With the ongoing tendency to defer crises and oversimplify the Presidential Leadership Council’s (PLC) predicament by reducing it to mere disputes over political quotas or government appointments, it remains unclear to what extent the council will remain resilient against fragmentation or collapse.

Abdullah Al-Shadli (South24 Center)

More than three years after the formation of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in April 2022, the discourse today has shifted from assessing its accomplishments to questioning its effectiveness as a unified transitional authority. Formed by decree by former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and supported regionally as a consensual framework to manage the transitional phase, the PLC currently confronts one of its most profound structural crises.

At the heart of this crisis lies the absence of institutional mechanisms for collective decision-making, the unilateral exercise of authority by a few, and the escalating internal disputes. These tensions prompted the Southern Transitional Council (STC) to initiate unprecedented reform measures in September, which in turn triggered regional mediation efforts aimed at containing the fragmentation of the PLC. 

Yet, the disputes raise existential questions: Can the PLC preserve its cohesion, or will the lack of consensus lead to paralysis and its eventual disintegration?

Recent Developments

On September 10, 2025, Aidrous Al-Zubaidi—PLC member and President of the STC—shocked the political scene by announcing a series of appointments involving 14 southern figures in government and local positions. 

This unprecedented move was not merely an administrative measure but rather carried a clear political message following the unilateral decision-making by Presidential Leadership Council President Rashad Al-Alimi— in complete disregard of the principle of partnership and the consensus mechanism outlined in the power transfer declaration from President Hadi to the Council.

President Al-Zubaidi’s decisions were accompanied by a coordinated political and media campaign led by the STC, implicitly accusing northern PLC members of obstructing the partnership and hinting at escalatory measures, including the potential declaration of a state of emergency. The STC also mobilized its supporters to demonstrate on symbolic occasions, adding a popular dimension to its push for recognition of the South’s political weight - in response to what it considers as its noticeable marginalization within the presidency.

This escalation prompted urgent regional efforts to prevent the crisis from spiraling into open confrontation. On September 18, the PLC convened in Riyadh, reaffirming the principles of collective leadership and partnership. The council approved the formation of a legal team tasked with reviewing all decisions issued since 2022, including Al-Zubaidi’s recent appointments—within a 90-day timeframe, with the option to consult the military and security committee.

However, tensions persisted. In interviews from New York on September 24, Al-Zubaidi intensified his rhetoric, accusing the PLC of failing to reach consensus and suggesting a shift toward elections to establish a strong and effective government.

Diagnosing the Structural Crisis

From its inception, the PLC has been riven by internal contradictions. To date, it lacks an executive bylaw that clearly defines its powers—a deficiency highlighted by Nasser Al-Khubaji, Head of the Negotiations Affairs Unit in the STC, during the “Yemen International Forum” in Amman on February 16. He warned that the council “still lacks an executive bylaw that defines its functions among the various authorities.”

Al-Khubaji went further, asserting that the PLC lacks a coherent strategy for engaging with the Houthis—politically, militarily, or economically—and directly accused President Rashad Al-Alimi of monopolizing decision-making and sidelining other council members.

In his September 24 interview with Sky News Arabia, Al-Zubaidi pointed out that there is “a failure within the PLC to achieve consensus”, citing the absence of a participatory decision-making mechanism and accused certain factions of “unilaterally issuing thousands of decisions without consensus”, which, he argued, undermines the government’s effectiveness. He reiterated his call for elections to form a capable government to manage the transitional phase.

Earlier, on September 17, STC Vice President and PLC member Abdulrahman Al-Mahrami stated that “unilateral decisions made over the past years were a major cause of division within the PLC”, warning that continued unilateralism “hinders the transitional process and erodes trust among members.”

In a concurrent statement, Major General Faraj Al-Bahsani—also STC Vice President and PLC member—called for the urgent adoption of a working bylaw to regulate the council’s operations, arguing that its absence exacerbates crises and “opens the door to corruption.”

Criticism was not limited to southern factions. The Political Bureau of the National Resistance, led by PLC member Tariq Saleh, reiterated on September 17 its earlier position from June 23, rejecting “unilateral practices” within the PLC. At that time, Rashad Al-Alimi met with the Political Bureau in an attempt to contain the fallout.

Implications of the Crisis

Southern political analyst Nasser Al-Eisai described the situation as “a natural outcome of the absence of a clear and effective decision-making mechanism within the council,” adding that it reveals “the weakness of the PLC’s institutional and consensual structure since its inception.”

Speaking to South24, Al-Eisai emphasized that the PLC, despite being a transitional authority, lacks a defined endpoint and measurable outcomes, and that the current fragmentation severely impedes the realization of its goals.

Abdulaziz Al-Aqab, President of the ’Fekr Organization for Dialogue and Human Rights Defense‘, attributed the crisis to “the absence of governing bylaws that are supposed to help build genuine partnership among council members.” He told South24: “This deliberate absence of mechanisms that help in organizing and guaranteeing genuine partnership leads to the recurrence of such issues constantly. The problem is not new but deeply rooted since the council’s formation.”

Journalist Naseem Al-Baithi noted that the PLC’s performance has been “inconsistent and shaped by structural, regional, and internal challenges.” He told South24: “Politically, the council has partially succeeded in maintaining the appearance of unified legitimacy, but divergent visions among its components have weakened its effectiveness.”

On the military front, Al-Baithi observed that “no meaningful unification of forces has occurred under the Ministries of Defense and Interior, which has weakened the collective front against the Houthi militia.” Economically, despite some reforms supported by regional powers, “the economic crisis continues to burden citizens, and there is a clear failure to mobilize local resources.”

Where to?

In a joint seminar organized by South24 and the Sana’a Center in early February 2025, Yemeni and international experts stressed that reforming the PLC requires addressing its structural deficiencies before considering any changes in personnel. Several technical proposals were put forth, including reducing the number of council members to streamline decision-making, rewriting the bylaws and institutional framework to clearly define each member’s powers, and to eliminate overlapping roles.

Speakers also emphasized the need for a shared reference framework to guide dialogue and facilitate implementation of reforms. 

The seminar focused on the dilemma of quota-based governance, and advocated for formation of a technocratic government led by a consensus prime minister who appoints ministers based on expertise rather than political affiliations.

Participants called for empowering local communities and councils in public administration to reduce centralization—a model that has repeatedly failed in Yemen. They stressed that any successful reform must account for the different priorities of a liberated South in need of development and services, and a North still entrenched in conflict with the Houthis.

Given the outcomes of the recent PLC meeting in Riyadh regarding the legal team’s mandate to address the decision-making crisis, concerns persist about the lack of fundamental solutions to tackle the crisis and the tendency to postpone resolving the issue. 

On September 17, Mohammed Al-Ghaithi, Head of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission supporting the PLC, called for “serious and direct dialogue leading to an effective participatory mechanism to end the stalemate,” affirming the Commission’s commitment to strengthening cohesion and establishing clear decision-making rules. This marked his first such statement, underscoring the gravity of the situation.

Nasser Al-Eisai pointed out that structural reform will require the establishment of an institutional decision-making mechanism based on consensus or structured voting, alongside the creation of a balanced decision-making center that will include all active stakeholders. He also advocated for separating the economic and service tracks from the political and military ones. In his view, this separation “will enable the council to present a successful administrative model in the southern governorates and other liberated areas, restore confidence in the transitional authority, and grant it the popular legitimacy it has lacked in recent years.”

Regarding the legal committee tasked with reviewing the decisions of Rashad Al-Alimi and Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, Al-Eisai opined that “legal committees cannot resolve a political and structural crisis of this depth,” emphasizing that their role is strictly advisory.

He added: “The real issue does not lie in the content of the decisions themselves, but in the absence of political consensus regarding the distribution of powers within the council, and the very nature of the transitional phase.” Al-Eisai further proposed that the objectives of the transitional phase should be redefined through political consensus among council members, in order to clearly determine whether the PLC functions as a service authority in government-controlled areas, a political leadership for negotiations, or a military authority for conflict management.

He also called for the establishment of a clear mechanism to end the transitional phase—whether through a peace agreement, a national referendum, or local elections—provided that such a process ensures genuine balance in decision-making. He reminded that the South today constitutes the largest portion of the liberated territories, which places upon it an added responsibility to deliver a successful administrative and economic governance model.

In the same context, Al-Eisai emphasized that Aidrous Al-Zubaidi’s recent statements in New York “reflect the political position of an active stakeholder, grounded in a realistic assessment that the South is the entity managing the majority of the liberated areas and possesses both field presence and institutional infrastructure.”

For his part, journalist Naseem Al-Baithi argued that the success of the legal team tasked with reviewing the decisions “hinges on the presence of genuine political will within the council,” stressing that the absence of a regulatory bylaw will render any decision vulnerable to dispute. He underscored the need to establish clear legal parameters for sovereign decisions and to put an end to unilateralism in governance.

Al-Baithi maintained that the path forward lies in rebuilding trust within the council through inclusive dialogue, institutional transparency, and consensus on unified national objectives—away from factional, partisan, and regional infighting.

More than three years since its formation, it has become evident that the crisis facing the Presidential Leadership Council is not merely a clash of interests or a transient flare-up in the media, but rather a manifestation of deep-seated institutional deficiencies—a heavy cost for which is being borne by the people of the South. These structural problems have directly undermined the council’s and the Yemeni government’s capability to deliver public services, unify their political stance through a joint negotiating delegation, and effectively manage the transitional phase.

With the ongoing tendency to defer crises and downplay the Presidential Leadership Council’s (PLC) dilemma by reducing it to disputes over political quotas or government appointments, it remains unclear to what extent the council will remain resilient against fragmentation or collapse.