In a context in which Hamas and Hezbollah are on their knees, the Houthis may carve out a greater role for themselves in the Axis of Resistance.

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Dr. Marta Furlan (South24)

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Since the Israel-Hamas war broke out last October, Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged near-daily fire across the Israel-Lebanon border, forcing tens of thousands of people on both sides to leave their homes. While the initial, widely held assumption was that neither side would be interested in a full-out escalation of the conflict and that a contained exchange of fire was best serving all parties, things dramatically changed two weeks ago, as Israel announced that its new goal in the war is to return tens of thousands of displaced Israelis to their homes in the north. 

On September 17 and 18, thousands of pagers of Hezbollah high-ranking members exploded when a coded message was sent to them, simultaneously activating explosives that had previously been inserted within the devices. While a full investigation into the matter has not been conducted yet, it seems that Israel’s Mossad managed to infiltrate the supply chain and to implant the explosives in the pagers destined to Hezbollah. The pagers’ manufacturer, the Taiwan-based Gold Apollo, denied being involved in the issue. On the following day, a second wave of attacks targeted the walkie-talkies of several Hezbollah’s members. The detonations, which left more than 40 people dead and thousands injured, were a powerful indication of the extent to which Israel’s intelligence had enhanced its capacity to harm Hezbollah.

However, the explosion of Hezbollah’s communication devices was to be just the first in a series of dramatic developments. Through a series of targeted strikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, Israel killed several Hezbollah top commanders, including Ibrahim Akil, Hezbollah’s military commander who was wanted for involvement in a deadly attack on the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983, and Ibrahim Kobeissi, the head of Hezbollah’s missile division. The Israeli Air Force also conducted strikes against approximately 400 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, including rocket launchers and additional military infrastructure in southern Lebanon.

On the night of September 27, following the speech delivered by the Israeli PM at the UN General Assembly, a new, unprecedented round of Israeli strikes targeted the neighborhood of Dahiya. The strikes, conducted against a building known to serve as the headquarters of Hezbollah. Several hours later, the Israeli military announced that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed in the strike – an announcement later confirmed by Hezbollah itself. 

Hezbollah’s response has so far been limited to launching some rockets against northern Israel, which clearly confirmed the extent to which the group has deeply suffered the latest Israeli offensive on leaders and arsenal. In other words, while Hezbollah still has drone and missile capabilities and an estimated 40,000-50,000 fighters, it is still recovering from the shock of the past two weeks – and it will take some time to re-organize and re-strategize.

The implications for Iran and its regional strategy

A day after Nasrallah was killed, Iran’s supreme leader said that the death of Hezbollah’s leader “will not go unavenged” and even announced five days of mourning in Iran in response to the “martyrdom of the great Nasrallah”.

Hezbollah has historically been Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East. Since the early 1980s, the Islamic Republic has relied on Hezbollah to pressure Israel and deter strikes on Iranian soil. Hezbollah’s position at the northern border with Israel represented a unique advantage in the hands of the Iranian regime. Over time, the approach of arming non-state groups to be used as useful proxies was replicated in other geographies – Syria, Iraq, Yemen— and more groups joined Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

Yet now, Israel’s ability to inflict such severe blow upon Hezbollah in just a few weeks is questioning the sustainability and even the utility of Iran’s “forward defense” doctrine. To be added to that, is the exhaustion that Hamas is facing after one year of war with Israel, which has weakened the capabilities of another Iranian ally sitting on Israel’s border.

Following the killing of Nasrallah, on October 1, Iran launched a barrage of missiles against Israel. Most of the missiles launched were nonetheless intercepted and brought down by Israel with the support of the United States – similarly to what had happened on another such occurrence last April. However, despite the symbolic significance of such attack, its impact on Israel was minimal at best. Also, Iran is not interested in pursuing a direct confrontation with Israel and dragging the Islamic Republic into a regional war that would have an immense cost in terms of lives and resources. 

For Iran, these mostly symbolic responses - coupled with the deterrence coming from a powerful proxy - remain the best strategy.  Given these new circumstances and the uncertainties that surround upcoming developments in Lebanon, it seems realistic to expect that Iran will rely more on the Yemeni Houthis, trying to use them to fill some of the gaps left by Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ setbacks. 

The Houthis’ role in the new Middle East dynamics

Since the start of the Hamas-Israeli war, the Houthis have been asserting themselves on the regional scene as one of the most influential actors. They have launched more than 220 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel and have attacked commercial ships transiting through the Red Sea, claiming that their attacks are in support of the Palestinian people. On September 28, following the killing of Nasrallah and amidst the shock and confusion that prevailed among Hezbollah’s members, the Houthis launched rockets on Tel Aviv, which led Israel to respond by striking the Yemeni port of Hodeidah (for the second time this year). On October 2, a Houthi long-range drone was launched against Israel.

Through those attacks, the Houthis have been trying to enhance their credibility as a power regional actor, consolidate domestic support, gain sympathy among the wider Arab street by living up to their “scream” (al-shi’ar) of “death to Israel”, and strengthen their agency and relevance within the Axis of Resistance - with all the advantages that this implies in terms of material support coming from Iran.

While the relationship between Iran and the Houthis dates back to 2009, it was in 2015 that Iran started to look at Yemen with great(er) interest. In fact, as the Houthis conquered Sana’a in September 2014 and the Saudis were getting increasingly worried about developments in Yemen to the point of intervening militarily in March 2015, Iran came to see support for the Houthis as a useful strategy to indirectly threaten Saudi Arabia as well as to expand Iranian influence into the Red Sea – a maritime area of immense strategic significance.

As part of its support, Iran has been transferring to the Houthis weapons and weapons parts, and has been providing them with military training, mostly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Hezbollah. The Houthi-Hezbollah ties, in particular, became prominent over the years, as the two movements increasingly cooperated in weapons smuggling and Hezbollah-linked advisors contributed to the Houthis’ military prowess. 

The support from Iran also allowed the Houthis to acquire the know-how necessary to build their own weapons factories and manufacture weapons inside Yemen. Thanks to Iran’s support, the Houthis have significantly enhanced their military arsenal and bolstered their fighting capabilities, as was most evident in the recent missiles and drone attacks against Israel.

As noted above, in a context in which Hamas and Hezbollah are on their knees, the Houthis may carve out a greater role for themselves in the Axis of Resistance. While the Houthis do not present the advantage of geographic vicinity offered by Hezbollah and Hamas, their membership in the Axis of Resistance, their ownership of a significant arsenal, and their continued commitment to take a more prominent role in regional dynamics may place them as the best card in Iran’s hands at the moment.