As the confrontation between Israel and Iran escalated in June 2025, the Houthi group once again surfaced at the heart of the crisis,not merely as a purely Yemeni actor, but as a regional tool moving to Tehran’s rhythm. This report highlights the repercussions of this escalation on Yemen’s domestic scene and the Houthis’ position within the broader conflict equation.

Abdullah Al-Shadli (South24)

In mid-June 2025, the Middle East witnessed a significant military development when Israel launched focused and unprecedented airstrikes on several strategic targets inside Iran, including nuclear and military facilities and high-ranking figures. Later, Iran responded, while the United States entered the confrontation by delivering a fierce strike against three Iranian nuclear facilities.

This conflict has publicly demonstrated the scale of the Houthis’ political and media involvement in the so-called “Axis of Resistance”, led by Iran, and the imminent military engagement that was about to occur.

From Sanaa to Tehran, and from the Red Sea to the Arabian Gulf, the threats and moves intersected, revealing that what happens in Iran not only impacts Yemen but is also reproduced within it. In light of that, this report aims to document and analyze the repercussions of the Iranian-Israeli crisis on Yemen, by examining the official statements, monitoring moves, and following up on possible scenarios that may shape the future of the conflict in the country. 

The Beginning of Escalation and its Repercussions

In the early hours of June 13, Israel carried out a series of wide-scale airstrikes inside Iran, targeting sensitive sites, including nuclear facilities, ballistic missile factories, military bases, and senior commanders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These attacks were described as being “unprecedented” in terms of size and scope, effectively transforming the “shadow war” between Tehran and Tel Aviv into a direct and open confrontation. 

The Iranian Health Ministry announced that the total death toll from the Israeli strikes had risen to nearly 627 along with 5,300 injured in different parts of the country. On the other hand, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office declared that the Iranian attacks had killed 28 persons and injured more than 3,200 inside Israel, including a number of critical cases.

With the beginning of the Israeli attack on Iran, the Houthis quickly announced their full support for Iran, ramping up their level of rhetorical escalation towards Israel and the United States. 

The Houthi Leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, described the Israeli attacks as a "dangerous development", framing what was happening as "a battle for the entire nation (Islamic)", and called for solidarity with Iran in the face of this "aggression”.

Subsequent statements from other Houthi leaders affirmed that they "will not stand by idly" and were ready to respond if the escalation intensifies. The head of the group’s Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat, stated that any American intervention in support of Israel would be met with a direct response from the group. He said, "If the United States joins Israel in its war against Iran, it will become more entangled," adding that the Houthis "will work to confront and resist any participation in the war against Iran."

These statements reflected a mobilization tone within the group which was translated into field gatherings in Sanaa, where massive demonstrations in support of Iran were held, with tens of thousands of citizens participating. The Houthis politically leveraged this public show of support to reinforce their media narrative.

The group also issued a statement through its military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, threatening to target American ships and warships in the Red Sea if Washington carried out a direct attack on Iran. It warned that any American involvement in the attacks would be met with a "direct military response”. However, hours after this statement, the United States launched airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, but the Houthis did nothing to fulfil their threats.

It appears that the group was content with limiting itself to rhetoric without translating its threats into practical action. Observers noted that this contradiction between discourse and practice raised questions about the extent of the Houthis’ decision-making autonomy, the centralization of decision-making in Tehran, and the Houthis’ ability or willingness to engage in a direct confrontation at this time. Later, statements from the Houthi Political Office Member Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti indicated that Iran had not asked them to engage in military operations in its support.

However, Rashid Al-Haddad, a political and economic expert based in Sanaa, told ‘South24 Center’ that the Houthis did not remain neutral in this crisis, but had rather declared full support for Tehran from the outset. He added that the group supported Iran’s retaliation against Israel and had expressed readiness to act if Washington intervened militarily.

Al-Haddad pointed out that a U.S. military intervention would have likely expanded the conflict into a maritime war, potentially stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Bab Al-Mandab. He noted that Western media had already begun discussing these scenarios, especially in countries that rely on stable maritime navigation, such as European Union countries, China, and East Asian nations.

U.S. Sanctions

Coinciding with the military escalation, the U.S. Department of the Treasury on June 20, 2025 announced the largest package of sanctions targeting the Houthi group in years. The sanctions included four individuals, twelve entities, and two ships, accused of operating an international smuggling network that funds the group's activities through illicit operations, including oil and goods smuggling, generating massive revenues via the black market.

The Treasury explained that these sanctions are part of efforts to pressure the Houthis to halt activities that threaten regional security and stability, stressing that the group has become part of a broader network that uses unconventional tools to fund war and undermine international peace efforts.

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American researcher specializing in Yemen affairs Nick Broomfield told ‘South24 Center’ that the Houthis served as one of Iran’s indirect response arms. He noted that the group had expressed its support for Iran in the aftermath of the Israeli strikes. He added that the Houthis’ tactics have more-or-less remained unchanged, with a steady claim of attacks on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport despite an unofficial ceasefire.

According to Broomfield, while the international community has generally tried to keep the Yemen file separate from the direct regional conflict, the growing alignment between the Houthis and the Iranian strategy makes this separation a difficult task.

Assessing the American efforts, Broomfield pointed out that the May 2025 ceasefire with the Houthis was apparently intended to prevent the US from being dragged into a full-scale confrontation in the Red Sea. However, the group continued its coordination with Tehran, adopting policies which align with the “Axis of Resistance”. 

The Calculations of Yemeni Parties 

Amid the ongoing regional escalation, the Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government found in the current developments an opportunity to reaffirm its stance on Iran’s role in supporting the Houthi group and to renew its narrative regarding "Tehran’s subversive interventions" in Yemen’s internal affairs.

Minister of Information Muammar Al-Eryani welcomed the recent U.S. sanctions, describing them as "a crucial step toward curbing Houthi activities." In statements published through official media, he stressed that achieving peace in Yemen would not be possible without cutting off the group’s sources of funding and holding its supporters, especially the Iranian regime, accountable.

On June 22, Foreign Minister Shaya Al-Zindani called on the international community to reject any attempts to widen the circle of escalation in the region, warning of the humanitarian and security consequences of any further tension. He emphasized the importance of preserving international peace and preventing the deterioration of regional conditions.

Earlier, on June 18, Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi, warned the Houthi group and its supporters against any escalation launched from Yemeni territory, holding them fully responsible for any consequences. This came during a high-level meeting attended by senior officials in the Yemeni government, dedicated to discussing recent political and economic developments and the fallout of the Iran-Israel escalation on Yemen.

Meanwhile, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) expressed a stance aligning with the Gulf perspective in rejecting Iranian interference, noting that the current escalation may present opportunities to weaken the Houthi group. Anis Al-Sharafi, Deputy Head of the STC’s Foreign Affairs Department, told ‘South24 Center’ that the developments "carry a positive aspect, as weakening Iran necessarily means weakening its Houthi proxy”.

Al-Sharafi noted that Tehran represents "the primary source of support and the decision-making center that directs the group”. He believes that weakening Iran will facilitate any future scenario for dealing with the Houthis. He explained that the STC "considers itself part of the Arab system, within the Saudi and UAE-led Coalition", and pointed to the STC's commitment to working within a collective framework that requires coordination and integration at the local, regional, and international levels.

Al-Sharafi also expressed concern over the economic and political consequences of the Iran-Israel crisis, warning that South Yemen, and Yemen in general, could be among the most affected due to the fragile economic situation and the multiplicity of internal conflicts. He noted that the depreciation of the local currency since the start of the escalation is one of the direct indicators of the economic impact of the crises.

Possible Scenarios

Despite the easing of tensions between Iran and Israel, the repercussions of the crisis continue to linger over the Yemeni arena, affecting the trajectories of war and peace, regional alliances, and the already fragile economy. Estimates suggest that the crisis will cast a long-term shadow over the future of the Yemeni file, both in terms of the available options to local actors and in terms of the policies of international powers toward the warring parties.

Broomfield believes that the most likely course of action would be a continued freeze of the peace process like what it has been since late 2023. He stressed that this deadlock may continue, giving the Houthis enough diplomatic margin to focus their attacks on other targets, primarily Israel.

However, he warned of a possible additional complication which could change the equation, represented by the accelerating deterioration of economic and humanitarian conditions in Houthi-held areas due to the international sanctions, declining aid, and airstrikes on vital infrastructure. According to him, if this continues to worsen, the Houthis may resort to using security threats against Saudi Arabia as leverage to secure a lifeline.

Regarding the likelihood of Israel’s military intervention in Yemen, Broomfield said that this option remains limited, due to geographic and technical factors. 

He explained that the long distance between Israel and Yemen, coupled with Israel’s limited capacity to sustain an extended air campaign compared to the United States, meant that any direct military intervention would remain confined to targeted precision strikes, such as the one carried out against Houthi leaders in Sanaa.

He added that the impact of such strikes on the group may be limited in the long term, given the Houthis’ deep entrenchment in the state institutions they control and the vast territories they govern. He noted that the effectiveness of these strikes in altering the Houthis’ decision-making remains limited unless accompanied by deep intelligence penetration or field cooperation with local actors.

In this context, Anis Al-Sharafi stated that the Houthis will eventually act in alignment with Iran’s agenda, arguing that the group owes all its current political and military influence to Tehran. He noted that Iran may reactivate the group's role in the coming phase, especially after it proved its ability to disrupt navigation in the Red Sea.

On the other hand, Rashid Al-Haddad argued that the unique nature of the Yemen conflict imposes a different reality. He pointed to the existence of undeclared support from the Houthis’ rivals for the Israeli strikes, motivated by their resentment toward Tehran for backing the group. He emphasized that this regional conflict will have long-term consequences for Arab national security as a whole, including the Yemeni file.

Regarding the concerns about opening negotiation channels with the Houthis, Al-Sharafi explained that the issue is not related to the principle of seeking peace but rather over the fact that the group does not view peace as a strategic option. He said the Houthis are looking for a settlement that would allow them to circumvent international pressure and bypass the crisis affecting Iran and its proxies, fearing a fate similar to that of Hezbollah or the Syrian regime.

Al-Sharafi expressed skepticism about the group’s intentions, stating that any international overture toward the Houthis would be fruitless unless they offer clear commitments proving a genuine willingness for peace, not just tactical maneuvering. He noted that South Yemen is not isolated from these developments but is directly affected by them, which necessitates greater coordination among local forces within the broader regional framework.

In light of the issues addressed in this report, the Iran crisis emerges as another indicator that the Houthi group operates beyond the scope of domestic action, and functions as part of a complex set of regional tools influenced by broader geopolitical balances. The overlap between the Yemeni file and these broader contexts shows that the crisis is no longer confined to the internal sphere but has become an active component of a wider regional landscape. This calls for different approaches and more effective alliances to confront a future in which political and security challenges are increasingly interwoven with unprecedented levels of complexity.