"The Houthis gained internal stability and an improved security image, while the AQAP obtained resources and military and human support that enabled it to reposition toward the South."

Ibrahim Ali (South24 Center)

Since 2022, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has disappeared from the frontlines of confrontation with the Houthis, following years of battles and reciprocal operations in Al-Bayda Governorate and its surroundings. This sudden shift has raised broad questions about the nature of the relationship between the two sides, especially amid growing indications of an undeclared understanding, allegedly backed by Iran.

This de-escalation appears to be more than a mere lull—it reflects mutual interest-based arrangements. The Houthis gained internal stability and an improved security image, while the AQAP received resources and military and human support that enabled it to reposition toward the southern borders.

However, behind these gains lie stark contradictions. The Houthis present themselves as a bulwark against “terrorism”, while simultaneously facilitating its reproduction away from their northern areas of control.

Conversely, AQAP continues to promote a narrative of “confrontation with Shiite rejectionists”, while in reality benefiting from the facilitation of a group closely linked to Iran. This analytical reading aims to unpack the dimensions of this complex strategic entanglement and its future implications for the Yemeni political scene.

Background

Since the early 2010s, Yemen has been a recurring battleground between AQAP and the Houthis. Al-Bayda Governorate was the most prominent theater of this tension, where the group carried out numerous attacks, and the Houthis responded with raids and territorial control over mountainous areas known as AQAP strongholds—such as the districts of Al-Zahir, Al-Sawma’ah, Mukayras, and Wald Rabi’. Between 2015 and 2020, field reports documented dozens of armed confrontations resulting in significant casualties on both sides.

By 2022, however, this conflict had notably ceased. In 2021, the group withdrew from its areas of control in Al-Bayda following Houthi military and security operations. Sources at ‘South24’ confirm that the withdrawal occurred as a result of understandings between the two parties, and not due to any decisive military or security action.

Regarding the broader de-escalation, the group did not announce a truce, nor did the Houthis issue a statement declaring final victory. The most plausible analysis points to an “undeclared understanding”, shaped by Iran, which views the Houthis as a regional leverage tool and does not oppose using AQAP as an indirect pressure card against its adversaries—so long as the group’s activity remains outside the Houthi-controlled northern areas. Even recent UN reports have echoed this assessment.

Houthis’ Gains

The Houthis were the primary beneficiaries of the de-escalation. The absence of AQAP attacks in Sanaa, Saada, Amran, and other northern areas allowed the group to promote a dual narrative: domestically, as a governing authority capable of securing daily life, and externally, as a force that could be a partner in “counterterrorism”.

However, this “model” security portrayal would not have materialized without the cessation of AQAP’s operations. Field experience in Al-Bayda confirms that the Houthis had in previous years failed to secure its areas against AQAP attacks.

Those operations had exposed the limitations of its military and security capabilities, revealing that the Houthis’ success in marketing themselves as a stabilizing force was not due to inherent superiority, but rather a direct result of the undeclared understanding with the Al-Qaeda. Without it, the group would have continued to face significant pressure and daily challenges in maintaining internal security.

This ‘model’ portrayal manifested across three strategic levels

• Security Level: Houthi-controlled areas appeared more stable compared to the South, where AQAP resumed its activity. This gave the Houthis a political edge over the internationally recognized government, which continues to suffer from repeated security breaches.

• Media Level: Houthi-affiliated channels and allied media amplified the narrative of “model security”, using the absence of terrorist operations as evidence of their governance efficiency.

• Political and Diplomatic Level: Leveraging this portrayal, the Houthis seek to break part of their international isolation by claiming they are best positioned to contain terrorist threats—unlike their rivals who struggle to do so.

Yet this narrative carries a structural contradiction: the group that claims to combat terrorism is the same one that released dozens of AQAP members from its prisons under the guise of “prisoner exchange deals”. Thus, the apparent stability in the north is not the result of genuine confrontation, but rather a product of tacit understanding with the organization.

AQAP’s Gains

For Al-Qaeda, the de-escalation with the Houthis represented a rare opportunity to regroup after years of sustained military and security blows—particularly from Southern forces since 2016. These forces adopted a strategy different from previous governments, pursuing the operatives into its mountainous and rural hideouts rather than merely expelling them from urban centers, which inflicted heavy losses and disrupted the organization’s calculations.

However, the support AQAP received—either through the Houthis or via Iran—shifted the equation. Field indicators revealed:

• Military Supplies: Field reports noted the arrival of drones and advanced weaponry to the AQAP, which had previously been inaccessible.

• Financial Support: Direct or indirect funding helped the group reorganize its ranks and cover fighter expenses.

• Leadership Release: The release of its key figures and operatives from Houthi prisons rapidly boosted the group’s human resources.

These resources translated into renewed AQAP activity in Shabwa, Abyan, and Hadramout, where it launched a series of operations against Southern forces in an attempt to re-create a state of security chaos in these areas. Thus, it can be said that the Houthis used AQAP as a tool to destabilize their southern rivals, while reaping the benefits of calm in the north.

Deconstructing Both Narratives

Both the Houthis and AQAP present seemingly coherent narratives to justify their actions, but a closer analysis reveals contradictions:

• Houthi Narrative: They claim to protect society from “takfiri terrorism”, but in reality they engage in forging understandings with the organization and exploit it against their rivals. This contradiction undermines any claim to a “state project” or “security model”, exposing the purely utilitarian nature of the Houthis’ behavior.

• AQAP Narrative: The organization portrays itself as a defender of Sunnis against the “Rafidi threat”, yet accepts support from a group linked to Iran—its supposed ideological enemy. This contradiction reveals the depth of its internal crisis, where ideological purity has been sidelined in favor of operational survival.

Ultimately, both narratives reflect temporary tactics. The Houthis use “counterterrorism” to consolidate power, while AQAP uses “hostility toward the Houthis” to recruit fighters. In reality, both parties have woven indirect understandings that allow each to achieve short-term goals.

Implications

Amid this backdrop, it can be seen that the direct beneficiary of this arrangement are the Houthis, who have amplified a superficial sense of stability in the north at the expense of destabilizing the situation in the South. Every AQAP operation against Southern forces weakens the authority of the legitimate government and reinforces the Houthis’ narrative that their rivals are incapable of enforcing security.

On a broader level, this dynamic means that terrorism has not been defeated—it has merely been “redirected”. It no longer targets the north, where the Houthis are entrenched, but is concentrated along the southern borders, where political and military battles rage among competing factions. This prolongs the conflict and complicates any prospects for a comprehensive political settlement.

Regionally, this situation raises sensitive questions: If Iran is indeed behind the undeclared understanding, it effectively controls the trajectory of terrorism in Yemen and can deploy it as a bargaining chip in its regional and international negotiations.

Future Scenarios

Based on the current trajectory, three primary scenarios can be anticipated:

• Continuation of the Status Quo: The north remains superficially stable under Houthi control, while AQAP intensifies its operations in the South to destabilize the group’s rivals. This scenario serves Houthi interests and allows Iran to retain a flexible pressure card.

• AQAP Reverses the Understanding: If the group feels exploited by the Houthis without sufficient gains—or seeks to counter growing reports of collusion—it may resume attacks against them. However, this depends on delicate balances in funding, operational autonomy, and logistical support.

• Counter Regional Intervention: If regional and international pressure escalates, broad military campaigns may be launched against AQAP in the South, potentially undermining Houthis’ strategic calculations. Yet past experience suggests that achieving a decisive and lasting defeat of the AQAP remains elusive.

Conclusion

Since 2022, the undeclared détente between AQAP and the Houthis has redrawn the contours of the conflict in Yemen. The Houthis have capitalized on portraying a “safe zone” model in the north, while AQAP has regained operational momentum along the southern borders—ironically with indirect support from its declared adversaries.

Behind these temporary gains lie strategic contradictions that threaten both parties: the Houthis compromise their credibility as a counterterrorism force, and AQAP exposes the decline of its ideological narrative in favor of survival imperatives.

Ultimately, the greatest casualty is Yemen itself—a country caught in a cycle that reproduces violence and terrorism in new forms, deepens the divide between a north that markets “managed stability”, and a South burdened by attacks from a group that is sustained by covert understandings.

In this context, support for Southern forces emerges as a critical pillar for maintaining security and stability in government-controlled areas against Al-Qaeda operations. Strengthening their military and defensive capabilities is not limited to repelling terrorist attacks—it constitutes a frontline mechanism for protecting civilians and vital infrastructure, while enhancing the state’s and society’s resilience against the group’s expansion.

Unless the Southern forces are provided structured and sustained support, Al-Qaeda will continue to exploit security gaps, threatening renewed cycles of violence and destabilization in the South, rendering any effort to rebuild peace increasingly fragile and vulnerable to collapse.