All the positions of the Yemeni parties, whether political or military, are based upon special calculations and legitimate concerns about what may happen if the Houthis are eliminated

Farida Ahmed (South24 Center)

The latest large-scale US airstrikes against the Houthis didn’t come as a surprise after US President Donald Trump’s order to redesignate the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) came into effect and after the Iran-backed group announced the resumption of their attacks against Israeli ships in the Red Sea. The US campaign was preceded by American pressure on Iran with an aim to make Tehran return to the negotiation table regarding its nuclear program. This denotes that these moves regarding Yemen came to materialize these threats through hitting one of Tehran's military engines, south of the Red Sea. It is worth mentioning that US President Trump stated two weeks ago that he had sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, seeking a new deal with Tehran “We have a situation with Iran that, something’s going to happen very soon. Very, very soon.” “Hopefully we can have a peace deal,” Trump said. “I’m not speaking out of strength or weakness. I’m just saying I’d rather see a peace deal than the other. But the other will solve the problem.”

Washington apparently seeks to undermine the capabilities of Iran and its armed groups in the region to push Tehran to make concessions regarding the nuclear negotiations or in its support to its affiliated groups. This came after the position of Tehran has weakened following the downfall of its most important allies in the region, Hezbollah and the Syrian Assad regime. This has encouraged Washington to adopt the “maximum pressure” policy which has been reactivated by Trump against Iran. Trump's statements targeting Iran on the social media platform ‘Truth Social’ in which he said, “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of Iran, and Iran will be held responsible and suffer the consequences”, are part and parcel of this strategy. 

It seems that the Houthi calculations have gone wrong this time as they adopted the same escalation tactic in the Red Sea hoping that Trump will open a door for dialogue with them for forging a possible de-escalation deal like their agreement with Saudi Arabia previously. This assessment reflects their naive understanding of the nature of the US military and ignores the decline of regional support for them and the weakness of the sponsor state (Iran). However, the belief that the US military escalation will fully eliminate the Houthis downplays the complexities of the scene at several levels. The US won’t risk the costs of a new war or even the continuation of its airstrikes for a long time in light of the high inflation rates and the accumulation of debts as well as the fluctuation of dollar price. Furthermore, US Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasized the Trump administration’s clear commitment to impose “unrelenting” military pressure on the Houthis if they continue their attacks on Red Sea vessels. “The minute the Houthis say 'we'll stop shooting at your ships, we'll stop shooting at your drones,' this campaign will end, but until then, it will be unrelenting," Hegseth said in an interview. This obviously denotes that the US military operations aiming to deter the Houthis will remain limited despite its strength and won’t fully eliminate the group.

Amid this backdrop, the regional states haven’t adopted clear stances toward the US antiـ-Houthi campaign. For example, in a series of tweets, Saudi Arabia described allegations of it providing logistical support to the US military operations in Yemen as “misleading”. With the escalation of the US pressure on the Houthi-ـheld areas, Riyadh finds itself in a clear political and security dilemma. It strongly seeks to avoid any direct confrontation with the Houthis after taking a step back for more than two years to reach deـ-escalation and maintain its stability and national security. However, Riyadh can’t ignore the United States' growing influence in the region, especially regarding using its airspace. This imposes on it a difficult equation which requires a delicate balance between its national interests and commitments toward its allies.

The Calculations of the Yemeni Parties

Since the beginning of this year, there have been several documented Houthi attempts to infiltrate and attack the Marib and Alـ-Jawf fronts, in addition to other attacks in Taiz and the border contact points with Al Dhalea, Abyan, Shabwa and Lahj. According to a military source, the Houthi goal behind the infiltration attempts is for planting mines in these areas to pave the way for a wider military operation. It is apparently a Houthi attempt to make changes in their favor in the military control map to mitigate the international pressures against them that began during the recent months. Furthermore, Marib has plenty of oil, refinery, and gas resources. This has pushed the religious group to seek other lucrative areas after the ban on fuel imports from Hodeidah as a result of the US sanctions.

Meanwhile, the remarkable absence of an official stance by the Yemeni Internationallyـ-Recognized Government toward the US antiـHouthi strikes stirs many questions about the motives behind this silence in light of the accelerating developments on the Yemeni arena. The only exception has been the unilateral stance expressed by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President and President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidrous Al ـZubaidi, during his recent visit to Socotra. He emphasized the need to support Washington's efforts to secure international shipping and adopt “a comprehensive strategy in which local, regional, and international roles integrate to maintain security and stability in the region and protect the lanes of international shipping”. PLC Member Tareq Saleh believes that “the US strikes deliver a clear message that the international community is aware of the danger posed by the Iran-ـbacked militias to international security and peace”.

This situation clearly reveals the rifts within the PLC. Instead of a unified front adopted and pushed by the Northern parties in the council, the Southern members present themselves as a reliable ally to the US in its battle to secure international navigation in the Strait of Bab Al ـMandab and the Gulf of Aden.

These cracks aren’t limited to the political level but extend to the administrative one too as PLC members haven’t met since the beginning of the US attacks against the Houthis on March 15, 2025. Furthermore, PLC Chairman Rashad Al-ـAlimi hasn’t met with the government members since his return to Aden on March 10. This reflects a clear state of indifference toward the current developments and the obsession with internal disputes, especially in light of the tension between him and the Prime Minister Ahmed Bin Mubarak. Accordingly, this separation deepens the divisions between the political leadership and the executive administration. This also negatively impacts the PLC’s ability to effectively deal with the current challenges facing the country although current reality forces it to be in the forefront of the scene. The only moves related to this context is the meeting held by Al-ـAlimi with the Joint Military Commission in Aden, a day after the US operations on Sanaa. According to the Saba news agency, he listened to an account of the developments regarding the US airstrikes against Houthi military locations. Moreover, the meeting held “the Houthi militias fully responsible for this escalation, imposing of international sanctions, and the militarization of the regional waterways”.

It is worth mentioning to emphasize that all positions of the Yemeni parties, whether political or military, are based upon special calculations and legitimate concerns about what may happen if the Houthis are eliminated. Essential questions are being raised about the future of South Yemen, how to distribute influence and resources in the post ـconflict phase and whether the parties engaged in confronting the Houthis will earn gains that suit their sacrifices, foremost of whom are the Southerners who have been at the forefront. The international and regional communities should take these concerns into consideration when formulating any visions or peace initiatives for the future of Yemen.

Sanaa the Turning Point 

So far, despite the repeated statements by political and military leaders affiliated with the Internationally-Recognized Government about the full readiness to confront the Houthis, the current indications don’t suggest that the conflict is heading toward a comprehensive military escalation on the fighting fronts, especially in Marib and Al ـJawf where the operations are still of defensive nature. This indicates that these statements are part of a psychological war more than expressing any real intention to launch a war. For example, the Popular Resistance in Taiz district announced its full readiness to effectively participate in the battle to liberate the governorate, restore the state, and move forward to Ibb. However, these statements are still part of mass mobilization that isn’t directed or supported by political leaders, including the PLC Chairman who belongs to the same governorate.

Talking about liberating Hodeidah governorate alone is no longer a priority in light of the recent developments. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are not only launched from Hodeidah but also from several areas such as Al Bayda, Taiz, Saada, Hajjah, and Dhamar. Although liberating the Port of Hodeidah, the Houthis' only international seaport to the world, will inflict logistic losses on the group, limit their smuggling of weapons and ammunition, and cut off a key economic lifeline, the battle toward Sanaa and the adjacent mountainous regions of Dhamar and Hajjah is the decisive one as they are the Houthis’ political and military center.

From a strategic perspective, the downfall of institutions run by the Houthis in the center, Sanaa, will constitute a decisive turning point, leading to the collapse of the Houthi system in other governorates under their control in a ripple effect. Holding control over Sanaa, as a capital, will lead to the downfall of other areas successively. This will be similar to what happened in Damascus in Syria by Ahmed Al Sharaa, who hasn’t been able to control the entire Syrian areas and some territories are still out of his influence. However, the Syrian state was established and restored. This raises essential questions about the reasons behind focusing on liberating other Yemeni areas with an aim to negotiate Sanaa later on. Isn’t it more effective to focus more on freeing Sanaa itself as a capital?

On the whole, it is clear that the military decision in Yemen is no longer a pure Yemeni one but is largely affected by the changes in regional interests. While the previous military operations were managed in coordination among regional allies, foremost of which are Saudi Arabia and the UAE, questions are raised today about the regional party that will supervise any coming battles and the local military forces that will be relied upon on the ground. This is especially related to the regional parties' refraining from direct engagement in any military confrontations. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to exit the conflict at any price limit its ability to take any military steps without strong international guarantees, especially after the international community abandoned it for many years before they recently realized the dangers posed by the Houthi threats.

Accordingly, the path of the conflict in Yemen is still a foggy one as its final destination lacks clarity. However, any expected decisive battle on the ground will have more popular support if it comes within a clear and declared Arab regional framework. Despite the importance of the US’ aerial support, it won't have the same popularity enjoyed by a supportive comprehensive Arab stance from day one. Yemenis may understand the American intervention in the context of deterring the Houthi threats to international navigation, but they are unlikely to accept direct US ground military intervention, given the risk it poses of further complicating the internal Yemeni situation.

Therefore, any possible military move should be based on a comprehensive strategic vision that guarantees the participation of all Yemeni parties. It should be issued by a unified political decision backed by effective regional support. Without this framework and in light of the escalation of military and economic pressure on the Houthis, the group may resort to the comprehensive escalation option. Therefore, the readiness of Yemeni parties to deal with this scenario is an urgent necessity, not only at the defense level but also on the offensive one.