The Significance of the «Radical Change» in Sanaa

The Houthis didn’t light the flame of the 61st* Anniversary of the September 26 Revolution in Sanaa. However, they celebrated in their own way as their leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi announced what he called the "radical change phase". They had begun promoting this move more than a month ago. The leader of the Iranian-backed group delivered a speech to celebrate the Prophet's Mawlid (birthday)*. He also announced the sudden dismissal of the unrecognized government in Sanaa, chaired by the prominent leader of the General People's Congress (GPC) Abdulaziz Al-Habtour. He said it was being replaced with a "technocrat government" as part of the first stage of the “radical change". The National Defense Council, affiliated with the Houthis, endorsed the decision. It confirmed the dismissal of the Al-Habtour government, which was asked to manage general affairs except appointments and dismissals till the formation of a new government. The interesting thing to note here is that the Houthi’s National Defense Council was apparently sacking itself, especially since the Prime Minister and Deputy in the Security and Defense Affairs, as well as the Defense, Interior, and Finance ministers, are members of the NDC. However, they quickly corrected the mistake two days later when the Supreme Political Council re-issued the statement to dismiss the government. 

These changes came in the wake of growing disputes between GPC supporters and the Houthis. The two parties have been engaged in a symbolic alliance since the Houthi coup against the state in 2014. Their relationship has further worsened after Sadeq Amin Abu Ras, the head of the GPC in Sanaa, called on the Houthis who control most of North Yemen, to pay the salaries of the employees. The Houthis have continued to evade responding to the popular demand and to hide their real revenues. Criticizing Abu Ras’ speech using harsh words, Mehdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, described those who demand the paying of salaries as being “bidders” and “foolish” whose aim is to serve the “invasion”. This was followed by calls to seize the headquarters and assets of the previous regime (Ali Abdullah Saleh regime and GPC) and the Houthi rivals in the legitimacy camp in Sanaa and other Northern cities. Al-Mashat said the seized money would be directed to “The Teacher Support Fund”, according to a tweet by senior Houthi leader ’Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi‘. Moreover, ’Nasr Al-Din Amer‘, Head of the Houthi version of ’Saba News Agency,‘ threatened Sadeq Abu Ras and other GPC members with “breaking their skulls” in the same way in which the Houthis killed former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This highlights the escalation of disputes between the two parties to a level where assassination threats are being hurled.

The discord between the GPC in Sanaa and the Houthis basically hinges on two main points. The first is the Houthi’s rejection to apply the condition of circulation of powers in the Supreme Political Council, established in July 2016, between the two parties (allies of necessity) following the 2014 coup. Although the Supreme Political Council isn't recognized internationally, it insisted on forming a government of “National Salvation” which was run by Al-Habtour, till his sacking late last month. The internal system of the Supreme Political Council allows for rotation of the president’s post every six months between the Houthi and GPC members. However, this has not been adhered to as the Houthis insisted on continuing their grip on power after they killed their ally Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2017. Such a monopoly over power has worsened the relationship between the two parties. The second point is the Houthis’ keeping out their GPC allies from the negotiations with both Oman and Saudi Arabia over the past few months. For example, the Houthis rejected a request from Foreign Minister Hisham Sharaf of the unrecognized Sanaa government to attend the meeting with the Saudi delegation, led by Ambassador Mohammed Al Jaber in April 2023. They also refused the GPC's repeated requests to meet the Omani delegation. This has revealed the reality that the GPC in Sanaa is a mere nominal ally, especially in view of the inflexible stance adopted by the Houthis.

Despite these disagreements, the GPC of Sanaa, in a statement on October 1, 2023, welcomed the latest measures announced by the Houthi leader. However, on the issue of giving the new government all powers, it said that the Houthi measures should be consistent with “the national framework which is committed to the goals, principles and values of the September 26 Revolution”. The statement said that it is important for the incoming Sanaa government to maintain “the unity”, in a reference to the Yemeni unity between South and North which is rejected by the majority of Southerners. 

The deep fissures haven’t been limited to the two so-called allies in Sanaa but extended to include the Houthi factions themselves. On the surface, the relationship appears harmonious. Nonetheless, the developments in the political scene over the past months, especially the Saudi-Houthi talks in Sanaa, Muscat or Riyadh, have effectively tested the Houthi consensus. It seems that the disagreements reached their climax as a radical Houthi faction rejected the idea of negotiating with Saudi Arabia in Riyadh or even to consider them as mediators in this process.

The rejection became evident later through some indications, including the Houthi attack on the Saudi southern border on September 25, 2023, when drones targeted locations affiliated with the Bahraini ’Duty Forces‘, deployed there as part of the Saudi-led coalition. The attack took place despite the cessation of the military operations among the parties of the conflict as a result of the expired truce. The attack, which occurred a few days after the return of a high-level Houthi delegation from Riyadh, killed four persons affiliated with the Bahraini forces. Spokesman for the Joint Command of the Saudi-led Coalition, Turki Al-Maliki, issued a statement to condemn “the treacherous act of aggression carried out by some Houthi elements”. He added that “these hostile acts aren't consistent with the positive efforts which have been exerted to end the crisis and reach a comprehensive political solution”. The statement used an unusual tone by blaming “some Houthi elements”, and not the entire group. This means that Saudi Arabia deals with the Houthis according to the positive moves they made in the negotiations. This was also seen in the Bahraini demand to the Houthis to hand over those behind the attack on their forces, according to Anadolu News Agency. Refraining from blaming the entire Houthi militia as was usual reveals that Saudi Arabia and its allies are seeking a safe exit from the Yemen war by nurturing the progress achieved in the Saudi-Houthi talks.

However, the scathing statements targeting Saudi Arabia by some Houthi elements will be seen as provocation as their stance hasn’t changed towards what they describe as "the invasion". Despite the deep disagreements among the Houthi wings, the amenable approach towards Saudi Arabia adopted by some of the Houthi elements may appear as a political card played by the group. The Houthis are likely to change their path when their preconditions are achieved. Thus, it is a mistake to look at what is happening (holding talks with the Saudis) as a big change in the Houthi approach, especially in light of their clear strategic policies at religious and military levels.

On September 21, the Houthis celebrated the anniversary of their coup in a deadly fashion according to ’The Washington Institute‘. The latter said: "These developments serve as a warning that the Houthis are building up their strength for additional probes of Yemeni and Gulf resolve at the exact moment that the United States, Europe, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are pressuring the remnants of the UN-backed government to make peace on terms dictated by the Houthis.” The growing pressure for achieving peace at any cost and the lack of balance in deterring the Houthi militias is dangerous. One has to take into consideration the continuous reinforcement of the Houthi military capabilities by Iran in addition to the militarization of people and recruiting them.

 

Over decades, the repressive Houthi political and religious narrative has strengthened their vision of the structure of their desired state. This was confirmed by their unequivocal stance towards the September 26 Revolution in 1962 against the Imamate rule in North Yemen. The Houthi security forces clearly expressed this on the eve of its anniversary last week. They prohibited any form of popular celebrations and deployed checkpoints to seize the Yemen Republic flags. They also cracked down on protests in Sanaa, Hodeidah and Ibb. They arrested more than 1,000 young men in Sanaa alone, according to Yemeni activists and lawyers. This can be attributed to the Houthi fear of allowing this kind of uprising to spread further.

Despite the Houthi crackdown, demonstrations flared in many places. It is the first time when popular protests have continued for more than a month to demand the paying of salaries which has been suspended by the Houthis for over eight years. Notably, in an attempt to avoid dangerous escalation, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi used the “radical change” announcement as an emotional tool to win over the people. It seems that the unexpected turmoil led to a likely reduction in the intended larger changes. Muammar Al-Eryani, Yemeni Information Minister in the internationally-recognized government, has claimed that the Houthis are on their way to replicate the Iranian “revolutionary model” as part of a series of radical changes. This includes amending the constitution, changing the governance system, dissolving the parliament and the judicial authorities and replacing them with the so-called “justice system”. They intend to carry out other changes at the level of the Northern governorate, controlled by the Houthis. 

The decision to sack the Al-Habtour unrecognized government guarantees three parallel things for the Houthis. The first is an attempt to contain the public anger in their areas. The second is holding the previous government responsible for their policy failures and to blame it for corruption and the looting charges. The third one is to ensure the formation of a new government more loyal to their project. In addition, the new government will be a non-emergency government unlike the former one that was described as a “National Salvation government”. They aim at reshaping the situation to a stable legitimacy in order to gain higher entitlements based on their gains over the past nine years.

The Yemeni anti-Houthi political parties should worry about the implications of the recent Houthi actions, that Riyadh appears to be unperturbed about. These developments will cast a shadow on the status quo and exacerbate the political settlement process and the whole peace operations if the talks continue in its current form, which while providing more concessions to the Houthis excludes some parties from participating in the negotiations. Despite the recent Saudi-Yemeni border threat, it seems that Riyadh will be more careful not to slide into an accidental conflict that would harm the truce and affect the Saudi chances for a safe exit from the war. This has come after months of negotiations with the Houthis. This is also likely attributed to internal reasons related to the incoming changes, including the transfer of power to the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Any kind of instant turmoil would further delay the matter.

It is important to state that the continuation of the situation in this way, the regional and international promotion for the unilateral Houthi talks and the exclusion of Yemeni political parties would weaken the position of the internationally-recognized government, especially the Northern parties. As for the Southerners, particularly the Southern Transitional Council (STC) whose security and military forces control large areas in South Yemen, alienating them from the scene would deepen the real division between the North and South. This will be the case if Saudi Arabia and Iran insist on empowering the Houthis politically and militarily to maintain the rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran.

Moreover, these developments would boost the aspirations of the Southern forces regarding the importance of establishing a federal civil democratic state in South Yemen that would protect international interests and respect human and women rights. North Yemen is divided between political Islamist groups (the Houthis and the Muslim Brotherhood) that have well-accepted incubators that support them and believe in their religious projects, and a limited number of ineffective Yemeni intellectual elites as well as self-divided small parties that have little impact. Amidst this backdrop, these developments would explode the political Islamism time bomb. The regional and international community have contributed in fueling this bomb and providing a proper cover for it to expand. The consequences of it will hit everyone without exception.

*The September 26 Revolution was launched against the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen in 1962. (The Mutawakkil Family belongs to the Zaidi doctrine adopted by the Houthis). During the September 26 Revolution, a civil war flared for eight years between supporters of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom and those affiliated with the Yemen Arab Republic who won the war. 

*The Prophet's Birthday is an annual celebration that commemorates the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed bin Abdullah. Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, celebrate it in some Islamic countries. The Houthis exaggerate in celebrating this day as they spend huge money to commemorate it. They decorate, paint, and light the streets in green. People in the Houthi areas have complained that the exaggeration in celebrating this day deprives them of receiving their salaries.