South24 Center

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Former senior figure in the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Riyadh al-Asiri, reveals a disturbing internal scene within the organization—ranging from silent defections, and recurring allegations of security breaches to the loss of popular support, declining field activity, and the direct impact of military operations targeting it in recent years.

In an exclusive interview conducted by a journalist collaborating with South24 Center, al-Asiri—a Yemeni national who defected from the group in 2021 and is currently based in Sanaa—offers an insider’s view of the trajectory of the group, that was once among the most prominent armed actors in Yemen.

Al-Asiri stated that his decision to withdraw came after realizing that the leadership was “persecuting sincere advisors and promoting sycophants”, adding: “A group with such qualities cannot be granted victory, and if it were, it will resemble a miniature version of dictatorial regimes.”

The Liberation of Mukalla: The Beginning of Decline

Al-Asiri points out that AQAP’s battlefield decline began with its loss of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout, in April 2016. At the time, Hadrami Elite Forces, backed by the Arab Coalition, succeeded in retaking the city after a full year of AQAP control. That control had provided AQAP with substantial financial resources through ports and oil markets, but these were quickly lost in a swift operation supported by intensive aerial bombardment.

Al-Asiri told ‘South24’ that this loss marked a decisive turning point: “The group’s actual activity began to gradually decline after withdrawing from Mukalla, eventually becoming confined to specific areas like Qayfa, where it first confronted the Houthis, then the ISIS.” However, as the Houthis began advancing in Al-Bayda and AQAP lost its positions there, “most of its fighters withdrew southward and began operating against UAE-affiliated forces.”

“With the Coalition’s pressure and its launch of proxy-led military operations against AQAP, the group was forced to operate behind the scenes.”

Silent Defections and Conflict with the Security service

Al-Asiri’s dispute with AQAP began in Taiz, where he was overseeing “preaching activities”. He said: “I witnessed serious violations which I tried to report to the leadership, but they ignored them. Over time, I realized the dysfunction lay within the leadership itself.” He added: “Some members defected silently, which is a sign of the depth of the crisis.”

He believes that repeated accusations of espionage fueled these defections, citing the killing of Abu Maryam al-Azdi, which “triggered a mass defection demanding reform of the security apparatus and the establishment of a neutral Sharia court.” However, according to him, the group responded to these demands with media defamation and accusations of dissidence.

“AQAP exerted physical and psychological pressure to extract confessions from detainees.”

Al-Asiri focused on the group’s security service system, describing it as an absolute authority that overrides the Sharia courts. He said: “Verdicts are often issued based on confessions extracted by security personnel through both legitimate and illegitimate means.”

Regarding the confession recordings released by AQAP, he commented: “Most of these confessions cannot be considered entirely genuine. Many detainees were subjected to physical and psychological pressure, and what is presented does not reflect the whole truth.” He believes that the repeated publication of statements exposing espionage networks may give observers an impression contrary to what the leadership promotes: “The more dangerous issue is the manipulation of the group and steering it indirectly, without an actual infiltration.”

Despite reports of top-level leadership disputes, al-Asiri asserts that many of them are exaggerated: “There is no truth to the alleged disagreements between Batarfi and Saad Atef, or between Batarfi and Qasim al-Raymi. Much of what is published is either rumor or the exaggeration of minor incidents, and not substantive disputes as portrayed.”

If this narrative is accurate, then such denials suggest that the real crisis lies not in the leadership rivalry, but in the performance of the security apparatus and defections within the ranks.

’Arrows of the East‘: A Defining Moment

Following the loss of Al-Bayda and Qayfa, AQAP’s presence became concentrated in southern governorates such as Abyan and Shabwa. However, al-Asiri views its movements there as erratic: “Instead of winning over tribes and mobilizing local support, the group targeted their sons at military checkpoints, deepening its isolation.”

Among the most significant developments AQAP faced in the South was the ’Arrows of the East‘ operation launched by the Southern Forces with Coalition support in August 2022. The operation, which is ongoing, targeted AQAP positions in Abyan and Shabwa, successfully expelling its fighters from several mountainous areas and traditional strongholds.

“The Arrows of the East operation by Southern Forces depleted AQAP’s human and logistical capabilities.”

Al-Asiri believes the operation’s impact was more attritional than decisive: “Arrows of the East had a relative and temporary effect, but it wasn’t the main factor behind the group’s decline. That decline stemmed from its internal mistakes and failure to gain tribal support.”

Nevertheless, al-Asiri acknowledges that “military operations like Arrows of the East drained AQAP’s human and logistical resources, while at the same time the Southern Forces also exhausted their own assets in confronting a fragmented and elusive adversary.”

Relations with Islah and Avoiding the Houthis

Regarding AQAP’s relationship with the Islah Party, al-Asiri clarifies that the absence of clashes during the years of Islah’s control over Marib, Abyan, and Shabwa was no coincidence. He stated: “There was a common enemy—the Houthis—and the organization sought to avoid direct confrontation with Islah… Yet at times, more pragmatic figures emerge within the Islah, leading to a tacit understanding with AQAP, especially when interests temporarily align.” Nonetheless, al-Asiri views Islah as “an opportunistic party that exploits other factions for its own benefit, only to turn against them once its goals are achieved.”

He added: “AQAP itself sought to avoid direct presence in areas under Islah’s control, or where they held checkpoints and military forces, taking into account the field realities to avoid confrontation.”

Despite his detailed discussion of the South, Islah, and the security apparatus, al-Asiri avoided addressing AQAP’s relationship with the Houthis, despite residing in Sanaa. This omission is notable given repeated UN and international reports pointing to coordination and communication between the Houthis and AQAP.

“AQAP avoided areas under Islah’s control to avoid confrontation.”

A recent UN report reveals an “opportunistic” relationship linking the Houthis with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and active AQAP elements in southern Yemen, “despite declared ideological differences”.

Southern Forces accuse the Houthis of supplying AQAP with drones, which the group is reported to have used in its recent attacks in Abyan and Shabwa.

Al-Asiri’s avoidance of discussing the Houthis in his testimony indicates the sensitivity of the topic or a desire to avoid conflict with the group that controls his current place of residence—Sanaa.

Cessation of Cross-border Operations

One of the most notable points in al-Asiri’s testimony is his acknowledgment that AQAP has not conducted external operations for nearly a decade. This cessation reflects a decline in the group’s organizational capacity for planning and infiltration, and its confinement to a narrow geographic scope within Yemen. Al-Asiri attributed this decline to “loss of methodology” and that “chaotic behavior has squandered the group’s internal and external potential”.

Nevertheless, a recent UN Security Council report stated that AQAP is working to reorganize its ranks and improve its internal structure in Yemen.

The report, issued by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team regarding “ISIS and Al-Qaeda”, noted that the group’s new leader, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki—appointed in March 2024—“has worked to enhance AQAP’s capabilities… restructured the group, improved the fighters’ living conditions, and reduced infiltration,” which the report viewed as a consolidation of his authority within the organization.

According to the report, al-Awlaki “may be gradually redefining AQAP’s relationship with Al-Qaeda’s central leadership,” hinting at a possible reduction in the influence of Saif al-Adl, the presumed global leader of Al-Qaeda, over its Yemeni branch.

Ineffective Statements and a Diminished Future

Commenting on AQAP’s recent statement endorsing protests in Hadramout and calling for a halt to oil exports from the governorate’s ports, al-Asiri said: “Its rhetoric has become detached from reality, incomprehensible to the public and disconnected from their needs.” He noted that its interpretation of economic reforms in government-held areas is “superficial and misleading”.

He added that AQAP’s statement was an attempt to market its project by invoking memories of the time of its former control over Hadramout, but it failed to present a practical vision: “If it were to regain control, it would be no different from other militias that rule under a religious banner.”

As for AQAP’s future, al-Asiri was unequivocal: “It will remain a marginal entity operating on the fringes. Any victory it achieves will be fleeting and quickly lost. The organization had multiple opportunities in the past but squandered them all due to its poor decisions and chaotic planning.”