*Ibrahim Ali (South24 Center)

On October 21, the Al-Mahfad district in Yemen’s southern Abyan governorate witnessed a serious security escalation in the form of a new and distinct attack carried out by the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) using two car bombs. The suicide attack specifically targeted the government complex that houses the headquarters of the First Support and Reinforcement Brigade of the Southern Forces, killing five soldiers and injuring 12 others, according to television reports.

This operation carries significant implications related to the group’s operational status. More importantly, its timing coincides with several local and regional events, raising questions about a possible “convergence of interests” aimed at destabilizing the South.

AQAP and Houthis on the Southern Front

The recent Al-Mahfad attack by AQAP was not an isolated incident, but rather reflects an operational interconnection between the networks of violence and terrorism in Yemen. Groups such as AQAP and ISIS do not act independently of the political environment, shaped at times by the Houthis. Instead, they exploit any security vacuum or wave of unrest to launch strikes intended to undermine stability and erode public confidence in local authorities.

Field indicators suggest tactical synchronization and coordination of interests between the two sides. Houthi political and media mobilization often peaks at the same time that AQAP carries out impactful field operations. Together, the rhetorical escalation and ground assaults create a dual pressure on state institutions and local authorities.

This synchronization is evident in the timing of the attacks alongside Houthi rhetorical escalation aimed at destabilizing the South. Houthi leader Mohammed al-Bukhaiti recently declared: “We must be frank with the Yemeni people that a political solution in Yemen is no longer possible,” attributing this to the group’s financial and economic interests being tied to the continuation of the crisis. He went further, openly calling for a non-political resolution: “The best option is for the Yemeni people to arm themselves with awareness… paving the way for a popular movement from Saada to Al-Mahra to liberate Yemen from occupation and reclaim its oil and gas resources.”

This mobilizing rhetoric against what he called “occupation” in the South preceded or coincided with AQAP’s field strikes against Southern Forces, making the “terrorist attack” a military cover for the Houthis’ political message calling for a “popular” uprising.

In parallel, the Al-Mahfad attack was accompanied by another escalation targeting southern stability through a new front. Pro-Houthi and AQAP-aligned figures, most notably activist Adel al-Hasani and former Transport Brigade commander Amjad Khaled—wanted by Aden’s security—announced the formation of a so-called “National Armed Resistance”. Their public statement explicitly called for violent acts against southern territories -- reinforcing the reality of “convergence of interests” between seemingly opposing parties, but united by a shared goal: undermining the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and destabilizing the region.

Previous events provide confirmation of this tactical convergence of interests. In June, the First Support and Reinforcement Brigade intercepted and downed a Houthi drone attempting to target its military sites in Al-Mahfad. Military sources reported that the Houthis had launched two projectiles toward the sites, but the brigade’s air defenses detected and destroyed the drone before it caused any casualties or damage. The AQAP’s targeting the same site on October 21 with two car bombs underscores their shared objective: of a concerted effort to destabilize Al-Mahfad, and weaken the First Support and Reinforcement Brigade in particular.

Expert reports and regional evidence indicate that external support networks have played a role in enhancing these groups’ capabilities—through funding, training, and sheltering leaders—while facilitating field communication channels, thus positioning the terrorist activity within a broader regional project that extends beyond Yemen’s borders.

Another angle cannot be ignored: under mounting regional and international pressure due to the detention of UN staff, AQAP may have launched the attack in a tactical move to ease pressure on the Houthis or divert attention.

This coordination extends beyond the battlefield into the propaganda sphere as well. Days before the attack, AQAP issued a statement attacking Saudi Arabia and inciting its followers and others to carry out operations. This came in parallel with an escalatory incitement campaign by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia, including through tweets by prominent leaders such as Mohammed al-Bukhaiti and Nasser Amer.

Further reinforcing this dual messaging is the propaganda dimension chosen by AQAP for the operation. Although the attack was carried out in Al-Mahfad against Southern Forces, the operation’s chosen names carried clear Palestinian references, most notably “Jerusalem Will Not Be Judaized”. The Al-Mahfad suicide bombers also appeared in video recordings wearing Palestinian-style headscarves. This propaganda direction aligns with recent Houthi rhetoric, which has intensified accusations against its rivals—particularly in the South—of “Zionism” or serving agendas hostile to the Palestinian cause, in an attempt to strip them of national legitimacy. Linking a domestic terrorist operation to the Palestinian issue thus serves two purposes: to falsely grant the attack “jihadist legitimacy”, and second, provide propaganda cover for Houthi accusations of treason against southern leaders.

Such harmony and convergence in propaganda messaging cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence, especially for observers tracking the parallel incitement trajectories of both groups in terms of motives, causes, and objectives.

Political Pressure and Terrorist Threat

The Al-Mahfad attack did not occur in a political vacuum. It came as a violent and calculated response to the political and popular momentum witnessed in the South during the large-scale observance of the 62nd anniversary of the October 14 Revolution. This year, the occasion became a unifying political umbrella that revived the revolution’s symbolism and historic goals, foremost being “liberation and independence”.

The events across several southern governorates were not merely celebratory but carried explicit and high-level political messages, including calls to reform state institutions, strengthen southern unity, and consolidate internal dialogue as a tool to solidify the southern position in any future negotiations. Amid this momentum, STC President Aidrous al-Zubaidi delivered a decisive speech affirming that southern independence is “coming despite conspiracies,” and that no political settlement in Yemen would be possible without the South as a principal party.

This intense political activity, which reasserted the Southern cause as a priority, placed the South at the forefront of the regional and domestic scene. Accordingly, the targeting of the South in a major AQAP operation just days later does not appear to be mere coincidence. Strikes during such moments of political ascendancy serve two purposes at once: first, of undermining public confidence in the southern leadership by exposing the security vulnerabilities, and second, distracting the political efforts by forcing them to deal with successive security crises, instead of being able to focus on internal consolidation.

More importantly, the STC’s ability to mobilize massive crowds across multiple governorates and reaffirm its independence goal has provoked concern among its regional and domestic adversaries, foremost the Houthis. The political and popular rise of the independence movement in the South directly threatens Houthi ambitions to control or extend influence over the region, eliminating any prospect of unifying Yemen under their rule. In this context, the Al-Mahfad attack, executed by AQAP, becomes part of a tactical effort to strike at this southern momentum or at least diminish its impact.

Implications of the Attack

Though all the AQAP operatives involved in the Al-Mahfad operation were killed and the attack failed to achieve its strategic objectives, it nonetheless sends important signals. While it is not a declaration of AQAP’s full resurgence, the use of two car bombs in a single strike demonstrates that the group still retains the ability to plan and execute high-impact attacks—something that must be taken seriously by security agencies and international counterterrorism partners. 

The return to suicide-style operations by AQAP, after a period of cessation, indicates a relative restoration of internal cohesion within the terror outfit. Such operations had previously declined due to reduced willingness for self-sacrifice, amid its internal disputes over the ISIS’ succession and other factors. Another notable point is the choice of Al-Mahfad as a target, outside AQAP’s active stronghold in Mudiyah district in eastern Abyan. This reveals its greater operational capacity and mobility, despite the group’s main battles being concentrated in rugged border areas with Al-Bayda and Shabwa.

The complexity of the operation also demonstrates that the group can conduct combined attacks when it has access to the necessary intelligence and conditions. The basic security message here is: closing the intelligence and logistical gaps will reduce the chances of similar strikes.

Conclusion

The Al-Mahfad attack was not an isolated security incident but part of a strategically timed context. It serves a clear interest in destabilizing the South, and attempting to prove the local authorities’ inability to protect themselves, as well as deepening the public discontent over deteriorating services—thereby paving the way for political or military moves that may serve the Houthis and their allies.

Accordingly, addressing the Al-Mahfad attack must not be limited to the security dimension alone but also approached politically and strategically. It reflects a challenge that goes beyond the AQAP as an organization to a broader network of intersecting interests united by one goal: keeping southern areas in a state of perpetual attrition.

Just as the October events proved that the South can reclaim its voice, confronting this pattern of coordination between AQAP and the Houthis requires constant vigilance, as well as political and security astuteness, one that can turn every attempt at destabilization into an opportunity to strengthen internal cohesion.