Aden (South24 Center)

Amid the fast-paced developments in the region, especially the ceasefire between Iran and Israel and the U.S. military intervention, attention is turning to the future of the Houthis in Yemen, in light of the declining Iranian support and the possibilities of reshaping of the power balance. In a series of exclusive analyses for ’South24 Center‘, a number of international experts and political researchers discussed the potential implications of these challenges on the Yemen reality. They stressed that the Houthis are at a critical juncture, caught between the erosion of regional backing and their continued military superiority within Yemen. While the Iranian military support will likely decline, the experts warn that the lack of a decisive strategy among the Houthis’ rivals coupled with the absence of effective international pressure might provide the Iran-backed group an opportunity to enhance their presence. At the same time, some analysts believe that an opportunity presents itself now to reset the diplomatic track in Yemen and construct more realistic political arrangements for the post-Houthi stage. 

Michael Rubin, Director of Policy Analysis at the Middle East Forum:

While the Houthis have very little legitimacy, the other Yemeni groups have been unable to oust them for a simple reason: The Sultanate of Oman and the Islamic Republic of Iran, each for different reasons, supply the Houthis with weaponry and other resources.

With the Islamic Republic teetering, the Houthis are likely to lose their greatest patron. Tehran abandoned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after supporting him and his father for more than 45 years. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has been unable to sustain support to the Hamas or Hezbollah. Do the Houthis really believe they will be an exception and that the Persians really value Arab causes and lives over their own? Oman might continue to undermine the Southern Transitional Council (STC), but amid the absence of the Houthis as a pressure tool they will have to do so diplomatically or through means of a political settlement.

It is time for the international community to start planning for Yemen’s post-Houthi future. It should dispense with the fiction of the Stockholm Agreement and cut the Houthi supply line from Hodeidah to Al-Mazyunah. It is also time for the international community to calibrate diplomatic support to the forces that actually govern rather than simply sit on the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). If the goal is to expand the legitimacy of the government, it must begin with groups that derive strength from the people, not the foreign diplomats who crafted the PLC and appointed those whose legitimacy was always more among foreigners than Yemenis. Finally, it is time for the international community to invest in any part of Yemen that holds potential for growth, starting with Aden.

Fernando Carvajal, former member of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on Yemen:

It is still unclear what the full impact of the war will be on the Houthis, especially as Iran’s regime remains intact and Israel’s engagement in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria continue.

So far, the Houthis have not engaged in the fighting, possibly as a consequence of the debilitating strikes carried out by the US over seven weeks as part of ‘Operation Rough Rider’. This can also be the usual Iran tactic of not immediately revealing all its cards, considering that the Houthis are capable of striking from both sides of the Red Sea, from Yemen’s side and now also from Sudan.

Air campaigns have forced the Houthis to redeploy their drones and missiles, possibly beyond their full control, as the Houthis lost vital elements within their command-and-control chain outside the central hub. The loss of infrastructure, like cement factories, warehouses and underground bases have significantly impacted their weapons supplies and command chains.

Despite this the Houthis retain the capability to engage in ground battles against their Yemeni rivals, as the armed forces under the PLC and the STC lack major military capabilities to shift the balance across multiple battle fronts. The Houthis do not need sophisticated drones or missiles to confront their Yemeni opponents on the ground, and they still appear capable of maintaining superiority in land warfare. 

The true impact of Operation Rough Rider and the strikes by Israel remains unclear. However, the Houthis’ lack of engagement in fighting since December 2024, even amid the escalation between Israel and Iran, seems to indicate either that the Houthis’ stockpile of drones and missiles is low or that they are simply reserving the arsenal for a later stage of the conflict, as a force multiplier for Iran along the southwest Arabian Peninsula and Bab Al-Mandab/Red Sea.

Irrespective of whether Iran emerges weaker or stronger from the conflict with Israel, it remains unclear if the Saudi-backed PLC forces will engage the Houthis on the ground and seize potential opportunities to make field advances against them. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia may oppose any escalation inside Yemen in order to avoid a retaliatory response from the Houthis that could involve targeting Saudi territory once again.

Ahmed Naji, Senior Researcher at the International Crisis Group:

The Houthis are apparently seeking to demonstrate a degree of independence away from any possible understandings between Iran and Israel. Since the ceasefire agreement doesn't include any articles related to Gaza or the Houthis, the escalation of their anti-Israeli narrative seems to be an attempt to assert the continuation of their military operations as linked to the Palestinian issue, a cause the Houthis have been invested in politically and through the media for years, and which they are unwilling to abandon without tangible gains.

The current question is how Israel will respond to the Houthis’ continued escalation. Any Houthi attacks are likely to be met by sharper Israeli responses, especially given the current limited Iranian military support. Israel may look at this as a favorable opportunity to intensify its strikes against the Houthis.

Dr. Andrew Korybko, Moscow-based American political analyst:

Israel inflicted tremendous damage on Iran during their 12-day war, which may lead to a reduction in Iranian military support for the Houthis, although their political backing for them will continue. However, the Houthis might have stockpiled arms and missiles in advance. So, in effect the decline in Iranian assistance might not affect the situation on the ground for quite some time. Nevertheless, the Houthis might curtail their maritime attacks and missile strikes against Israel in such a scenario, but it's still too early to tell.

In any case, now is the perfect time for resolving the Yemen Conflict, seeing how Iran is weaker than it has ever been since its war with Iraq. The ideal solution is diplomatic, which could result in recognition of the Houthis' control over North Yemen, whether as an independent state or as a confederal entity within a nominally unified Yemen. The US and Israeli strikes have failed to dislodge them, while a ground campaign would be difficult given the terrain and how deeply they have entrenched themselves over the past decade.

Adel Al-Shabhi, politician and researcher:

The announcement of a ceasefire between Iran and Israel following U.S. intervention and the targeting of Iranian nuclear facilities, and Tehran's response with a strike on the Al Udeid base in Qatar was seen by many analysts as an Iranian attempt to ’save face’. It is widely believed that the operation was pre-coordinated with Qatar, especially since it caused no significant damage. The implications of these developments, if the negotiation path succeeds, will undoubtedly extend to the Yemeni file. 

The cessation of U.S. strikes offers the Houthis a new safety margin, bolstering their military and political standing, and ensuring their continued control over territory and institutions. Conversely, these developments represent a lost opportunity for the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, who had the chance to unify their ranks and organize operations in order to force the group to withdraw and disarm-something that ultimately did not happen. While the Houthis have declared they will continue targeting Israel in support of Gaza, the survival of the Iranian regime provides them with the political and military backing needed to consolidate their presence and advance their project in Yemen.

Dr. Eman Zahran, regional security researcher:

Despite the Houhi public support for the Iranian actions, they are expected to adopt a cautious approach at the political and operational levels. The Houthis will not be able to bear the cost of violating their deal with the United States, and risking the group's potential political gains if a political solution to the Yemeni issue is pursued.

Nonetheless, like the other Iranian proxies, the Houthis don't have a space to maneuver outside the directives of Tehran, which have clearly relied on the gradual escalation tactics while avoiding sliding toward an all-out war in the region amid the absence of clear rules of engagement. 

It can be said that the Houthi threat remains, but it is evolving based on the dynamics of the conflict scene. First, at the regional level, by assessing the agenda of the international forces, especially the United States, and the stakes of engaging in the region's interactions. Second, at the internal level, by responding to the shifting priorities of the decision-makers, and the group's organizational and elite formations.