According to a number of indications, if a possible military operation is launched, it will likely be a sudden and unexpected one.

---

Farida Ahmed (South24 Center)

---

The pace of conflict in the Middle East has increased on several fronts after the escalation of the Israeli invasion on Gaza and Iran’s involvement in the confrontation line, directly and indirectly through its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The Houthis, who control many areas in North Yemen, have led the military scene since November 2023 by launching attacks on commercial and military vessels, south of the Red Sea. The ongoing Houthi attacks have constituted a security threat against international navigation. Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, the Leader of the religious group, confirmed that the Houthis have targeted more than 196 ships so far. The Red Sea attacks have hindered the path of negotiations conducted last year with Saudi and Omani sponsorship to reach a ceasefire in Yemen.

On the other hand, the US presidential election has attracted the attention of the Middle East’s leaders, including Israel. They wondered how the US foreign policy will change the current events in the region depending on the winner. Some files in the region have been delayed, including the ceasefire negotiations in Lebanon and Gaza, until being aware of who will rule the White House. However, with Donald Trump winning a second Presidential term, he will likely resume his usual policies in the Middle East, foremost of which is supporting Israel. He has described himself as “the best friend to Israel” and that he will “make it great again”. Trump will likely adopt a sharper approach toward Iran by reimposing strict sanctions, exerting economic pressure, and undermining the role of its proxies in the region after his official inauguration on January 20, 2025.

Over the last months, the interest of the US Democratic administration in the Yemeni file has become bigger than before through amplifying the Houthi threats.

This was made clear in statements by the US Special Envoy to Yemen Timothy Lenderking who told the ‘Wall Street Journal’: “The Houthis have doubled down on their contacts with other malign actors in the region and beyond”, terming the trend “very alarming”. This was a reference to the Houthi cooperation with the Somali terror group ’Al-Shabaab‘ and Russia. He added: “The US is talking with regional partners about how to respond.” A report by ‘The Washington Post’ said that Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, face American pressure to condemn the Houthis and stop their maritime attacks. 

The expansion of the Houthi military operation against ships in the Red Sea and their cooperation with terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, amid the lack of deterrent regional and international response, provides the religious group with larger spaces to continue attacking global navigation. The US-UK led maritime initiative, ’Operation Prosperity Guardian’, has so far failed to secure the route of ships. 

Accordingly, the Houthi moves in Yemen over the latest weeks have revealed their apprehensions over the launching of a likely ground military operation against them. As a result, they have moved thousands of fighters and hundreds of military equipment from the governorates of Sanaa and Saadah to Hodeidah where they hold control. This is in addition to organizing a maritime maneuver along the coast of Hodeidah governorate. This clearly suggests that preparations are being made for a widespread military operation against the government forces around the coastal governorate that overlooks the Red Sea. This is consistent with the confirmation by the Yemeni Defense Minister, Mohsen Al-Daeri, about the readiness of the Yemeni army to move and free Sanaa. In this regard, Rashad Al-Alimi, the President of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), has repeatedly called on the international community to support the government forces by participating in thwarting the Houthi attacks against maritime navigation. This echoes a similar call by PLC Vice President Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, who also serves as President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). He has stressed the importance of this support by way of providing weapons, training, and exchanging intelligence information with the government forces. 

Is Hodeidah the Arena of the Coming Battle? 

The Israeli attack against the Port of Hodeidah on July 20, 2024 has impacted oil exports, especially after the air strike destroyed at least 33 oil storage facilities, according to sources from the Netherlands organization  ’PAX for Protection of Civilians‘. The Iran-backed Houthis control the governorate of Hodeidah except for Al-Khawkhah and Al-Tuhayta districts. 

In June 2018, the Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with the Yemeni government forces, launched the biggest attack on Hodeidah to regain control on the governorate from the Houthi hands. However, this was stopped by American and British pressure for a ceasefire. They obliged the two parties to redeploy their forces away from the coastal city under the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018. However, the Houthis haven't fulfilled their terms under the agreement and have even developed their military capabilities. They have also spread their forces around the city in a blatant violation of everything that was agreed upon. 

The Israeli air raid on Hodeidah targeting oil facilities constituted a double blow against the Houthis. It targeted the Iran-backed militia’s main economic artery, undermining their ability to fund their military operations. The Israeli attack also weakened the Houthi’s ability to move their ground military equipment from other governorates as their fuel supplies were hit. It is true that the remaining oil tanks number three in Hodeidah and three in the Port of Ras Issa on the western coast, and ships reach the port for unloading. However, if a military battle takes place, the entry of vessels to the Port of Hodeidah won’t be possible from day one. The Houthis won’t be able to find any economic resources, including fuel, from the seaports under their control. Accordingly, the intense fuel shortage will destabilize the Houthis’ internally and weaken the cohesion in their ranks.

As for the forces affiliated with the Internationally-Recognized Government, a ground battle toward Hodeidah will be easier than others as the road is coastal and paved. However, they may face other obstacles such as mines. UN reports previously stressed that Hodeidah governorate is teeming with mines and explosives and that hundreds of civilians were harmed as a result of it over the past years, including many women and children. It is worth mentioning that the battle for Sanaa is considered more difficult and costly at the material and casualty levels from the perspective of some of the international parties. This is because the fighting will be inside Sanaa if the government forces reach it. The battle may turn into a street war which will hurt many civilians who will be intentionally used as human shields by the Houthis. However, a battle for Hodeidah will be more possible if the government forces surround the city in an arc and encircle it from south to north while controlling the port without subjecting the city and its people to danger. This plan was ready to be carried out in 2018. It is unknown whether the same plan will be implemented or will be changed. This is especially related to the fact that the Houthi militia have become aware of the military tactics of the plan.

It is important to state that the international stance in the case of securing the Red Sea and the ongoing Houthi presence in Hodeidah has changed unlike 2018. It seems that the US in particular has become ready to resort to any option in order to end the Houthi threat in the Red Sea. However, the British position is still unclear or is a hesitant one. London is the one that insisted on hindering the military operation in Hodeidah in 2018. This is in contrast to its current involvement along with the US in launching airstrikes against Houthi targets since January 2024.

It isn’t clear so far whether Britain will ultimately accept launching of a ground military operation in Hodeidah under US pressure. Recapturing Hodeidah would be a strong reason in helping to limit the Houthi influence on maritime ports in light of their escalatory threats in the Red Sea.

However, carrying out such a military operation stirs important questions. Will the operation include several internal fronts or be limited to Hodeidah? Will all forces in the anti-Houthi camp, including the Southern forces, participate in the battle or only select ones? To what extent will these moves have implications regarding the future of the UN-led peace process in Yemen?

Other Indications Toward Escalation

There are clear indications that enhance the possibility of launching anti-Houthi military operations. Over the past week, meetings were held in Riyadh with a number of Saudi military officials. PLC Vice President and the Commander of the Southern Giants Brigades Abdulrahman Abu Zaraa Al-Muhrrammi met with the Arab Coalition Commander, Lieutenant General Fahd Al Salman at the Joint Forces Command Headquarters in Riyadh on October 29. The meeting came a day after a similar one was held between the Commander of the National Resistance Forces Brigadier General Tareq Saleh with the same Saudi official. This is considered an indication about a possible military battle toward Hodeidah, especially as the Southern Giants Brigades have led the battles on the western coast front since 2016.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has recently added six sophisticated air defense systems to its armed forces. These include the THAAD which is especially designed to intercept and neutralize ballistic missiles at high altitudes. It is the same system that the US announced it will send to Israel to sustain its air defense capabilities to thwart any Iranian attack. This development reflects an urgent Saudi desire to enhance its air defense potential against any possible Houthi threats in light of the latter’s repeated warnings of targeting Saudi ports and airports. Acquiring better air defenses will make Riyadh safer in case military operations are launched against the religious group.

However, over the past two years, Saudi Arabia has sought to exit from the Yemeni quagmire by providing big concessions to the Houthis and holding talks with the group in Sanaa and Riyadh. This is in addition to the Chinese-brokered Memorandum of Understanding signed in March 2023 between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Riyadh instead has been more preoccupied by its strategic project ’Vision 2030‘. Meanwhile, the media war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has become sharper recently. For example, Houthi leaders celebrated the November 8 armed attack by a Yemeni soldier that targeted Saudi soldiers in the headquarters of the 1st Military District in the city of Seiyun in Hadramout, killing two Saudi soldiers. 

However, in principle, there have so far been no official statements announced by the parties of the conflict in Yemen about the beginning of military operations. Nevertheless, according to the aforementioned indications, if a possible military operation is launched, it will likely be a sudden and unexpected one. It will be within the frame of regional and international coordination with the local forces affiliated to the parties within the Internationally-Recognized Government. The information available so far suggests that military preparations by the two sides have been on full swing for weeks. This follows a period during which the fighting fronts remained dormant since the beginning of the truce in April 2022.

On the other hand, the declaration earlier this month about the formation of the so-called ’National Bloc of Political Parties and Components‘ is remarkable. The new entity includes 22 political parties and groups whose rotating president is Ahmed Bin Dagher. The foundation of the bloc has been supported by the USAID and the National Democratic Institute. The US administration was racing against time to sponsor and announce the establishment of this bloc in a short time in the hope that the Democratic party would win the US Presidential election. Trump’s win doesn’t mean that the US approach toward the Yemeni issue is changing. One of the goals of the US-sponsored bloc is the term “restoring the state” to confront the Houthi coup. This means that Washington has become ready to address what it used to avoid -- “the coup and confrontation” discourse in exchange for restructuring political representation.

This approach, which disturbs many Southerners especially the STC which has categorically refused to participate in the new bloc, may lead to more political tension. STC leaders have warned against attempts at “deviating the compass of the war toward Aden and South Yemen or crossing the red lines of the South people and their national project”. They have concerns regarding the nascent bloc’s use of terms such as “the federal state” without taking into consideration any of the developments that took place on the ground over the past years.

It is important to state that the US’ move aimed at restructuring the political representation by putting the parties in the forefront again will weaken the role of the territorial entities which have emerged in a more effective manner after the war, such as the STC that leads the representation of the South and its cause. While considering some political partisan arrangements, the failure of these parties over more than a decade of conflict should be clearly examined. Some of them have played a negative role leading to the expansion of the Houthi’s role, especially the Islamic Islah Party that was managing the Yemeni presidency during the era of former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and today it leads the parties of the new bloc.

The US’ plan may be useful in weakening the Houthis on different military and political aspects. However, it should include assurances to the Southerners regarding their political situation and the future of their issue. The bet on eliminating the Houthis may create strategic gains for everyone ultimately. Nonetheless, this shouldn’t come at the expense of limiting the Southerners politically and militarily or opening other fronts toward the South, even if they are temporary.

In any case, the previous indications apparently aim at intensifying pressure against the Houthis, especially on the military level. It isn’t unlikely that the Saudi-led Arab Coalition will support these moves with international green light this time in light of the Houthis’ escalation of threats in the Red Sea. However, the anticipation is the dominant sentiment so far amid the flaming regional conditions. The Trump administration may have many surprises in store regarding the Yemeni file, especially in view that it had adopted a stricter stance toward them from the very beginning unlike the Biden administration that began to re-examine its miscalculations too late.