"Al-Zubaidi’s decisions may be interpreted as an attempt to impose a parallel political framework within the Presidential Leadership Council, reviving the principle of parity between the North and South."

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Situation Assessment (South24 Center)

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On the evening of September 10, 2025, member of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council and President of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, undertook an unprecedented initiative within the formal structures of Yemeni governance, announcing a series of official appointments in his dual capacity as a member of the presidency and head of the STC. The decrees included the designation of 13 southern figures to various governmental and local posts, -- ranging from the presidency of the Land Authority, to deputy and undersecretary roles in ministries, as well as undersecretary positions across several southern governorates.

These appointments were accompanied by a sharply worded political statement from the STC, accusing its partners in the Presidential Leadership Council of “obstructing the partnership and derailing the Riyadh Agreement”, while affirming its commitment to “defending the rights of the southern people and safeguarding their achievements”. The announcement was also accompanied by a public mobilization call for demonstrations in Aden on two emblematic southern occasions: the anniversary of the October 14 Revolution and the November 30 Independence Day. This convergence between the appointments, the political messaging, and grassroots mobilization, reflects the STC’s intent to imbue its move with both institutional and popular legitimacy, going beyond the mere administrative reshuffling.

Crisis Background within the PLC 

The timing and background of these decisions raise fundamental questions, particularly as they emerge amid a deepening political impasse within the Presidential Leadership Council. Since the transfer of power in April 2022, Council President Rashad Al-Alimi has—according to repeated accusations of fellow members—been exercising his executive authority unilaterally, bypassing the Council’s intended collaborative structure. Regular sessions have not been convened, and major decisions have been taken without consensus, rendering the presidential Council ineffective.

These grievances have not been exclusive to the STC. Other actors, such as the National Resistance led by Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, echoed similar concerns in a June 2025 statement, denouncing Al-Alimi’s “exclusionary and discriminatory approach” and warning of the risks of undermining the power-sharing framework. Prior to that, senior STC official Nasser Al-Khubaji, speaking at the Yemen International Forum in Amman (February 2025), accused Al-Alimi of monopolizing decision-making and marginalizing fellow Council members. All these developments reveal the underlying accumulations that preceded Al-Zubaidi’s latest move.

South24 had previously discussed President Al-Alimi’s persistent assertion of presidential prerogatives in a manner akin to a unitary head of state, rather than as chair of a collective leadership body—in contravention of the political architecture established by the power transfer declaration. This deviation from its intended collective aim has exacerbated the internal tensions and entrenched divisions within the Council.

Interpreting the Move: Recalibration or Strategic Escalation?

Al-Zubaidi’s decisions may be construed as an effort to assert a counterbalancing political framework within the Council, reaffirming the principle of parity between the North and South as enshrined in the Riyadh Agreement, as well as invoking the popular mandate underpinning the STC’s claim to southern representation. The Southern Transitional Council’s statement underscores this stance, declaring that “the land belongs to the Southern people, and the decision is theirs”. Legally, however, Al-Zubaidi’s decrees face questions of enforceability, as the April 2022 declaration stipulates that only the Presidential Council President may issue republican decrees following consensus. Accordingly, any unilateral decisions remain subject to procedural and constitutional scrutiny.

From a political standpoint, the move appears deliberate, even if it is met with resistance. It conveys a dual message: first, a direct challenge to Al-Alimi’s unilateralism; second, a signal of potential escalation should the STC’s demands continue to be disregarded. This posture was reinforced by a statement from Anis Al-Sharafi, head of the STC’s Political Department, who warned of a possible “state of emergency” if the appointments are not ratified, asserting that the Southern Transitional Council’s options are backed by military capacity, popular support, and public awareness.

The STC’s actions reflect mounting concerns over its status within the governing framework. To date, the STC continues to be treated by Al-Alimi and northern factions as a subordinate partner, despite its extensive political and military influence in the South. These anxieties are also related to concerns about post-Houthi scenarios, in which the STC fears there could be a move toward forced unity or the marginalization of southern interests. The response of the other PLC members will determine the trajectory of the STC escalation and whether its future moves will extend beyond administrative appointments within the framework of “legitimacy”.

Regional Dimension

Given the central role of regional players in Yemen’s political scene, the STC’s statement included praise for “the fraternal role of the Arab Coalition and the efforts of the peace process sponsors,” commending “their attentiveness to the southern voice and their serious engagement with its cause as a cornerstone of regional security and stability”.

Thus, the regional dimension is integral to interpreting the implications of these developments. Through its ongoing mediation and conflict management efforts, Saudi Arabia may—reminiscent of its 2019 intervention—seek to reconvene the parties at the negotiating table to avert further fragmentation within the “legitimacy” bloc, amid the current sensitive geopolitical moment. Conversely, the United Arab Emirates may back actors with tangible influence on the ground, which would bolster the STC’s position. In both scenarios, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appear invested in the emergence of a governance structure capable of navigating the next phase and its attendant security and military challenges—particularly amid a severe economic downturn and the government’s inability to fulfill basic obligations. Nonetheless, these remain analytical assumptions rather than official positions that can be relied upon. 

Ultimately, Al-Zubaidi’s decision poses a real test for the Presidential Leadership Council. It can be interpreted either as an attempt to "recalibrate" the presidency and enforce respect for the consensus mechanism, or as a prelude to broader political escalation that would reshuffle the internal dynamics of the PLC.  Concrete indicators will emerge swiftly once the presidency gives its official response: if republican decrees are issued to formalize the decisions, it would constitute an implicit recognition of a new political reality; but if the decisions are obstructed, the southern street may well become the next arena of confrontation.