Contrary to mainstream views, the Houthi-Iran alliance is neither a client-patron arrangement nor temporary, it’s a project that has proven the capacity to adapt to increasing unpredictability.

Fernando Carvajal (South24 Center)

The steady supply of Iranian weapons continues to flow into East Africa and northern Yemen, most notably helping the Houthi rebels maintain the capability to threaten maritime commerce and Gulf monarchies. In March 2023 Iran agreed to stop arming the Sana’a-based rebels (as part of the Chinese-brokered deal with Saudi Arabia), but the smuggling continues with devastating consequences for the global economy and Yemen’s neighbors. The recently-initiated talks between Iran and the US could result in a new pledge by Tehran, keeping in mind that the well-rooted network across East Africa can help Tehran circumvent any agreement and temporarily avoid major repercussions. Sudan and Somalia play a major strategic role in this new network.  

Contrary to mainstream views, the Houthi-Iran alliance is neither a client-patron arrangement nor temporary, it’s a project that has proven the capacity to adapt to increasing unpredictability. After a decade of civil war, a look back at Houthi ascendency illustrates how the threat evolved. Two years into their coup d’etat (2014), Houthis escalated their war against Saudi Arabia by launching a ballistic missile (Burkan-1) nearly 800km from Sadah, Yemen, toward the King Fahad Air Base in Taif. The missile was intercepted near the holy city of Mecca. In November 2017, the Houthis launched a Burkhan-H2 ballistic missile over 1000km toward Riyadh, which the US confirmed was supplied by Iran. In January 2018, a UN panel of experts in a report confirmed that Iran had violated the arms embargo on Yemen. The UN panel also expanded on findings regarding the flow of technical components and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Houthi-held territory across northern Yemen. The flow of small arms, components such as computer chips and batteries, and UAVs quickly assisted Houthis in overcoming the military gap with Yemeni rival forces and the air superiority of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition.   

The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, monitoring the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2140, has consistently documented smuggling incidents, the routes utilized by land and sea, and the weapons and components seized by international and Yemeni forces. Evidence gathered over the past ten years has clearly illustrated the Houthis’ growing military capability, accuracy and range. The evolution of this capability, starting with small off-the-shelf drones from Southeast Asia smuggled through al-Mahara, to European batteries and motors for drones, and shared intelligence by Iran, have allowed the Houthis to evolve from a local source of instability to a regional and now global threat. While Houthis utilize these capabilities primarily to advance their interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, the convergence of interests with Iran makes the Houthis a vital member of the Axis of Resistance, acting like an on and off switch. Iran cannot abandon the Houthis and in order to maintain the relationship weapons and fuel keep flowing through traditional routes or new-found shores along East Africa.       

Flow of Weapons

The flow of weapons and technology from Iran, mostly via Yemen’s Red Sea coast, undoubtedly facilitated Houthi expansion since taking the Capital Sana’a in 2014. Control over Hodeidah remains vital for Houthis to maintain the flow of weapons and income. When we look at Houthi capabilities by 2010 and Yemen’s arsenal prior to September 2014, the Houthis could never have posed such a threat as they do today without the influx of Iranian weapons and technology. 

Yemeni experts “agree that the Houthis were receiving weapons from Iran by 2014” following their coup in Sana’a and control of the international airport. The alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh allowed Houthis to eventually co-opt well-established smuggling networks anchored across the Horn of Africa (HOA). Prior to 2014 smugglers focused on light weapons, human and drug trafficking, but the sea and land routes were ripe for new cargo, and profits. The relationship with Iran and flow of weapons evolved gradually during the time of the alliance with Saleh. 

While the Houthi-Saleh alliance was referred to as a ”marriage of convenience”, with an expiration date, the relationship between Houthis and Tehran is multifaceted and far more intertwined. There are three main reasons for the Houthis gravitating toward Iran: international legitimacy, flow of fuel-generating income to fund patronage networks, and a steady flow of weapons to maintain military superiority over Yemeni rivals and deterrence vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Iran needs the Houthis for one primary purpose, maintain a credible deterrence on Saudi Arabia. As a consequence of the optics from the relationship, Houthis have been called proxies, as if the group had no independent ambitions, and the “southern Hezbollah”, a more apt label considering their 10-year trajectory. Just as Hezbollah, Houthis could potentially pose a threat beyond the region. 

The flow of weapons to the Houthis has two primary functions, both shared interests by Iran. First, the Houthis are the center of power they are today as a result of technical assistance provided by Iranian experts and the weapons needed for theatre superiority against Yemeni rivals. This is how Houthis consolidated control over 75 percent of the population in one-third of Yemen’s territory, “the backdoor” to Saudi Arabia. Second, Iran’s gradual supply of weapons, technology and know-how followed a trajectory from the Houthi consolidation of power to high confidence within the alliance. Once the Houthi-Saleh alliance ended, interests converged with Iran and capabilities expanded. The flow of weapons into Houthi territory continues by land via al-Mahara, and by sea from the Arabian Sea and Red Sea where East African shores are emerging as major points of contact. Somalia is not the only territory where Houthis follow Iran’s steps in building symbiotic relations with groups like the Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab, but now Sudan grants Houthis a foothold across the Red Sea.  

East Africa as the New Route 

The Houthi-Iran relationship has evolved beyond mere propaganda and slogans, where one-sided dependency turned into a transnational strategic alliance. In uncertain times, there is a need to diversify, and a steady flow of weapons relies on multiple routes. Any deal between the US and Iran will most likely close the Mazyunah route (in Oman on the border with Yemen), making East Africa a vital strategic region for Houthis to retain credible deterrence. 

For the Houthis, multiple priorities have pushed the expansion into East African territories like Somalia and Sudan. Houthi priority, following establishment of permanent presence in Oman, has been to set-up outposts that allowed mobility for their operatives and future leap-frog bases as an umbrella for a “network of resistance”. Presence in Somalia, for example, in partnership with al-Shabaab granted the Houthis a choke point along Bab al-Mandab Strait, a force multiplier through relations with pirates and profits through the weapons trade. Shared interests with Iran advanced the Houthi footprint across East Africa with help from well-established smuggling networks, offering services to all parties. Sudan on the other hand, offers a myriad of opportunities for Houthis. Following Iran’s steps since 2014, relations with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) grant the Houthis further diplomatic legitimacy, a base along the Red Sea coast across Saudi territory from Yanbu to Jazan, and a land route to Libya and the Mediterranean. 

This expansion by Houthis beyond their shores illustrates Iran’s commitment to the alliance. Rumors of Iran abandoning the Houthis amid growing pressure from the US were pure speculation as the new partnerships across East Africa make it abundantly clear the alliance is well-rooted in mutual long-term interests. In fact, in order to maintain credible deterrence, Iran needs the Houthis in East Africa as much as the Houthis need the route to maintain the flow of weapons to sustain the war against Yemeni rivals and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s own interests in East Africa absolutely center in countering the growing influence of Gulf rivals like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Sudan’s shores grant both allies direct access to Yanbu, a major port for gas and oil export that allows Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab en route to the Suez Canal. Houthi drone capabilities, both aerial and sea-based, have alternative launch points from Sudan protecting their rear in the event of a foreign invasion by sea.   

Throughout 2024, Iran provided intelligence assistance to Houthis for strikes against merchant vessels, and even targeting assistance against international naval forces along the Red Sea. Rumors of Iran’s Nedaja (Iranian navy) redeployment from the Red Sea amid the US military build-up also were rumored as a withdrawal by Tehran, rather than caution to avoid possible escalation as the US navy moves closer to Bab al-Madab. A tactical withdrawal by Iran’s navy, along with its spy ships, does not signal abandonment, as its major assets remain across in SAF-held territory along the Red Sea. 

A Shift In Route Avoids Commitments

Both Saudi Arabia and the US have demanded that Iran halt weapons shipments to Houthis and asked Oman to expel Houthi operatives. Iran and Oman have obviously ignored the demands. After the first round of talks between the US and Iran in Muscat (April 12) it was expected the US will increase pressure on Oman to seal the border with al-Mahara. An agreement to show good faith by Oman following increasing criticism of the Sultanate’s relations with Houthis may appease the Trump administration. The challenge remains as conflicts along East Africa are far more complicated for US foreign policy makers. 

Houthis have refrained from targeting civilian merchant vessels across Bab al-Mandab since late December 2024 and have refrained from any escalation since the US air strikes began in March. Iran’s hand has definitely strengthened since the SAF captured Khartoum (March 2025), as investigations have revealed Tehran’s role in building production tunnels and delivery of weapons systems across SAF territory. Talk of a ground operation to dislodge the Houthis from Hodeidah may be premature, as Trump’s policy of ”maximum pressure” on Iran seems fixated on the Houthis and Shia militia in Iraq, with no apparent consideration of the challenges posed by actors across East Africa. The US must find other ways to retain leverage over the Houthis and Iran in order to chip away at potential threats that derail talks and force the Houthis to the negotiating table under UN auspices.