"Therefore, the suspension of US direct intervention doesn't necessarily mean an end to the conflict or reaching a sustainable peace agreement in Yemen."

Farida Ahmed (South24 Center)

In a sudden development, US President Donald Trump on May 6 announced a halt to the American military operations targeting the Houthi-held areas in Yemen. This decision came after a period of escalation that saw the US resuming its raids since March 15 as part of a campaign to undermine the Houthis’ ability to threaten international navigation in the Red Sea. The US escalation was in response to the Houthi announcement about resuming their attacks on Israeli vessels and also after the group attacked US aircraft in the Red Sea.    

Parallel to that, the Omani Foreign Ministry announced that the US and the so-called “relevant authorities in Sanaa” have reached a ceasefire agreement which includes halting the attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab Al-Mandab. It's worth mentioning that Steve Witkoff, the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, led the Iran talks and also mediated a ceasefire with the Houthis during the week, that preceded the US’ announcement of suspension of its airstrikes. On the other hand, the Houthis’ eagerness for de-escalation is highlighted by the fact that the mediation efforts were ongoing even before the group targeted Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport on April 4. This indicates the Houthi’s prior intention for defusing the conflict with the US. Which is why, Trump emphasized that the Houthis “have capitulated”.  

It is noteworthy that since April 28, the Houthis had halted their attacks on US warships, which indicates the significant impact the US strikes had on the Houthi’s military capabilities. Such an assessment is strengthened by statements by the Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government that the Houthis lost more than 30% of their military capabilities by April. Other estimates suggest that the losses may have increased to 60% so far. As for the vital economic and strategic infrastructure in the Houthi-held areas, initial assessments put the total losses suffered in recent weeks at between $1.5 billion and $2 billion. This doesn't mean that the United States hasn't suffered operational and combat losses in recent weeks, which are said to exceed $1 billion. However, any kind of comparisons here would be akin to madness, adhered to by the Houthis.  

Meanwhile, the Houthis admitted to having reached an agreement with the United States, a country they describe as “the enemy”. Nonetheless, they stressed that the agreement is “exclusively limited to operations against American targets in the Red Sea and doesn’t in any way include operations targeting Israel”. For its part, the US State Department confirmed the same, adding that the deal is limited to the cessation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. This has apparently infuriated the Israelis who said the announcement was a “shock” to Tel Aviv.   

Although the deal with the Houthis came as part of the successful military pressure and was not a voluntary response or a goodwill gesture by the Houthis, the US announcement took Israel by surprise. It came just hours after the US military provided a protective security umbrella for the destructive attacks launched by Israeli fighter jets against civilian facilities controlled by the Houthis in Sanaa. Israel apparently has concerns that the deal may allow the Houthis to re-arm themselves which will once again destabilize the region. Moreover, the link between the Houthi deal and the Iranian nuclear file gives rise to concerns that any future agreement with Iran may be dealt with in the same way, by prioritizing US interests at the expense of Israeli security concerns.    

Regionally, the Arab response reflected a cautious welcome for the Oman-led diplomatic efforts which led to the ceasefire agreement between the US and Houthis. They view the deal as a positive move to enhance regional stability. In a similar stance, Iran has praised the Omani position. On the other hand, the Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government said that the Houthi “surrender hasn't been a voluntary choice but came under the pressure of pain and exhaustion after the targeting of their command and control centers, weapons stores, and ballistic missile and drone assembly facilities”.    

A Prelude to Peace Agreements or Heading toward Escalation?    

Steve Witkoff's statement regarding the Trump administration's efforts to expand the scope of the Abraham Accords is a clear indication of Washington's policy of seeking normalization between Israel and Arab states as a strategic priority in the region. The Trump administration is striving to achieve more progress on these agreements to notch up further success in its foreign policyhttps://south24.org/news/baioe.php?nid=1768. Trump wants to leave behind a legacy of himself as a “peacemaker” at any cost. He hinted about an upcoming “very big announcement” prior to his expected visits to the Middle East. However, it is unknown whether this announcement is related to expanding the peace agreements with Israel, making progress in the negotiations with Iran or the Israeli war on Gaza.  

Nonetheless, Washington’s endeavors to expand the umbrella of the Abraham Accords have to contend with complicated regional and political circumstances. The lack of a clear vision for solving the Palestinian issue still constitutes a major obstacle to any attempts to normalize relations between Israel and some Arab states. Furthermore, the delicate regional balance, foremost of which are the calculations related to Saudi national security, will be a decisive factor in assessing the feasibility and future of any new normalization initiatives, given that Riyadh has engaged in prior rapprochement with Iran (March 2023) and later in de-escalation talks with the Houthis (September 2023). Riyadh's reluctance to participate in the ’Prosperity Guardian‘ coalition as well as its refusal to join the US air campaign against the Houthis can be explained in two contrasting contexts. The first reflects a Saudi dissatisfaction or “stubbornness” toward the remarkable fluctuation in the US’ stance toward its regional allies, especially since the kingdom was left alone to fend for itself for a long time in its confrontation with the Houthis. The second is probably related to diversification of Saudi Arabia’s strategic choices and its keenness to join the emerging regional and international axis that includes Iran, China and Russia, given the fact that Beijing is the world's largest importer of Saudi oil.  

It is important to state that Trump's expected visits to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar will not lead to a tangible transformation unless it is associated with altering the US’ unconditional support for Israel. This may open up a more realistic political path which guarantees the interests of all regional parties.    

However, the most pressing question in light of the complicated Yemeni scene is regarding the position and the role of the Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government which finds itself outside the framework of any negotiations related to Yemen even as the Houthis negotiate directly with international and regional parties. This reveals that the Yemeni authorities may have missed a historic opportunity by not engaging in a large-scale ground offensive against the Houthis. Such a move would have changed the balance on the ground in light of the decline of the Houthi’s military capabilities. On the other hand, another scenario can explain the Yemeni government's apparent silence. It may be part of a tactical strategy agreed upon with regional allies, especially Saudi Arabia and UAE, with an aim to drain the Houthi’s military and strategic capabilities in the areas under the group’s control through continuous airstrikes, paving the way for a subsequent ground offensive to achieve decisive goals that would end the Houthi control. This is in view of the fact that all Houthi oil facilities were targeted and Sanaa International Airport has been completely destroyed. Under such a scenario, the Houthis would be unable to move their military vehicles and equipment to advance in a ground battle, and their activities would be limited to defensive operations only.  

Finally, though the US has suspended its direct military operations against the Houthis, another possible scenario emerges - about Washington’s likely intention to shift this role to Israel which isn't committed to any current deals. In light of the continuation of the Houthi threat to target it, Israel may find this as a pretext to escalate its operations against the group.    

Parallel to this possibility, a third scenario may see the signing of a peace deal by the Yemeni parties with international sponsorship. Such a deal could serve as an official exit to the regional powers involved in the conflict, allowing them to publicly withdraw from the Yemeni war while maintaining their influence by indirectly supporting the Yemeni parties allied with them. This ambiguous role which combines public mediation and covert support is currently exemplified by Oman. While it publicly assumes the mediator’s role, frequent reports point to its involvement in providing logistic support to the Houthis, including facilitating the flow of weapons to them.    

Therefore, the suspension of US direct intervention doesn't necessarily mean an end to the conflict or reaching a sustainable peace agreement in Yemen. The nature of external interventions may witness a shift -- varying between direct military operations, indirect support, and hidden strategic moves. They may prolong the crisis and hinder the achievement of real stability in the country especially if the Houthis continue to adopt extremist hostile positions toward the Yemeni and regional parties.