelligence on the Houthis, it reveals a strategic inflection point in the group’s actions. The Houthis are no longer merely a proxy of Iran, receiving military and technological support. They have become an active provider of advanced combat services and technologies to other banned outfits, and manage multi-route smuggling networks that stretch from the shores of the Horn of Africa to Saudi Arabia’s borders, passing through oil-rich regions in southern Yemen.

Terrorist Alliances and the Logic of the Black Market

The report draws particular attention to the operational relationship between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab. Unlike previous reports, which contained vague or brief mentions, this edition offers expanded details on the nature of their cooperation, including military and technical training for Al-Shabaab operatives by the Houthis inside Yemen --encompassing techniques in IEDs, drones, and low-cost high-impact weaponry.

More alarmingly, the report reveals Al-Shabaab’s smuggling activity through Hadramout and Shabwa governorates, indicating that Yemeni territory is no longer just a transit point but has become a platform for sustained economic partnership between the two outfits. Among the report’s findings is that the Houthis facilitated the entry of around 400 Somali nationals into Yemen for organized combat training, a figure that suggests the existence of an institutional program rather than an isolated deal or incidental field collusion.

From the economic and security perspective, this alliance exemplifies the “black market” logic: the Houthis possess combat infrastructure built over years of war, accumulated expertise in developing drones, and control over key coastal areas. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, represents a fitting client, seeking cheaper and more effective alternatives to Western arms. Thus, a partnership emerges, one that thrives on Yemen’s fragile political and security environment, the weakness of state institutions, and the ability of both groups to protect smuggling networks.

The same dynamic extends to the Houthis’ relationship with AQAP, but with a critical difference: the UN has this time presented material evidence—of an intercepted direct call between the Houthi intelligence apparatus and AQAP leaders discussing operational coordination. This proves that the coordination between the two groups is organized rather than what was being termed as “forced coexistence” in contested areas.

The report also confirms logistical and medical support provided by the Houthis to AQAP operatives, including treating wounded fighters of the latter in Houthi-controlled medical facilities. These activities, when connected, indicate that the Houthis engage in selective battles, sparing the AQAP and allowing it to operate in chosen areas—so long as its actions target mutual adversaries, primarily the Southern forces.

Of greater concern is the fact that the Houthis’ calculated alliance with the AQAP is contributing to prolonging the Yemeni conflict, weakening state institutions, and fostering a war economy sustained by chaos. In the Houthis’ view, these dynamics give them a stronger bargaining position in any future peace negotiations, enabling them to exert pressure and engage in tactical understandings with such groups.

In this context, it is worth noting that this pragmatic approach, which transcends each side’s ideological differences, is echoed in official Houthi statements. In a public tweet, senior Houthi figure Mohammed al-Bukhaiti expressed readiness to “ally with the Muslim Brotherhood to cut off the UAE’s destructive hand in Yemen and Sudan.” This explicit call for alliance with a historical ideological rival in pursuit of a shared operational goal -- countering a regional adversary --  not only supports the theory of coordination with AQAP and Al-Shabaab but places it within the declared Houthi strategy of forming regional counter-fronts.

This was reinforced by a statement from AQAP on November 7 regarding Sudan, calling for “terrorist” operations against the UAE and Western interests.

Al-Bukhaiti’s justification rested on three practical points, written in response to Islah Party leader Mohammed al-Hazmi: first, a call to unite against what he termed as “UAE sabotage,” citing alleged violations against Islah members in Aden prisons; second, a reminder of Islah’s past abandonment of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and its alliance with the Houthis during the 2011 revolution; and third, most critically, a reference to a previous secret truce in the Marib and Nihm fronts during escalation on the western coast—proving that coordination is possible when goals align.

Thus, al-Bukhaiti’s message confirms that the logic of a “common enemy” governs the group’s foreign relations -- explaining its direct operational coordination with AQAP and military training facilitation for Al-Shabaab on Yemeni soil. The shared threat also becomes a tool to increase pressure on regional rivals.

The report also refers to Somali intelligence tracking communications between the Houthis, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab, which suggests that African jihadist factions now view the Houthis as a force that can deliver what they want: protected smuggling routes, low-cost combat technology, and an ideology that is similarly hostile to regional and international adversaries.

Strategic Shift: From Importer to Exporter

The most significant takeaway of the report is of the Houthis’ transition from being an “importer” to an “exporter” of combat technology. In past years, Iranian supply chains were the primary source of the Houthi’s military capabilities. Today, the Yemeni group has the capability of manufacturing and developing offensive drones and supplying them to external actors through organized smuggling networks.

It is important to note that this shift does not merely indicate partial independence from Iran but rather a strategic ambition to replicate Hezbollah’s model of exercising regional influence - military and political. Unlike Hezbollah, however, the Houthis operate in an open maritime commercial environment, extending their reach deep into Africa, not just the Gulf neighborhood.

Their geographic penetration now includes ports and areas that are vital to Yemen’s economy, such as oil and gas -rich Shabwa and Hadramout, which are under the internationally recognized government’s control. The presence of Al-Shabaab operatives in Hadramout—in coordination with the Houthis—poses a compounded threat to maritime security and global trade, especially considering that shipping lanes have become a central bargaining chip in regional conflicts.

Although the report notes an increase in operations by government forces (South Forces) against AQAP and smuggling networks, the Houthis’ ability to use southern coastal areas as corridors for smuggling weapons or Al-Shabaab operatives—who infiltrate among the thousands of migrants landing on southern shores—amplifies the challenge of securing these vast coastlines. It also reveals the real threat posed by Houthis to regional stability and maritime security.

Conclusion

These findings indicate that the Houthi group is no longer a mere local militia but has evolved into an active regional player capable of cross-border operations through explicit partnerships with AQAP, Al-Shabaab, and other extremist organizations. This project, fueled by a war economy, has turned the Houthis into exporters of weapons, technology, training, terrorist operatives, and narcotics.

Ignoring this transformation by the international community implicitly allows Yemen to become an open arena for producing and spreading chaos toward the Horn of Africa and global maritime corridors. The real danger lies in complacency, which would multiply the cost of maritime security, eliminate prospects for building a stable state, and reinforce the Houthis’ role as a proxy power threatening regional and international stability, alongside extremist groups across the Horn of Africa.