The Hadrami reality constitutes a complicated and accelerated scene. While there is a focus on the governorate’s oil resources and huge economic revenues, the Hadrami demands and basic needs have been neglected.

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Farida Ahmed (South24 Center)

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As a governorate, Hadramout has an important strategic location and is bestowed with rich natural resources. However, despite being the largest governorate in Yemen, covering more than a third of the country’s total landmass, Hadramout has always distanced itself from the raging conflicts since the beginning of the Yemeni war. Nonetheless, the conflicts did cast their shadow on the Hadrami scene as the Hadrami forces have enjoyed remarkable geostrategic alliances with several local and regional parties over the past years. The most important Hadrami entities that have a say in the political arena include the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy, led by noted tribal figure Amr Bin Habrish. This is in addition to other influential Southern components at the political and military levels, including the ’Hadrami Elite‘. All of these forces enjoy a significant influence in the governorate.

Initially, the movement, which is shaped by the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy, had demands limited to improvement of the economic, services, and military conditions of the Hadramis as well as driving the First Military District forces (affiliated with the Islamic Islah Party) out of the valley of Hadramout. This is in addition to issuing warnings against exploitation of Hadramout’s resources and oil under any circumstances or pretexts, particularly in light of the economic collapse in the country and the fact that the Internationally-Recognized Government relies upon 70% of Hadramout’s revenues. However, these have now gradually evolved into demands for self-rule. This was included in the latest statement issued by the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy, in response to the plan proposed by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to contain the crisis and normalize conditions in Hadramout.

The development plan regarding Hadramout, announced by the PLC on January 7, includes allocating the revenues from selling the crude oil held in the storages of Al-Dhaba and Al-Masila to establish two new electricity stations - in the coast and valley of Hadramout, the engagement of Hadramis in the armed forces and the security bodies, and boosting the management of local and national resources in a way that serves the development and reconstruction plan through partnering with the government and regional and international donors. It seems that the plan has come too late and doesn’t fulfill the Hadrami aspirations, although some local groups have welcomed it. The proposal is considered lower than the Hadramis expectations and one that could have been achieved two years ago at least, in light of the escalating demands.

Although PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi wants to make it look like a big public achievement by having responded to the demands of the Hadrami street, and despite it constituting a victory for the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy based on their persistent pressure, well-informed sources told ’South24 Center‘ that he is obstructing its implementation and hasn’t so far assigned a team to carry out the adopted plan. This is considered by the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy as a clear evasion and an attempt to circumvent the Hadrami position which will lead to further escalation.

The Hadrami reality constitutes a complicated and rapidly intensifying scene. While there is a focus on the governorate’s rich oil resources and huge economic revenues, the Hadramis' demands and basic needs have been neglected. Thus, achieving their minimum standards has been more difficult, especially amid the growing sharpness of competition among the political and military forces on the ground and the regional polarization witnessed by the local conflict arena. Thus, escalation could be resumed to achieve other demands related to the political aspect, especially that Bin Habrish is now demanding that Hadramis become partners in the PLC. This tone reveals that he doesn’t consider the PLC Member Faraj Al-Bahsani a representative of Hadramout and is attempting to assert himself as the only reference point for selecting the governorate’s representatives. 

Political and Military Transformations

In April 2017, the establishment of the Hadramout Inclusive Conference was announced following long consultations among the social and tribal notables in the governorate about how to run Hadramout. This came after liberating the coast of Hadramout from the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) by the Hadrami Elite forces in April 2016. The idea of establishing the Hadramout Inclusive Conference was backed and accepted by different political and social segments. Over eight years, the leaders of the Hadramout Inclusive Conference have exerted tireless efforts to largely maintain social cohesion and political balance despite the pressures against them as a result of their demands for obtaining the economic, political, and military rights of Hadramis. The narrative adopted by the Hadramout Inclusive Conference was closer to the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Hadrami Elite forces until recently, in light of the latter’s successful counterterrorism operations that bolstered the pillars of security and stability in the districts of the Hadrami coast.

Over the past two years, Amr Bin Habrish has adopted a sharper approach regarding achieving the demands of the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy. This includes the deployment of armed local Hadrami tribes people at checkpoints near oil production areas to establish control over the oil fields. Bin Habrish moves sometimes in the name of the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy that exerts tribal pressure power, and sometimes in the name of the Hadramout Inclusive Conference, which represents a political move. To add more power and control to his adopted political approach, Bin Habrish began recruiting the tribes in the plateau of Hadramout under the name of the new ’Hadramout Protection’ forces, consisting of a group of tribes led by Major General Mubarak Al-Obthani. The recruitment move has been met with doubts and concerns by some Hadrami political and military forces, including the Second Military District, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and the Local Authority. Reacting to the latest move by Bin Habrish, the Security Committee, led by Hadramout Governor Mabkhout Bin Madi, expressed its complete rejection to any recruitment outside the state institutions.

Through Bin Habrish, the stances adopted by the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy have witnessed a remarkable transformation. They previously demanded creation of an independent territory as part of a federation within the framework of the state. However, they are now seeking to impose self-rule. This shift in position stirs questions about its causes and motives, especially as it isn’t limited to the Yememi forces but extends to include demands of the Southerners for independence from the North. Moreover, this change is linked to the speech that was formerly used by the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen who sought to divide the Southern components by rooting for the restoration of the sultanate in Hadramout. This raises concerns about weakening and dividing the Southern front.

It is important to state that the transformation of the political and military authority is witnessing worrying developments that may lead to division of the governorate and forming its internal borders based on the operational scope. Hadramout is administratively divided into two parts. The first is the northern one which includes 16 districts affiliated with the valley and desert of Hadramout. It shares a 700 km-border with Saudi Arabia. It is controlled by the First Military District forces whose many elements are affiliated with North Yemen. The second one is the southern part which includes 12 districts of the coast and the plateau under the control of the Second Military District. The competition over influence among the different forces has led to growing concerns about the possible division of the districts in the southern part into the coast and the plateau. This follows Bin Habrish’s formation of new non-state military forces in the plateau. This development can fuel a tribal conflict which would negatively impact  the security and stability as well as the community fabric that has been coherent for a long time in the districts of south Hadramout.

Furthermore, Hadramout is becoming a time bomb due to embracing several military forces more than in any other governorate. It has so far four military forces as shown below, based on their geographical scope:

	Name and commander of the forces	Geographical scope	Description
1	The Second Military District forces, led by Major General Talib Saeed Bargash	The coast and plateau of Hadramout	They consist of nine combat forces; their theater of operations is the south of Hadramout and the governorates of Al-Mahrah and Socotra.
2	The First Military District, led by Major General Saleh Mohammed Al-Jamelani	The desert and valley of Hadramout	They consist of seven combat forces. Their command center is in the city of Seiyun. They include ground forces and border guards.
3	The Nation Shield Forces, led symbolically by the PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi and militarily by Brigadier General Bashir Al-Madrabi Al-Subayhi	Parts of the valley of Hadramout	They were established in early 2022 with Saudi support. Most of their elements are Salafists who were affiliated with the ‘Southern Giants’.
4	Hadramout Protection Forces	The plateau of Hadramout	Bin Habrish announced their establishment in December 2024. They are basically armed tribal militias that were deployed previously to protect the oil fields in Hadramout.

Accordingly, the military scene appears more complicated in Hadramout in light of the multiplicity of the military forces and the desires of each one to expand at the expense of the others. For example, the Nation Shield Forces have enhanced their influence in some parts of the districts of the valley of Hadramout after the killing of two Saudi soldiers inside a camp affiliated with the Arab Coalition in November 2024 in Seiyun. They sought to find the Yemeni soldier who carried out the crime and is affiliated with the First Military District. The latter has witnessed an ongoing military alert over the past two years amid concerns over the deployment of the Nation Shield Forces to replace them. The killing of the two Saudi soldiers accelerated military changes, including the appointment of Major General Saleh Al-Jamelani as the new Commander of the First Military District to succeed Major General Mohammed Taymas, and the appointment of Brigadier General Ali Al-Adbaei as Commander of the 135th Brigade to replace Brigadier General Yahya Abu Ouja who has close ties with the Islah Party. These basic appointments will allow the Nation Shield Forces to gradually expand and deploy in the districts of the valley and the deserts of Hadramout to replace the First Military District. This move is basically apparently linked to Saudi Arabia’s national security motives. 

On the other hand, the narrative of the Southern forces in the coast of Hadramout is more strict toward the First Military District. This is apparently clear in the STC’s approach which insists on driving the First Military District out of the valley of Hadramout. Exclusive sources told ‘South24 Center’ that Saudi Arabia had prevented previous attempts by the Southerners to move forward toward the valley. The temporary changes in the First Military District’s commanders seemed enough amid the ongoing pressure. Moreover, the establishment of new militias, led by Bin Habrish, that are not an extension of the former Hadrami forces, is a worrying indication, especially if another regional influencer is behind it.

The visit by former Al-Mahra Security Chief Major General Ahmed Mohammed Qahtan to Amr Bin Habrish in Hadramout on December 31 has raised many questions about the reason behind it, especially since he is considered the representative of the notable tribal sheikh Ali Salem Al-Huraizi in Al-Mahrah who is known for his close ties with Oman and Qatar. After being sacked as Deputy Governor of Al-Mahrah in mid 2018, Al-Huraizi used much of his capabilities to illegally smuggle weapons to the Houthis through the Omani borders. Large quantities of arms and missile shipments continue to be seized by the customs service of the Internationally-Recognized Government. Additionally, Al-Huraizi has repeatedly praised the stance adopted by the Houthi Leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi in the Red Sea, of attacking ships.

Through his ambiguous approach, Bin Habrish apparently wants to deliver messages internally and to the Saudi-led Arab Coalition states that his rapprochement lines are open with regional parties, including Oman, as well as other players in the Yemeni scene. It is important to state that the establishment of a new military force from scratch requires huge financial funding which isn’t currently available for Bin Habrish without the support of regional parties. Bin Habrish is seeking to establish his influence in Hadramout by his attempts to impose himself and lead the political and military scene in the Hadrami arena as a new player in an unexpected way. He has unilaterally issued many statements without consulting the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy. For example, in the name of the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy’s Presidium, Bin Habrish previously issued a statement criticizing the Hadramout Local Authority, the Hadrami Elite Forces, and the UAE, accusing them of “backing special political agendas and imposing them on the Hadrami society by money and the power of weapons”. This reflects a shift in the political discourse which until recently used to endorse the stances of the other Southern forces, especially the Hadrami Elite Forces. He had previously hailed their role in providing security to the members of the founding conference of the Hadramout Inclusive Conference in 2017. 

Bin Habrish's inability to adapt his changeable stances with that of the Hadramout Inclusive Conference and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy is a challenge that threatens to create divisions within these entities. This comes amid frequent news about disputes between him and the Hadramout Tribes Confederacy's Secretary General Akram Al-Ameri, who holds a position within the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission. Bin Habrish's new stances contradict his previous ones regarding the Northern presence in the First Military District, or suggesting the possibility of moving to a more dangerous scenario if a regional player finances the establishment of the “Hadramout Protection” militia. This may impose dictations to turn Hadramout into an outlet to smuggle weapons to the Houthis like Al-Mahrah. This is related to the fact that Hadramout is geographically closer to the Houthi-controlled areas than Al-Mahrah. 

The conflict in Hadramout is manifested through three main axes. Economically, there is a focus on the issue of controlling the vast oil resources, especially PetroMasila. Reports issued by the Central Organization for Control and Accounting revealed corruption issues related to the company whose importance lies in its wide impact that goes beyond the economic aspects to include public services and indirectly extends to the political arena. It largely contributes to the Local Authority's revenues through the governorate's share of oil. This is in addition to supplying power stations with fuel. This makes the company a main factor in the dynamics of the Hadrami street. Militarily, the conflict revolves around the influence on the First Military District forces who are accused of protecting influential figures in the oil sector and embracing “terrorist” elements. At the administrative level, the position of the governor constitutes a big challenge as he is supposed to adopt a neutral approach toward different political and military forces. However, Governor Mabkhout Bin Madi hasn't been able to skillfully deal with this complexity. 

Finally, the most prominent challenges facing Hadramout are represented in the inability to overcome disagreements in the short-term. In case of the failure to contain the current strong militarization by different forces, Hadramout will be in a deadlock. The possible conflict among these forces will in turn impact the local community that has remained amalgamated for a long time. It is important to note that engaging in clashes with Bin Habrish won't play into the other Hadrami political and military forces. It will be better to open a dialogue with him to reach a rapprochement and compromise solution. This aims to prevent any threats that may further complicate the situation in Hadramout. Besides, this will reduce the factors that may push Bin Habrish to resort to joining a regional party whose presence will have a negative impact.