"Turkey’s stance toward the Houthi militia’s attacks in Yemen has largely been defined by acquiescence or silence throughout much of the escalation that has continued since October 2023."

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Mohammad Fawzi (South24)

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On January 12, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued statements in which he condemned the U.S.-UK strikes that were, at the time, targeting the Houthi militia in Yemen, stating that “these attacks contribute to creating a bloodbath in the Red Sea". In view of these statements and the nature of Turkey’s engagement with the escalation in the Red Sea region since October 2023 till today, it becomes clear that Ankara's stance is not merely in alignment with segments of the Turkish public opinion sympathetic to the Palestinians, who view the Houthi attacks as an attempt to champion the Palestinian people, rather it also reflects that this stance aligns with their approach that seeks to transform the Red Sea crisis into a strategic opportunity and gain.

In this context, the Hebrew-language newspaper Israel Hayom published an article stating that “President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seeking to leverage the current crisis in the Red Sea region to advance the Middle Corridor project, an international transport route crossing the Caspian Sea”. The report noted that “Ankara has established communication channels with the Houthis through a regional network comprising Iran, Qatar, and allied Yemeni factions. These channels have been used to secure covert financing and arms supply routes via Turkish companies and ports, including the smuggling of thousands of rifles and sensor devices”. These are all indicators that raise questions regarding the nature of Turkey’s position on developments in the Red Sea region and the extent to which Turkey is utilizing these developments to serve its strategic objectives and regional project in the area.

First – Patterns of Turkish Engagement with Red Sea Developments

Since the beginning of the escalation in the Red Sea region, Ankara has adopted a relatively cautious approach in dealing with the complex situation in this vital strategic corridor—a posture that is closely aligned with its overall position on the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip. In addition to Turkey’s efforts to capitalize on these developments in a manner that serves its agenda in the Middle East, the key features of Turkey’s position on the Red Sea developments can be identified as follows:

1. Linking the Escalation in the Red Sea to the Gaza War:

Turkish politicians and officials have been keen, in their official discourse, to link the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip to all forms of escalation witnessed in the Middle East since October 7, 2023, including the deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea region, amid the Houthi escalation. The latest indication of this Turkish position was expressed by Turkey’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Aslı Güven, during a recent session of the UN Security Council, where she affirmed that, “Turkey attaches the highest priority to maritime security, freedom of navigation and the opening of maritime lines of communication…..A permanent ceasefire in Gaza is essential to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea,” warning that “Israel is fueling instability across the entire region”.

2. Non-participation in Red Sea Coalitions:

It is notable that Turkey refrained from joining the coalitions formed in the Red Sea region, whether the ’Operation Prosperity Guardian‘ formed by the United States, or the ‘EUNAVFOR Aspides‘ established by the European Union. Turkish officials have reportedly emphasized this position. It appears that Turkey’s reservation about engaging in the Red Sea coalitions stems, on the one hand, from Ankara’s unwillingness to enter into direct confrontation with the Houthis—possibly based on a functional logic on how Ankara engages with the Yemeni militia, and, on the other, from a key assumption: that Turkey has, over the past years, successfully capitalized on the absence of a formal security architecture in the Red Sea to expand its presence, and therefore Ankara views such coalitions as potential threats to its influence in the Red Sea.

3. Condemnation of U.S.-British strikes against the Houthis:

On January 12, 2024, President Erdogan condemned what he described as a disproportionate response carried out by Washington and London against Houthi positions in Yemen. He also accused the West of seeking to “create a bloodbath in the Red Sea”, adding: “Yemen, through the Houthis and with all its strength, is signaling its intent to respond in the region to the United States and Britain.” He continued: “All these actions constitute a disproportionate use of force,” in his words.

4. Limited Condemnation of Houthi attacks:

Turkey’s stance in dealing with the Houthi militia’s attacks in Yemen has largely been defined by tacit alignment or silence throughout much of the escalation that has persisted since October 2023 to the present. The only instance in which Ankara condemned Houthi attacks was in November 2024, when the Yemeni militia targeted the Turkish vessel Anadolu S with several ballistic and naval missiles. A statement issued by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack and noted that necessary measures had been taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, without specifying what those measures were.

Overall, this Turkish position aligns with Ankara’s official narrative that primarily calls for de-escalation and regional calm, particularly as Erdoğan had implicitly indicated that such strikes would contribute to fueling conflict in the region. These statements also reflect Ankara’s broader approach toward Western powers, which it accuses of exploiting certain contexts to extract political and strategic gains.

Second – Turkey’s Efforts to Capitalize on Red Sea Events

Turkey has consistently adopted, over the past two decades, an approach centered on exploiting crises and seeking to repurpose setbacks into strategic gains. The contours of this approach are evident in the renewed and growing discourse surrounding the “Middle Corridor” project amid the ongoing escalation in the Red Sea region. Broadly speaking, the key features of this project can be highlighted as follows:

• Since 2019, Turkey and China have intensified bilateral discussions regarding a project dubbed as the “Middle Corridor”, one of the initiatives emerging from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Turkish circles promote the project as a profitable land-based alternative route, saving costs and time.

• Turkish narratives advocating for the project emphasize that it offers a shorter distance between Asia and Europe, specifically in comparison to the Northern Corridor, which runs from China through Russia and Belarus to Europe, and the Southern trade route which passes via the Suez Canal.

• Based on available data and statements from Turkish officials, the corridor aims to connect East, West, and Central Asia via the Caspian and Black Seas, as part of broader efforts to revive the ancient Silk Road trade route linking East Asia to Europe. Hence, some have referred to it as the “New Silk Road Initiative.”

Accordingly, Turkey has sought to leverage the tensions in the Red Sea region to promote its strategic project, capitalizing on the disruptions to maritime trade caused by Houthi attacks, as part of its “crisis investment” approach However, this project faces a set of complex challenges, as outlined below:

• The geopolitical environment surrounding the Middle Corridor is marked by complexity and tension. On one hand, Russia may perceive the project as conflicting with its economic, commercial, and geopolitical interests—a reservation that could extend to other actors such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, numerous unresolved security issues persist, which may discourage broader participation in the initiative.

• Some assessments have indicated that one of the primary challenges facing the Middle Corridor is its limited capacity, as it represents only 5% of the throughput of the Northern Corridor that runs through Russia and Belarus to Europe, in addition to various logistical and operational challenges.

• Although Turkish officials and institutions have stated that the corridor would enable transport operations to be completed within 12 days—offering a competitive advantage, border-related challenges, particularly routine procedures and customs regulations, undermine this advantage and significantly increase the transit time, thereby affecting the corridor’s time-saving appeal.

• In spite of the promotional narrative advanced by certain Turkish circles, maritime routes continue to hold significant advantages over their land-based counterparts, as in the case of the Middle Corridor. This is due to the fact that maritime transport offers far greater carrying capacity over land routes. This remains a decisive factor driving countries and corporations to favor sea-based trade routes.

Third: Turkey’s Strategy in the Red Sea

Turkey’s interest in the Red Sea is deeply rooted in history, dating back to the Ottoman era, when the region became the focal point in the empire’s conflicts with various European powers, alongside the establishment of multiple military and intelligence bases along the Red Sea. In this historical context, it is notable that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has significantly intensified its efforts to bolster Turkey’s presence in the Red Sea in recent years, driven by a set of strategic considerations and core factors, as outlined below:

1. Regional and International Competition in the Red Sea:

In recent decades, the strategic character of the Red Sea has undergone notable transformations. Once perceived as an Arab-African maritime domain, this perception began to shift with the emergence of Israel and the establishment of the port of Eilat, followed by Israel’s engagement with several African littoral states. Subsequently, a host of regional and global powers—including the United States, China, Iran, and Russia—entered the competitive arena of the Red Sea. Turkey’s growing interest in the region thus reflects its response to this evolving geopolitical contest, and aligns with its broader strategy to expand influence across the Middle East and the African continent.

2. Strengthening Economic and Commercial Networks:

Turkey’s engagement in the Red Sea cannot be separated from its economic and commercial interests. Ankara has notably focused on developing, constructing, and investing in ports throughout the region, to secure substantial investment and trade gains. This presence also offers opportunities to foster economic integration and strategic partnerships with global economic actors, while enhancing trade volumes between Turkey and Red Sea nations, an especially important objective given the current challenges facing the Turkish economy.

3. Applying Pressure to Advance Agreements with the European side:

As part of its “crisis exploitation” strategy, it is not unlikely that Turkey’s approach toward the security crises in the Red Sea is aimed at exerting pressure in order to deepen its rapprochement with the European Union, and push for modernization of the EU–Turkey Customs Union agreement and expand trade relations, especially as EU member states have begun importing goods and products from Turkey following the intensification of the maritime transport crisis in the Red Sea.

4. Advancing Turkey’s Foreign Policy Agenda:

Turkey’s approach to developments in the Red Sea—whether in terms of its handling of the Houthi escalation or its efforts to consolidate its presence in the region—primarily aims to reinforce its regional agenda and strategic positioning in the Middle East. This approach is based on the assumption that it will enable Ankara to emerge as a competitor to several regional and global powers, particularly given that the Red Sea serves as a critical logistical gateway to numerous other strategic issues. Moreover, it ensures that Turkey gradually transitions into a key player in any emerging security arrangement in the Red Sea region.

In this context, it is observed that Ankara has begun to move toward achieving these objectives through a set of principal tracks—whether via soft power tools, which include humanitarian aid, participation in peacebuilding efforts, and religious organizations. It also uses hard power mechanisms, such as the establishment of military bases (as in the case of Sudan), the cultivation of ties with certain groups that have become active in the Red Sea arena (such as the Houthis), or reliance on economic partnerships and trade alliances.

In sum, Turkey’s approach to the security crises unfolding in the Red Sea since October 7, 2023, reflects a calibrated strategy that balances tacit alignment with the Houthi militia and avoidance of direct confrontation, while simultaneously seeking to capitalize on regional developments to revive strategic initiatives such as the “Middle Corridor” project—ultimately serving Turkey’s broader regional ambitions.