Implications of U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia and Its Impact on Yemen’s Conflict

As Houthis remain undeterred nine months into the US-led multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian, President Biden announced lifting of the 2021 ban on sale of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) highlighted the shift in policy reflected “Saudi Arabia’s central role for Biden Middle East policy.” 

This shift in policy, just two months until the upcoming US presidential election, coincides with growing tensions across the region as Iran is expected to strike Israel in retaliation for killing Ismail Haniyeh. Initial reports following the announcement on 13 August said "the Biden [administration] will send Saudi Arabia shipments of bombs worth more than $750 million in the coming months, removing a major irritant between Washington and Riyadh...The deliveries will include 3,000 Small Diameter Bombs [SDBs] and 7,500 Paveway IV bombs." The type of weapons reported also provide sufficient information as to the intent of the shift in policy. SDBs are guided munitions used “to target stationary or moving targets,” such as bunkers, communications facilities and air defenses. Essentially, providing capabilities against targets engaged by Naval and Air Forces under Operation Prosperity Guardian. 

From one perspective, the shift in policy by the Biden administration could be seen as admitting failure of Operation Prosperity Guardian and limits in deterring Houthis. By providing offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia, the US would bolster the Kingdom’s capabilities in order to sustain the status quo with Houthis, protect the two-year old détente and prevent potential escalation. The deal is not exactly a Green Light from the US administration for Saudi Arabia to resume strikes within Yemen, this is the opposite of what Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has signaled through his reluctance to strike at Houthis since the end of the ceasefire reached in March 2022. Saudi Arabia. The shift in policy by the US could simply be seen as a move to placate the Kingdom during negotiations for a wider US-KSA security agreement. 

In a rational war environment, such shift in policy concerning offensive weapons would potentially encourage parties to reach a more comprehensive peace agreement beyond détente. The fact remains that Houthis are undeterred by presence of overwhelming force, and as the Israeli strike on Hodeidah fuel depot illustrated, acts of aggressions turn into propaganda wins for Houthis and bolster their profile among their base inside Yemen, within Iran’s Axis of Resistance and among Progressives in the West. 

Observers who claim there is no military solution to Houthi aggression fail to recognize the absence of a diplomatic, non-military solution to Houthi aggression. Since December 2018, Houthis have managed to expand control over physical territory inside Yemen by nearly twenty-five percent. Houthis expanded control over the whole of Sa’dah province, western al-Jawf, al-Baydha and expanded presence within 20km from the west and south of Mareb City. Furthermore, Houthis have also gained capabilities beyond those of 2017 when they first targeted Riyadh international airport.  

While the announcement of lifting sales restrictions captured public attention, it is important to note the delivery of nearly $750 million in weapons is spread along the remaining of 2024. The suspension in 2021 focused on concerns over “Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Yemen and efforts to improve civilian harm mitigation measures.” This policy from the Biden administration did not directly lead to end of hostilities by Saudi Arabia, but rather negotiations with Houthis in March 2022 to reach a ceasefire as the Political Leadership Council (PLC) was established. The administration went out of its way to focus on US-Saudi security cooperation by saying “Saudi Arabia has remained a close strategic partner of the United States, and we look forward to enhancing that partnership.”

Considering the unpredictability under growing tensions around the Arabian Peninsula, Dr. Theodore Karasik, the Fellow on Russian and Middle Eastern Affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, said “the sale is going through because of Saudi security requirements moving forward. KSA still needs American weapons support for potential coming scenarios. Holding up the aid only hurts trying to bring some kind of resolution because Riyadh is one of the 800lb gorillas.” 

While some observers like Nabeel Khoury, Former US Deputy Chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Sanaa, believe “the Biden administration contradicts itself by saying it wants peace while encouraging inaction [on] Israel’s genocidal war and stoking a return to violence in Yemen,” there is no overt intent by the US to grant Saudi Arabia a green light to initiate hostilities against Houthis, nor does the Kingdom hint at shifting from its reluctance to re-engage cross border strikes amid tensions with Iran and pressure to normalize relations with Israel. Karasik noted the “normalization issues are maybe [left for] next year because in the current environment it's just not politically feasible.” While Khouri expressed concern over UN “...delisting the Saleh family as suspiciously motivated,” under the current environment. 

From another perspective, the shift in relations between the US and Saudi Arabia unfortunately comes with no benefit to Yemeni actors engaged with Houthis on the ground. The lifting of restrictions on Saudi Arabia has no impact, and will not reach Houthi rivals on the ground, as the Kingdom remains reluctant to provide adequate air support to southern troops or elements of the Internationally Recognize Government of Yemen (IRG).  

Officials within the IRG warned the US in December 2023, that engaging the Houthis without supporting its military within Yemen would yield another military failure. Officials of the IRG and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) asked the US for support against Houthis, but the Biden administration remains reluctant to move beyond a defensive posture and become yet another party to the conflict, especially this close to a presidential election. Therefore, it is true that under the current approach there will be no military victory against Houthis, only prolonging the suffering of 28 million civilians as the economic and humanitarian crises deepen across Yemen. 

While Houthis have essentially halted strikes against commercial vessels across Bab al-Mandab since 20 July, more random opportunistic strikes than sustained tactics, tensions grow amid allegations of cross border shelling by Saudi forces in Sa’dah. Houthis have also shot down a number of US surveillance drones over recent months. Saudi Arabia continues to hold the line against re-escalation in Yemen, but face mounting challenges as US pressures the Kingdom to engage normalization amid the war in Gaza, while Iran uses Houthis and Iraqi Shia militias as a potential stick if Saudi Arabia abandons Palestinians. 

Houthis lack a strategy for a post-conflict environment, they are unwilling and unprepared to move towards governance beyond armed conflict. The Sana’a-based rebels continue to engage threats of escalation as a primary tactic in negotiations with Saudi Arabia and the UN. The fact Houthis have held UN and NGO staff for over two months, and failed to reach an agreement on release of prisoners, shows there is no interest in peace. Saudi Arabia and regional partners simply aim to prepare for potential break in the détente with Houthis, particularly as the war in Gaza expands, and realize the US will be unwilling to join direct hostilities before the presidential election in November. A potential Trump victory could also raise further unpredictability even for staunch pro-Trump actors in the region.