REPORTS

One Year After the Houthi Maritime Attacks: Why Haven't they Stopped?

Oil tanker Marlin Luanda is on fire after being hit by a missile launched by the Houthis in the Gulf of Aden on January 27, 2024 (Source: AP)

20-11-2024 at 5 PM Aden Time

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“Airstrikes alone are not going to stop the Houthis. The most they could do is set back the Houthi capabilities if they manage a series of perfect hits.”


Abdullah Al-Shadli (South24)


On November 12, the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi militia announced that they had attacked the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln with drones and cruise missiles. This is in addition to targeting two American destroyers in the Red Sea using ballistic missiles and drones.


Later, the US Department of Defense (Pentagon) confirmed that two American destroyers were attacked by the Houthis with eight drones, five anti-ship ballistic missiles, and three anti-ship cruise missiles. However, Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder said that he was "not aware of any attacks against the Abraham Lincoln” aircraft carrier which the Houthis claimed to have targeted.


This Houthi attack has been the most dangerous one since the militia launched their maritime campaign in November 2023, targeting Israel-linked vessels amid the backdrop of the Gaza war. These attacks have developed over five phases to include all military and civilian ships affiliated with Israel, the US and Britain.


The latest Houthi attack coincides with the anniversary of hijacking of the ship ’Galaxy Leader‘ and its crew on November 19, 2023 by the Houthis who turned the captured ship into a tourist attraction and also danced and sang on its deck while it was anchored in the Port of Hodeidah. The year-long capture of the ship and its crew reflects a real failure in putting an end to the Iran-backed militias’ attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden despite the Western naval forces being widely spread out in the region as part of the US-led Operation ’Prosperity Guardian‘ coalition, and the European Union mission ’Aspides,‘ as well as the American-British airstrikes in Yemen.


On October 31, the Houthi militia announced that they had targeted 202 ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean during their maritime campaign. This begs the question: What are the reasons behind the failure of the Western efforts to stop the Houthi attacks?


A Mix of Reasons


American researcher and Yemen affairs expert Nick Brumfield told ’South24 Center‘ that “the international military efforts to stop Houthi attacks on shipping have so far failed due to a mix of their evident inability to deplete the Houthi weapons stocks through airstrikes and interdictions, and the fact that international shipping in the waters around Yemen is just very vulnerable”.


He added: “It does not take a lot to scare shipping companies and maritime insurers; and the Houthis will likely be able to continue their campaign with lower tech drones or mines in case higher tech Iranian weapons are cut off.”


Ibrahim Jalal, Non-Resident Scholar at the ’Carnegie Middle East Center‘, believes the failure in stopping the Houthi attacks can be attributed to the “defensive nature” of the Western maritime alliances deployed in the Red Sea. He told ’South24 Center‘: “These forces don’t deal with the sources of threat within their full strategic context. This makes the failure of putting an end to the Houthi attacks against commercial ships an expected result.”


American expert Fernando Carvajal, former Member of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen, told ’South24 Center‘ that “the Houthis aren't using highly sophisticated weapons. The short and mid-range drones they are launching against civilian and military vessels are not complicated.”


According to him “their intelligence resources and targeting capabilities are another issue, which definitely depends on Iran. After a decade of war and over two years of the UN-brokered ceasefire, the Houthis undoubtedly have the full capability to produce these drones and surface-to-surface missiles throughout the territory under their control.” 


“It is highly likely these weapons were deployed throughout the Houthi areas since October 2022 after their major military parade in Sanaa. Units in charge of launching are placed across strongholds in Hodeidah and Taiz with a network that can easily replenish drones and missiles,” he explained.


He added that “the US strikes are a reaction to the Houthi missile launches, and due to major constraints they cannot act to prevent the production, deployment or launches in order to deter the Houthis. The US cannot escalate it into an offensive operation as it would become part of the conflict and in turn derail the Saudi and UN peace plan.”


The New US Administration


On November 5, Republican candidate Donald Trump won the US Presidential Election by a landslide. The controversial billionaire returns to the White House for a second Presidential term after his inauguration on January 20, 2025. During the first term between 2017-2021, the Trump administration demonstrated a strict stance toward Iran and its backed groups in the region, foremost of which were the Houthi militia. The latter were designated by the Trump administration as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 10, 2021, before the Biden administration removed this classification days later, on January 26, 2021.


Currently, Trump's comeback stirs questions about his possible way of dealing with the Houthi maritime attacks that have huge security and economic ramifications as part of an inflamed regional context. Although the Biden administration still has several weeks to continue efforts to stop the war in Gaza and Lebanon and defuse an all-out comprehensive war between Israel and Iran, there are no real indications looming on the horizon to end this unprecedented escalation.


On whether the incoming US administration will adopt a new approach in dealing with the Houthi maritime attacks, Carvajal believes that “Trump will be restrained by Saudi Arabia in order to prevent an escalation with the Houthis, which undoubtedly would risk indirect conflict with Iran”. 


He added: “The latest incident in Seiyun in Hadramout (November 8, 2024) that saw two Saudi soldiers being killed sent a strong message to Saudi Arabia. Irrespective of whether the AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) was behind it or a Houthi soldier from Amran governorate, Riyadh cannot afford other such attacks or pressure to withdraw from South Yemen.” 


He pointed out that “Trump will shout against the Houthis but Saudi Arabia should ultimately restrain him and Israel from going for further escalation. His picks for the State Department and Defense also signal he will remain active in the Middle East to protect his personal business in the region.”


However, Yemeni researcher Ibrahim Jalal believes that the Trump administration will be different from Biden’s in many aspects. He explained: “It is highly likely that Trump will restore the ‘maximum pressure’ approach against Iran which includes economic sanctions. Any restrictions slapped on the leader of the so-called Axis of Resistance usually impact its proxies in the region in different ways, such as sanctions and increasing the level of terrorism designation”.


He added: “It is still unclear if a wide-scale coalition will be formed to protect the Red Sea and resume freeing Hodeidah and its surroundings.”


Lecturer at Oxford University and Middle East expert British writer Andrew Hammond told ’South24 Center‘: “Airstrikes alone are not going to stop the Houthis. The most they could do is set back the Houthi capabilities if they manage a series of perfect hits.”


According to him, “the Americans would do better to focus on ending the Gaza war. The problem for them is that the Houthis have established this weapon of being able to hurt maritime trade. I suspect Trump wants the Gaza war over and that will make it easier to avoid the increased bombing option, which would be disastrous and still fail.”


Required Moves


On what is needed to be done to stop the Houthi operations against ships or to minimize them to the greatest extent, Carvajal said: “US political and military forces are constrained by Saudi Arabia and the UN Envoy’s restraints to protect the two-year old détente and the stalled peace process.”


He added: “The US is not part of the Coalition formed in 2015, and operations going beyond protecting vessels would require the US president declaring war on the Houthis, something Biden could not advance during an election year or even now as a lame duck president.”


Carvajal pointed out that “while the Houthis claim to have targeted nearly 200 vessels, the number of ships hit and damaged has been minimal and apparently an acceptable risk for the US, UK, EU and GCC. Israel might have been impacted economically, but the global economy has not been largely affected. Thus, the risks remain controllable."


Ibrahim Jalal identified two paths to stop the Houthi operations in the Red Sea, the first of which is regional de-escalation, while the second one “is linked to changing the map of influence inside Yemen in favor of the Yemeni government to regain its control over the vital areas. This will reduce the Houthi ability to threaten maritime security.”


Brumfield agreed that “the best way to stop the Houthi shipping attacks would be to de-escalate Israeli operations in Gaza and Lebanon, which is the justification the Houthis have used for these attacks, although that by no means solves the longer-term threat of their resuming them as a pressure tactic for something else later on”.


Commenting on the possibilities that Britain or the United States might provide direct military support to the Internationally Recognized Yemeni Government or to the factions of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), he said: “the US and UK administrations are likely more seriously considering that possibility now than they were a year ago”.


He added: “There’s recently been a flurry of US engagement with all factions united under the PLC that may presage a change in policy. However, a lot of that is going to be dictated by the position of Saudi Arabia, which is incredibly concerned about reigniting active fighting in Yemen that could see its very vulnerable infrastructure targeted by Houthi air attack capabilities”.


Brumfield stressed that “At least in the short term, this likely rules out Western support for a large-scale anti-Houthi military offensive, but we’ll have to see what happens with the new Trump administration in January”.


Nonetheless, Ibrahim Jalal believes that it is currently too late, explaining that “the Western talks about the possibility of providing direct military and security support to the Yemeni government has become a luxury following the Red Sea crisis that has been ongoing for more than a year”.


In any case, Carvajal pointed out that “the US cannot provide direct military assistance to the PLC as this is in the hands of the Arab Coalition. The PLC would rely on Saudi Arabia or other GCC states to fund the purchases, as Trump is not the type to hand out free weapons”.


“Trump could increase military advisors to units of the PLC but would not be in a position to directly provide weapons against the Houthis. Legitimate military units do not have a great record when provided with weapons since the start of the war. There is a high risk that military forces will lose the weapons to Houthis along battle lines,” he added.


Carvajal concluded: “The US has to support the PLC as an institution rather than particular factions within it. This also prevents military assistance as PLC factions would not allow an unbalanced distribution of weapons in favor of their rival factions.”


On November 16, 2024, the US Central Command released a video of US Air Force B-52H Stratofortress long-range strategic bombers flying over the US Central Command area of responsibility on November 13. On October 17, the US announced that it carried out precision strikes that targeted five underground weapons storage sites in areas controlled by the Houthis. It is the first time that B-2 Spirit bombers were used against the Houthis.


The B-52H is a conventional long-range bomber used for comprehensive bombing or targeting wide areas. Unlike the B-2 Spirit, it does not rely on stealth technology, but has a great ability to carry munitions in large numbers, including nuclear weapons and guided missiles. The B-2 Spirit is a modern, advanced bomber that relies on stealth and precision.


The Houthis have threatened more escalation over the coming period with Trump’s resurgence to power. The Houthi Leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi said during a speech on November 7 that “the ships linked to Israel, the US, and Britain will be continually targeted”. He threatened launching more attacks toward the depth of Israel, using drones and missiles.


Journalist at South24 Center for News and Studies

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