There are several indications which push toward the hypothesis of the eclipse of the Islah Party. On one hand, they are related to the current regional context, on the other, they are linked to the nature of the group's own practices. 

Mohammad Fawzy (South24 Center)

The decision by Jordanian authorities, announced through Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya, to ban the Muslim Brotherhood marks a new chapter in what can be described as the "eclipse of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region”. This development comes in the wake of a series of setbacks and defeats the group has faced in several countries in the region over the past decade. This decline renews questions about the Muslim Brotherhood’s status in Yemen, where it is represented by the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (The Islah Party). This comes in the backdrop of its involvement in widespread violations in areas under its control, its adoption of violent tactics in recent years, and accusations of covert coordination with the Houthi armed group. These developments pave the way for broader discussions on the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen and their political positioning in the coming period, which are the topics this paper seeks to highlight.

Firstly, the Current Position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen

The roots of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen date back to the 1960s and 1970s when Abdulmajeed Al-Zindani, its de facto founder who was listed by the UN in 2004 as a terrorist—led a group of clerics to establish a fundamentalist religious education system in North Yemen. Following the unity between South and North Yemen in 1990, Al-Zindani co-founded the Islamic Islah Party with support from then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who relied on the party to mobilize support and legitimize the fighting during the 1994 war against the Southerners. The party has remained a key player in Yemen, alternating between opposition and alliance with the government. Since 2011, the most prominent trends and characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach to Yemen’s political landscape can be illustrated as below:

1. Rapid Turn against Ali Abdullah Saleh: Before the 2011 outbreak of protests in Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance was based on a pragmatic alliance with the Saleh regime. However, they quickly turned against him, abandoning their previous position and alliance. Mohammed Al-Yadoumi, Head of Islah’s Supreme Body, justified the move by saying: “We allied with Saleh for the benefit of the country. When we realized that he wasn’t serious in implementing what we had agreed upon, we had to join the opposition. We are people of principles, not seekers of power.”

2. The Muslim Brotherhood’s position After the Houthi Militia’s Coup:

Following the Houthi-led coup in 2014 and the Arab Coalition's intervention in Yemen to support the Internationally-Recognized Government, the Islah Party (Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood) declared its support for the Saudi-led ’Operation Decisive Storm‘. But in reality, they played no actual role in resisting the Houthi expansion. Reports later revealed ties between the Brotherhood and the Houthis. Instances include allegations by several Yemeni circles about the Muslim Brotherhood’s support for the Houthis during their advance in Hodeidah, as well as a meeting between Al-Islah leaders and Houthi Leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi in Saada in November 2014. The party’s ambivalent approach became apparent after the Houthis took control of Amran governorate in July 2014 as the Muslim Brotherhood announced that they won't fight on behalf of the ’Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi‘ government. Moreover, the party's cooperation with the Houthis came to light during the November 2014 meeting between the Islah leaders with Houthi Leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi in Saada. The Islah leaders participating in the meeting included the Head of Parliamentary Bloc Zaid Al-Shami and the party’s Spokesperson Saeed Shamsan. The two parties reached the ’Coexistence and Peaceful Reconciliation Agreement’. Houthi Political Council Member ’Ali Al-Qahoum‘ said that “the meeting aimed to close the page of the past, arriving at reconciliation, treating the ramifications of the conflict, and move forward with implementing the Peace and Partnership Agreement.” The rapprochement between the Islah and the Houthis has also been seen in other ways, including freezing the anti-Houthi fighting fronts in some key areas such as in Midi district, Sirwah, Al-Jawf, Nihm, and Taiz.

3. The Nature of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Influence in Yemen:  The Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen exerts patterns of influence at the political, geographical, and military  levels. Geographically, the Muslim Brotherhood controls Marib in east Yemen and parts of Taiz. Additionally, the Islah Party considers governorates such as Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout as vital fields over which it still aspires to regain control or enhance its presence within them like in the case in Wadi Hadramout. It engaged in several wars against the Southern forces between 2019-2022. At the community level, the Muslim Brotherhood largely controls the sharia and legislative aspect in the Yemeni institutions, including having a major influence in education. Militarily, Ali Abdullah Saleh enabled the Muslim Brotherhood decades ago to wield significant influence inside the military and security bodies affiliated with the Yemeni state. During the anti-Houthi war, the Islah Party formed armed popular resistance groups under its direct leadership in key battleground cities and supervised the establishment of military councils under its command. Politically, the Islah Party has relied on the strategy of “pragmatic evasion” which it translated into practical form by diversifying its internal alliances to serve the party’s interests and retain its influence. This is exemplified in its contradictory relationship -- both with the legitimacy camp in which it has representatives, as well as maintaining links with the Houthi militia and the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Secondly- Are we Witnessing the Eclipse of the Muslim Brotherhood? 

There are several indications pointing toward the hypothesis of the eclipse of the Islah Party. On one hand, it is related to the current regional context, and on the other to the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood’s own practices within Yemen. The prominent indications include the following points:

1. The Decline of Religious groups in the Middle East: Recent years have witnessed two very important changes regarding the spread of armed and religious groups as well as non-state armed actors in the Middle East. The first is linked to the defeat faced by political Islamism in the region. This is part of what can be described as “the eclipse of political Islamism in the region”, starting with the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt following the June 30 Revolution in 2013. It continued with the significant decline of Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement following President Kais Saeed's decisions on July 25, 2021 (of suspending parliament and dismissing the prime minister). Similarly, the political relevance of Morocco’s Justice and Development Party has declined. This is in addition to Muslim Brotherhood’s decline in Libya and in the Gulf states. Furthermore, countries like Turkey and Qatar have scaled back on their support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, the Jordanian authorities on April 23 banned the Muslim Brotherhood, declared it an illegal organization, dissolved the group, and forbade promotion of its ideology. 

The other change is related to the Israeli war on Gaza and ramifications at the regional level. The influence of factions affiliated with Iran in the region has declined. They have basically, along with other factors, caused crises and threats against the nation state in many cases, as well as threatened the regional security system. This is exemplified in how governments in Iraq and Syria have chosen to curb armed factions in their territories. This is apart from the weakness that has beset the Hezbollah politically and militarily because of the ongoing war with Israel, as well as Lebanese President Joseph Awn’s approach of deciding to establish the state's monopoly over weapons. In addition, the US is currently leading military operations against the Houthi militia in Yemen amid growing indications of the increasing possibility of launching ground military operation against the group. Accordingly, all these indications reflect the decline and eclipse of these non-state religious groups in favor of enhancing the concept of the national state in the region. This will have its impact in the creation of a local, regional, and international desire to similarly curb the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood in relation to this context. 

2. The Contradictory Pragmatic Alliances of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen: Since the 1970s, the group forged a close relationship with the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime, mainly based on Saleh’s use of the Muslim Brotherhood to tackle his rivals, especially from the leftist and national parties. In return, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood used their relationship with the Saleh regime to increase their internal penetration in the same regime and to strengthen their influence in most Yemeni areas, especially tribal. Following the changes in the Yemeni political arena, the Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from Saleh and entered the framework of the so-called ’Joint Meeting Parties‘ that later led the February 2011 Revolution which deposed Saleh from power. Later, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained contradictory practical relationships with the legitimacy camp (the Internationally-Recognized Government) and also the Houthis, as mentioned above. 

In addition, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood played along contradictory paths with regard to foreign alliances. Initially, the Islah Party had ties with Saudi Arabia, besides Qatar and Turkey, while also seeking to send reassuring messages to the UAE and build ties with it. This reflects the Islah Party's adoption of a pragmatic approach based on repositioning itself continually and adapting to all internal Yemeni changes, along with the external factors related to this file in a way that guarantees ensuring its survival and influence. This has enhanced the view of the group as being one that doesn't have a real national agenda and adopts a shifting approach to preserve its interests.

3. Growing Human Rights violations by the Islah Party in Yemen: One of the key factors and indications leading to the further internal marginalization of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood—as well as the regional and international rejection of the group in the Yemeni landscape and any potential settlement—is primarily due to the violations and crimes committed by the organization over the past years. For example, a report by the Human Rights Accountability Organization documented more than 60 violations against civilians in Marib Governorate between January 2019 and March 2024. These violations included targeting civilians through shelling, arrests, enforced disappearances, and torture. Besides, they are accused of targeting public and private property, through destruction, bombings, and looting. This effectively highlights the Muslim Brotherhood's participation, alongside the Houthis, in exacerbating the suffering of the Yemeni people, as well as worsening the severity of the humanitarian and living crisis. In addition to these human rights violations, the Muslim Brotherhood’s record in areas under their control includes abuses based on the organization’s strict religious beliefs.

Finally, it can be said that despite previous indications related to the hypothesis of the eclipse of Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood, in light of the current regional context and the group's internal practices in the Yemeni scene, this issue depends on some main determinants. The first is a Yemeni consensus about a comprehensive and strategic settlement of the political scene in the country after putting an end to the Houthi militia's rule and their control over several areas in North Yemen. Additionally, this depends on realization by some components of the Yemeni legitimacy of the danger linked to the Muslim Brotherhood's approach. The second one depends to what extent the international and regional parties agree on this matter, given the focus by all international approaches on curbing the Houthi threat, independent of the Muslim Brotherhood. The third one is to what extent other Yemeni components, especially the legitimacy camp, are able to create civil entities which rely on “soft influence” to end the Muslim Brotherhood's tribal and religious influence.